The Oyez Project: 1991 Term Decisions

Allied-Signal, Inc., As Successor-In-Interest To Bendix Corp. v. Director, Division Of Taxation (No. 91-615)

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American National Red Cross v. S.G. and A.E. (No. 91-594)

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Ankenbrandt, As Next Friend And Mother Of L. R. v. Richards (No. 91-367)

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Ardestani v. Immigration And Naturalization Service (No. 90-1141)

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Arkansas v. Oklahoma (No. 90-1262)

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Barker v. Kansas (No. 91-611)

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Barnhill v. Johnson, Trustee (No. 91-159)

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Board Of Governors Of The Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc. (No. 90-913)

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Bray v. Alexandria Clinic (No. 90-985)

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Burdick v. Takushi, Director Of Elections Of Hawaii (No. 91-535)

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Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Ford (No. 91-779)

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Burson v. Freeman (No. 90-1056)

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Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, Governor Of Alabama (No. 91-471)

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Cipollone v. Liggett Group (No. 90-1038)

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City Of Burlington v. Dague (No. 91-810)

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Collins v. City Of Harker Heights, Texas (No. 90-1279)

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Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, Trustee For The Estate Of O'sullivan's Fuel Oil Co., Inc. (No. 90-1791)

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County Of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes And Bands Of The Yakima Indian Nation (No. 90-408)

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Dawson v. Delaware (No. 90-6704)

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Denton, Director Of Corrections Of California v. Hernandez (No. 90-1846)

Did anti-abortion protesters who obstructed access to Washington, D.C. abortion clinics violate 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) by conspiring to deny women their "right to abortion" or right to interstate travel?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters had not violated section 1985(3) by obstructing access to the abortion clinics. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, there must be a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action" for it to violate 1985(3). The clinics' claim that the protesters had demonstrated "animus" toward women as a class was unfounded because the demonstrations were not directed at women but rather were intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect gender-based intent, Justice Scalia wrote, because there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women.

In addition to holding that the protesters did not exercise discriminatory animus, Scalia also addressed the specific rights on which the clinics based their arguments. The right to interstate travel, Scalia pointed out, was not affected here because the protests were carried out entirely within the District of Columbia and were not aimed specifically at interstate travelers. Nor was the "right to abortion" implicated, he wrote, because that right was merely one to be free of governmental interference in the decision. The protesters, acting as private individuals, could not possibly violate that right.

Dewsnup v. Timm (No. 90-741)

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Doggett v. United States (No. 90-857)

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Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (No. 90-1029)

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Estate Of Cowart v. Nicklas Drilling Co. (No. 91-17)

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Estelle, Warden v. Mcguire (No. 90-1074)

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Evans v. United States (No. 90-6105)

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Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. (No. 91-72)

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Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement (No. 91-538)

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Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department Of Natural Resources (No. 91-636)

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Foucha v. Louisiana (No. 90-5844)

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Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (No. 90-918)

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Franklin v. Massachusetts (No. 91-1502)

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Freeman v. Pitts (No. 89-1290)

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Gade, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. National Solid Wastes Management Association (No. 90-1676)

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General Motors Corp. v. Romein (No. 90-1390)

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Georgia v. Mccollum (No. 91-372)

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Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California (No. A-767)

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Griffin v. United States (No. 90-6352)

Does the "sue and be sued" provision in the Red Cross' charter confer original jurisdiction on federal courts over all cases to which the Red Cross is a party?

Yes. A congressional charter's "sue and be sued" provision confers federal-court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically mentions the federal courts. The Red Cross Charter provision does specifically mention the federal courts. This holding leaves the jurisdiction of the federal courts well within the Article III limits, because the Court has consistently held that Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer federal-court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered corporations.

Hafer v. Melo (No. 90-681)

Was the Republic of Argentina's default on certain bonds an act taken "in connection with a commercial activity" that had a "direct effect in the United States" so as to subject Argentina to suit in an American court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction under the FSIA. The Court reasoned that the issuance of the Bonods was a "commercial activity" and that the rescheduling of the maturity dates on those instruments was taken "in connection with" that activity because Argentina had acted as a private player within a market and not as a regulator of that market. Moreover, the Court concluded that the unilateral rescheduling of the Bonods had a "direct effect in the United States" because Argentina had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment and had made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments.

Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission (No. 90-848)

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Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation (No. 90-727)

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Holywell Corp. v. Smith (No. 90-1361)

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Hudson v. McMillian (No. 90-6531)

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Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Doherty (No. 90-925)

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Immigration And Naturalization Service v. National Center For Immigrants' Rights, Inc. (No. 90-1090)

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Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342)

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Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner Of Internal Revenue (No. 90-1278)

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Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (No. 91-155)

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Jacobson v. United States (No. 90-1124)

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Keeney, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary v. Tamayo-Reyes (No. 90-1859)

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Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department Of Revenue And Finance (No. 90-1918)

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Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB (No. 90-970)

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Lee v. Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness (No. 91-339)

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Lee v. Weisman (No. 90-1014)

Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech?

No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council (No. 91-453)

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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (No. 90-1424)

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Mccarthy v. Madigan (No. 90-6861)

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Medina v. California (No. 90-8370)

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Molzof, Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Molzof v. United States (No. 90-838)

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Morales, Attorney General Of Texas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (No. 90-1604)

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Morgan v. Illinois (No. 91-5118)

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Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden (No. 90-1802)

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New York v. United States (No. 91-543)

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Nordlinger v. Hahn (No. 90-1912)

Did the Secretary of Commerce's decision to apportion overseas personnel of the Department of Defense to their "homes of record" for census purposes meet the constitutional requirement of a census counting the number of people "in each State," or was the procedure "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act?

The Secretary's decision was not reviewable under the APA because it was not a "final agency action." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in the majority opinion, wrote that only agency decisions that complete the decision-making process and directly affect the party bring suit may be challenged under the APA. In this case the Secretary's decision resulted merely in a set of findings reported to the President that he could ask to have revised using a different formula. Also, the recommendation (and therefore the procedure used to arrive at it) did not directly affect Massachusetts; the President had to take action before the findings would affect the number of Representatives apportioned to the State. The procedure and the findings that resulted from it, therefore, was not a "final agency action" challengeable under the APA, and the actions of the President are also not challengeable under the APA.

Evaluating the Secretary's chosen procedure under Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, however, Justice O'Connor ruled that the decision to include overseas personnel of the Department of Defense was a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution's intent. "The Secretary's judgment does not hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home states, actually promotes equality," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Norman v. Reed (No. 90-1126)

Do the respondents have standing to sue?

No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.

NRPC v. Boston & Maine Corp. (No. 90-1419)

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Patterson, Trustee v. Shumate (No. 91-913)

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PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez (No. 91-122)

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Planned Parenthood v. Casey (No. 91-744)

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Presley v. Etowah County Commission (No. 90-711)

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Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, By And Through Its Tax Commissioner, Heitkamp (No. 91-194)

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R.A.V. v. St. Paul (No. 90-7675)

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Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (No. 91-763)

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Riggins v. Nevada (No. 90-8466)

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Robert E. Gibson v. Florida Bar (No. 90-1102)

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Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service v. Seattle Audubon Society (No. 90-1596)

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Rufo, Sheriff Of Suffolk County v. Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail (No. 90-954)

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Sawyer v. Whitley, Warden (No. 91-6382)

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Simon & Schuster v. NY Crime Victims Board (No. 90-1059)

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Smith v. Barry (No. 90-7477)

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Sochor v. Florida (No. 91-5843)

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Southwest Marine, Inc. v Gizoni (No. 90-584)

Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a "taking" calling for "just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking."

Stringer v. Black, Commissioner, Mississippi Department Of Corrections (No. 90-6616)

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Suter v. Artist M. (No. 90-1488)

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Taylor v. Freeland & Kranz (No. 91-571)

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Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. (No. 91-971)

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Union Bank v. Walas, Chapter 7 Trustee For The Estate Of Zzzz Best Co., Inc. (No. 90-1491)

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United States Department Of Commerce v. Montana (No. 91-860)

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United States Department Of Energy v. Ohio (No. 90-1341)

Does Article XIIIA's "acquisition value provision," which created a dramatic disparity in the property taxes paid by long-term property owners as compared with new property owners, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against new property owners?

The Court, through Justice Blackmun, held that California's new property tax system rationally and plausibly furthered legitimate state interests in restraining increasing property taxes and preserving local neighborhood stability. The discrepancy which Article XIIIA created between new and long time property owners is warranted, because the latter had a far greater reliance interest in their property than the former. Thus, long-time property owners deserved more protection from higher property taxes than new property owners. This demonstrated a significant difference between the two property owner types. In addition, both of Article XIIIA's exemptions rationally promoted a legitimate state interest. The first exemption did not discourage older people from moving to a smaller home that is likely to better suit their smaller family and income. The second exemption aimed at preserving family unity and neighborhood stability. Accordingly, the Court held that Article XIIIA did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

United States Department Of State v. Ray (No. 90-747)

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United States v. Alaska (No. 118 ORIG)

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United States v. Alvarez-Machain (No. 91-712)

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United States v. Burke (No. 91-42)

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United States v. Felix (No. 90-1599)

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United States v. Fordice (No. 90-1205)

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United States v. Nordic Village, Inc. (No. 90-1629)

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United States v. R. L. C. (No. 90-1577)

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United States v. Salerno (No. 91-872)

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United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. (No. 91-164)

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United States v. Williams (No. 90-1972)

Does the regulation banning the distribution of literature at airports violate the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment?

In a short per curiam opinion, the court held 5 to 4 that the ban on literature distribution violated the Free Speech Clause. (A related case, also Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, addressed a ban on the solicitation of funds.)

United States v. Wilson (No. 90-1745)

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Wade v. United States (No. 91-5771)

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White v. Illinois (No. 90-6113)

Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four?

In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.

William "Sky" King v. St. Vincent's Hospital (No. 90-889)

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Williams v. United States (No. 90-6297)

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Willy v. Coastal Corp. (No. 90-1150)

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Wisconsin Department Of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co. (No. 91-119)

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Wooddell v. International Brotherhood Of Electrical Workers, Local 71 (No. 90-967)

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Wright, Warden v. West (No. 91-542)

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Wyatt v. Cole (No. 91-126)

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Wyoming v. Oklahoma (No. 112 ORIG)

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Yee v. City Of Escondido, California (No. 90-1947)

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