http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 17 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.</p> <p>Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?</p> 93-1841_19950117-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1841/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied-Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.</p> <p>Should the Federal Arbitration Act, making an arbitration provision enforceable in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce," be applied broadly?</p> 93-1001_19941004-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1001/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.</p> <p>Does the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempt a state-court suit, brought by participants in an airline's frequent flyer program, challenging the airline's retroactive changes in terms and conditions of the program?</p> 93-1286_19941101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1286/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 17 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-197_19950117-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_197/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1883_19950118-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1883/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 07 Dec 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1660_19941207-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1660/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.</p> <p>Is the quantity of protected seed that a farmer can sell under the exemptions in the Plant Variety Protection Act limited to the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields?</p> 92-2038_19941107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_92_2038/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 17 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.</p><p>The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.</p> <p>Does the definition of "harm" as an expansion of the word "take" in the Endangered Species Act include habitat modification that kills or injures wildlife?</p> 94-859_19950417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_859/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Fred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.</p> <p>Is Department of Veterans Affairs regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), which restricts disability compensation to injuries caused by accidents or negligence during surgery, consistent with the controlling statute, 38 U.S.C. 1151?</p> 93-1128_19941031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1128/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.</p> <p>Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech under the First Amendment?</p> 94-780_19950426-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_780/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 06 Dec 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1504_19941206-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1504/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-325_19950221-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_325/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does the City of Edmonds' zoning code provision covering areas zoned for single-family dwelling units -- which defines family as persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer unrelated persons -- qualify for exemption from the Fair Housing Act?</p> 94-23_19950301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_23/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-500_19950327-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_500/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 17 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1935_19950117-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1935/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 11 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1151_19941011-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1151/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.</p> <p>Is the arbitrability of disputes subject to independent review by the courts? Should courts of appeals apply an "abuse of discretion" standard when reviewing district court upholding arbitration awards?</p> 94-560_19950322-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_560/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.</p> <p>Do the Florida Bar rules prohibiting direct mail solicitation of accident victims violate the free speech of personal injury attorneys?</p> 94-226_19950111-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_226/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-286_19950222-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_286/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-6790_19950424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_6790/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-404_19941102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_404/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-167_19950322-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_167/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 05 Dec 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-7659_19941205-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_7659/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-367_19950221-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_367/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1197_19941003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1197/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-172_19950221-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_172/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.</p> <p>Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?</p> 94-749_19950425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_749/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1318_19941101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1318/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-762_19941012-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_762/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 18 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.</p> <p>Is a Federal District Court's determination, in denying a summary judgment motion of police officers entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense, that the record raised a factual issue an appealable final decision?</p> 94-455_19950418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_455/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 105orig_19950321-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_105_orig/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-2068_19950426-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_2068/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-7927_19941107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_7927/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1525_19941107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1525/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-18_19950110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_18/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.</p> <p>Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?</p> 93-986_19941012-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_986/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1543_19941102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1543/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.</p> <p>Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act allow a party to seek modification of a disability award on the ground of change in conditions, when there has been no change in the employee's physical condition but rather an increase in the employee's wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new skills?</p> 94-820_19950425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_820/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 19 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community."</p> <p>Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?</p> 94-631_19950419-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_631/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 05 Dec 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-768_19941205-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_768/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.</p> <p>Does the fact that a plaintiff's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence, together with the existence of a genuine dispute over liability, justify a District Court's departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases?</p> 94-788_19950424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_788/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1823_19950111-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1823/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 18 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-688_19950418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_688/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 07 Dec 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1612_19941207-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1612/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 11 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-823_19941011-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_823/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 108orig_19950321-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_108_orig/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1408_19950118-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1408/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.</p> <p>Is state law the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?</p> 94-834_19950425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_834/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-7407_19941031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_7407/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-771_19950424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_771/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1677_19941128-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1677/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 30 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1121_19941130-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1121/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 11 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-908_19941011-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_908/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-790_19950424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_790/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-3_19950227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_3/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a diety or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.</p> <p>Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines?</p> 94-329_19950301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_329/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 30 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1631_19941130-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1631/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 18 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.</p> <p>Is it proper to accord de facto validity to the actions of civilian judges on a military appellate panel, when the accused challenges the composition of the panel as a violation of the Constitution's Appointments Clause?</p> 94-431_19950418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_431/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1911_19950228-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1911/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-7901_19941003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_7901/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1251_19941031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1251/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-372_19950228-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_372/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1199_19941128-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1199/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1636_19950110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1636/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-6892_19941005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_6892/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-714_19941004-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_714/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.</p> <p>Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution?</p> 93-1456_19941129-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1456/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-270_19950320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_270/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 17 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-514_19950417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_514/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 19 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-558_19950419-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_558/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.</p> <p>Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?</p> 93-1260_19941108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1340_19941102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1340/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does the honoraria ban abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment?</p> 93-1170_19941108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1170/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-251_19950227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_251/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-981_19941003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_981/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-395_19950222-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_395/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.</p> <p>Did the Act's use of the term "knowingly" violate the First Amendment's Free Speech clause by not mandating a showing that the alleged offender knew which materials contained under-age performances?</p> 93-723_19941005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_723/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.</p> <p>Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?</p> 94-590_19950328-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_590/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-623_19950320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_623/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" before entering.</p> <p>Does the Fourth Amendment's reasonable search and seizure clause require police officers to knock and announce their presence before entering a private residence?</p> 94-5707_19950328-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_5707/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.</p> <p>Does the exceptional circumstances test govern a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings? Should a court of appeals evaluate a district court's decision to do so under an abuse of discretion standard of review?</p> 94-562_19950327-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_562/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 17 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-6187_19950417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_6187/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist