The Oyez Project: 1990 Term

Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers (No. 89-1416)

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Air Line Pilots v. O'neill (No. 89-1493)

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Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Noise Abatement (No. 90-906)

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American Hospital Assn v. NLRB (No. 90-97)

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Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co. (No. 89-1283)

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Arizona v. Fulminante (No. 89-839)

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Astoria Federal S. & L. Ass'n. v. Solimino (No. 89-1895)

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Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (No. 89-1215)

Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson") manufactures batteries whose assembly process entails exposure to high levels of lead. After discovering that eight of its female employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of those thought safe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Johnson barred all its female employees - accepting those with medically documented infertility - from engaging in tasks that require exposure to lead in access of recommended OSHA levels. Following its passage, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) challenged Johnson's fetal-protection policy as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act). When the Appellate Court affirmed a district court decision in favor of Johnson, the UAW appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc. (No. 90-26)

Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.

Blatchford v. Native Village Of Noatak (No. 89-1782)

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Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell (No. 89-1080)

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Braxton v. United States (No. 90-5358)

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Burns v. Reed (No. 89-1715)

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Burns v. United States (No. 89-7260)

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Business Guides v. Chromatic Comm. Enterprises (No. 89-1500)

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California v. Acevedo (No. 89-1690)

California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the truck of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle (U.S. v. Ross), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container (U.S. v. Chadwick). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

California v. Hodari D. (No. 89-1632)

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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute (No. 89-1647)

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Chambers v. Nasco, Inc. (No. 90-256)

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Chapman v. United States (No. 90-5744)

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Cheek v. United States (No. 89-658)

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Chisom v. Roemer (No. 90-757)

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Clark v. Roemer (No. 90-952)

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Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (No. 90-634)

Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.

Coleman v. Thompson (No. 89-7662)

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Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (No. 89-1671)

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Connecticut v. Doehr (No. 90-143)

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Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 89-1965)

For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as "substantially identical" (because they had the same fair market value).

When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the "sale or disposition of [the] property." An exchange of property only constitutes a "disposition" if there is a "material difference" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as "substantially identical," the IRS ruled, a "disposition" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.

Demarest v. Manspeaker (No. 89-5916)

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Dennis v. Higgins (No. 89-1555)

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Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd (No. 89-1598)

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Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (No. 89-7743)

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EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (No. 89-1838)

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Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc. (No. 90-34)

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Farrey v. Sanderfoot (No. 90-350)

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Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. (No. 89-1909)

Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's directories. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Firstier Mtge. Co. v. Investors Mtge. Ins. Co. (No. 89-1063)

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Florida v. Bostick (No. 89-1717)

In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Florida v. Jimeno (No. 90-622)

A Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed.

FMC Corp. v. Holliday (No. 89-1048)

FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department Of Revenue, Florida (No. 88-1847)

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Ford v. Georgia (No. 87-6796)

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Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 90-762)

Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.

Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.

General Motors Corp. v. United States (No. 89-369)

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Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada (No. 89-1836)

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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (No. 90-18)

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Gollust v. Mendell (No. 90-659)

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Gozlon-Peretz v. United States (No. 89-7370)

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Gregory v. Ashcroft (No. 90-50)

Under Article V, Section 26, of Missouri's Constitution, state court judges must retire at the age of seventy. The two petitioners in this case, both of whom were Missouri state judges, challenged the state constitution's retirement requirement on legislative and constitutional grounds.

Grogan v. Garner (No. 89-1149)

Frank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by "actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the "preponderance of the evidence" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The Court found that most states used the "clear and convincing" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a "fresh start" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding "clear and convincing" standard).

Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Di (No. 89-1166)

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Harmelin v. Michigan (No. 89-7272)

Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Hernandez v. New York (No. 89-7645)

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Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen. (No. 90-813)

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Illinois v. Kentucky (No. 106 ORIG)

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Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mcclendon (No. 89-1298)

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Irwin v. Veterans Administration (No. 89-5867)

Shirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the letter on April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government must be filed within 30 days "of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.

James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia (No. 89-680)

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Johnson v. Home State Bank (No. 90-693)

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Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. (No. 90-516)

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Kay v. Ehrler (No. 90-79)

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Lampf v. Gilbertson (No. 90-333)

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Lankford v. Idaho (No. 88-7247)

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Leathers v. Medlock (No. 90-29)

In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn (No. 89-1217)

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Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB (No. 90-285)

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Martin v. Oshrc (No. 89-1541)

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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (No. 89-1799)

After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.

Master, Mates & Pilots v. Brown (No. 89-1330)

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Mccarthy v. Bronson (No. 90-5635)

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Mccleskey v. Zant (No. 89-7024)

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Mccormick v. United States (No. 89-1918)

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McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander (No. 89-1474)

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Mcnary v. Haitian Refugee Center., Inc. (No. 89-1332)

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Mcneil v. Wisconsin (No. 90-5319)

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Melkonyan v. Sullivan (No. 90-5538)

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Michigan v. Lucas (No. 90-149)

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Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. (No. 89-1158)

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Minnick v. Mississippi (No. 89-6332)

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Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution (No. 89-1452)

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Moskal v. United States (No. 89-964)

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Mu'min v. Virginia (No. 90-5193)

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Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers (No. 89-1027)

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Ohio v. Huertas (No. 89-1944)

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Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe (No. 89-1322)

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Oklahoma v. New Mexico (No. 109 ORIG)

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Owen v. Owen (No. 89-1008)

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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip (No. 89-1279)

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Parker v. Dugger (No. 89-5961)

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Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines (No. 89-1714)

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Payne v. Tennessee (No. 90-5721)

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Peretz v. United States (No. 90-615)

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Perry v. Louisiana (No. 89-5120)

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Powers v. Ohio (No. 89-5011)

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Primate Protection League v. Tulane Ed. Fund (No. 90-89)

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Renne v. Geary (No. 90-769)

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Riverside County v. McLaughlin (No. 89-1817)

McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.

Rust v. Sullivan (No. 89-1391)

The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.

Salve Regina College v. Russell (No. 89-1629)

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Schad v. Arizona (No. 90-5551)

An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first- and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.

Siegert v. Gilley (No. 90-96)

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Stevens v. Department Of Treasury (No. 89-1821)

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Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas (No. 89-1679)

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Toibb v. Radloff (No. 90-368)

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Touby v. United States (No. 90-6282)

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Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. Of Treasury (No. 89-1106)

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United States v. Centennial Savings Bank (No. 89-1926)

Centennial Savings Bank exchanged interests in one set of mortgage loans for another set of mortgage loans of the same market value. The mortgages were worth substantially less at the time they were exchanged than they had been at the time they were acquired, however, and Centennial reported the difference as lost income on its income tax return. In a separate set of transactions, Centennial collected early withdrawal penalties from customers who withdrew their certificates of deposit before they were scheduled. Centennial reported the early withdrawal penalties as "income from the discharge ... of indebtedness," meaning that it did not need to be reported as income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C).

With regard to the exchanged mortgages, the IRS did not allow the deduction, ruling that the properties exchanged had not been "materially different" and that the exchange therefore did not actually produce a reportable loss. With regard to the withdrawal penalties, the IRS ruled that they had to be reported as income. Centennial took the issue to federal District Court, where a judge ruled for the IRS on the mortgage exchange issue but for Centennial on the withdrawal penalty one. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the mortgage exchange holding and upheld the withdrawal penalty holding, siding with Centennial on both issues.

United States v. France (No. 89-1363)

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United States v. Gaubert (No. 89-1793)

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United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc. (No. 89-1436)

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United States v. Smith (No. 89-1646)

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Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg (No. 89-1448)

First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a "freeze-out" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a "high" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an "essential link" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, finding that she would have received that much more if the stock had been valued adequately.

West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (No. 89-994)

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Wilson v. Seiter (No. 89-7376)

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Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier (No. 89-1905)

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Yates v. Evatt (No. 89-7691)

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Ylst v. Nunnemaker (No. 90-68)

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