The Oyez Project: 1990 Term Decisions

Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers (No. 89-1416)

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Air Line Pilots v. O'neill (No. 89-1493)

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Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Noise Abatement (No. 90-906)

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American Hospital Assn v. NLRB (No. 90-97)

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Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co. (No. 89-1283)

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Arizona v. Fulminante (No. 89-839)

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Astoria Federal S. & L. Ass'n. v. Solimino (No. 89-1895)

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Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (No. 89-1215)

Does a policy barring the participation of potentially fertile and pregnant women in occupations that could be detrimental to their reproductive capacities constitute sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that even well intentioned proposals are forbidden if they result in discrimination. Johnson's fetal-protection plan discriminated against women by not requiring their male counterparts to demonstrate proof of medical sterility, despite the fact that lead exposure has also proved hazardous to male reproductive systems. The Court added that Johnson's fetal-protection plan fell outside the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII, since the exception only permits employers to discriminate based on qualities that detrimentally impact on an employee's job performance. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn, Johnson furnished no proof that it detracted from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc. (No. 90-26)

Does a state prohibition against complete nudity in public places violate the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee?

No. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.

Blatchford v. Native Village Of Noatak (No. 89-1782)

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Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell (No. 89-1080)

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Braxton v. United States (No. 90-5358)

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Burns v. Reed (No. 89-1715)

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Burns v. United States (No. 89-7260)

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Business Guides v. Chromatic Comm. Enterprises (No. 89-1500)

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California v. Acevedo (No. 89-1690)

Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

California v. Hodari D. (No. 89-1632)

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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute (No. 89-1647)

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Chambers v. Nasco, Inc. (No. 90-256)

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Chapman v. United States (No. 90-5744)

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Cheek v. United States (No. 89-658)

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Chisom v. Roemer (No. 90-757)

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Clark v. Roemer (No. 90-952)

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Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (No. 90-634)

Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.

Coleman v. Thompson (No. 89-7662)

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Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (No. 89-1671)

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Connecticut v. Doehr (No. 90-143)

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Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 89-1965)

Can the exchange of properties considered "substantially identical" for accounting purposes under Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations be considered a "disposition of property" for IRS tax purposes, given that properties exchanged must be materially different to constitute a "disposition" under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "substantially identical" under the FHLBB regulations was intentionally flexible and broad enough to include even properties that were "materially different" for IRS purposes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the majority opinion, wrote that exchanged properties are "materially different" if they "embody legally distinct entitlements." The properties involved in this exchange clearly satisfied that test. "Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L's derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of exchange."

Demarest v. Manspeaker (No. 89-5916)

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Dennis v. Higgins (No. 89-1555)

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Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd (No. 89-1598)

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Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (No. 89-7743)

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EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (No. 89-1838)

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Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc. (No. 90-34)

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Farrey v. Sanderfoot (No. 90-350)

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Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. (No. 89-1909)

Does the copyright in a telephone company's directory protect the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by another telephone directory company?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. The Court reasoned that Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection because the information they contained lacked the requisite originality, as Rural had not selected, coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way. "Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Firstier Mtge. Co. v. Investors Mtge. Ins. Co. (No. 89-1063)

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Florida v. Bostick (No. 89-1717)

Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure?

No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.

Florida v. Jimeno (No. 90-622)

Does a suspect's consent to a search of his vehicle extend to closed containers found inside?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the majority opinion. "We think it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container."

FMC Corp. v. Holliday (No. 89-1048)

Does ERISA preempt the Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort recovery?

Yes. Three provisions of ERISA speak to the question of preemption: the preemption clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause. The preemption clause establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the states the power to enforce those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance." The deemer clause dictates that an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be deemed an insurance matter. The Pennsylvania law is covered by the preemption clause since it relates to an employee benefit plan. It also falls within the saving clause because it invalidates certain insurance subrogation provisions. The deemer clause, however, exempts self-funded ERISA plans from being governed by state laws regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause. As a result, Section 1720 is preempted insofar as it prohibits FMC's self funded Plan from exercising its subrogation rights.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department Of Revenue, Florida (No. 88-1847)

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Ford v. Georgia (No. 87-6796)

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Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 90-762)

Does 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) permit the assignment of particularly complex cases dealing with large amounts of money to "special trial judges" appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court, provided that the special trial judges do not enter the decision but simply prepare an opinion for review and adoption by a regular Tax Court judge? Under the Appointments Clause of Article II Section 2, may Congress permit the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate"?

Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."

On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.

General Motors Corp. v. United States (No. 89-369)

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Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada (No. 89-1836)

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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (No. 90-18)

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Gollust v. Mendell (No. 90-659)

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Gozlon-Peretz v. United States (No. 89-7370)

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Gregory v. Ashcroft (No. 90-50)

Did Missouri's mandatory retirement requirement for its state court judges violate the the 1967 federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

No and no. Missouri's mandatory retirement requirement for its state court judges did not violate either the ADEA or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In addition to emphasizing Missouri's, or any other state's, Tenth Amendment right to define the qualifications of its highest state officials, the Court held that the regulations of the ADEA did not apply to "policy-making" appointees such as state court judges. With respect to the petitioners' Equal Protection challenge, the Court employed a rational basis test to examine whether a rational relationship existed between Missouri's goal of promoting competent state court judges and its retirement requirement. Noting the connection between increasing age and declining mental and physical capacities, the Court held that Missouri's retirement requirement for judges who reach the age of seventy was not unreasonable.

Grogan v. Garner (No. 89-1149)

What standard of evidence should bankruptcy courts apply in considering whether a debt was the result of "actual fraud" under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code?

Courts should apply the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the lack of a specified standard of evidence in section 523(a) implied that Congress had intended the preponderance of the evidence standard to be used. That lower standard was generally used in civil actions between private parties (including bankruptcy filings) unless particularly important interests were at stake. Protecting a bankruptcy filer who had previously been convicted of fraud was not sufficiently important to demand a higher level of evidence.

Stevens also wrote that the "fresh start" intention of the bankruptcy laws did not suggest a higher standard of evidence. "In the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start policy," he wrote, "we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'" A debtor previously convicted of fraud did not fit this description.

Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Di (No. 89-1166)

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Harmelin v. Michigan (No. 89-7272)

Is a statutorily mandated sentence that does not allow for consideration of mitigating factors a violation of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishments?

No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that since the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee, the determination of whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" is not made with reference to the particular offense. Moreover, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against unusual methods of punishment, not necessarily cruel ones. As such, while Harmelin's life sentence may have been cruel, it was not constitutionally unusual or unprecedented.

Hernandez v. New York (No. 89-7645)

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Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen. (No. 90-813)

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Illinois v. Kentucky (No. 106 ORIG)

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Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mcclendon (No. 89-1298)

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Irwin v. Veterans Administration (No. 89-5867)

Does the 30-day window after "receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC within which a suit against the federal government must be filed begin when an attorney's office receives notification, or when the attorney or client himself receives notification?

The 30-day window begins as soon as either the attorney's office, the attorney, or the client receives notification - whichever comes first. In an opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that lower courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney's office qualifies as notice to the client. "The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia (No. 89-680)

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Johnson v. Home State Bank (No. 90-693)

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Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. (No. 90-516)

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Kay v. Ehrler (No. 90-79)

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Lampf v. Gilbertson (No. 90-333)

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Lankford v. Idaho (No. 88-7247)

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Leathers v. Medlock (No. 90-29)

Does differential taxation of different media violate the First and 14th Amendments? Does differential taxation of members of the same medium violate the First and 14th Amendments?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content-neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non-discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn (No. 89-1217)

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Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB (No. 90-285)

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Martin v. Oshrc (No. 89-1541)

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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (No. 89-1799)

Does the First Amendment give the New Yorker a right to publish fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure?

No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment_s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm_s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.

Master, Mates & Pilots v. Brown (No. 89-1330)

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Mccarthy v. Bronson (No. 90-5635)

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Mccleskey v. Zant (No. 89-7024)

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Mccormick v. United States (No. 89-1918)

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McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander (No. 89-1474)

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Mcnary v. Haitian Refugee Center., Inc. (No. 89-1332)

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Mcneil v. Wisconsin (No. 90-5319)

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Melkonyan v. Sullivan (No. 90-5538)

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Michigan v. Lucas (No. 90-149)

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Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. (No. 89-1158)

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Minnick v. Mississippi (No. 89-6332)

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Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution (No. 89-1452)

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Moskal v. United States (No. 89-964)

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Mu'min v. Virginia (No. 90-5193)

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Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers (No. 89-1027)

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Ohio v. Huertas (No. 89-1944)

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Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe (No. 89-1322)

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Oklahoma v. New Mexico (No. 109 ORIG)

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Owen v. Owen (No. 89-1008)

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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip (No. 89-1279)

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Parker v. Dugger (No. 89-5961)

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Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines (No. 89-1714)

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Payne v. Tennessee (No. 90-5721)

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Peretz v. United States (No. 90-615)

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Perry v. Louisiana (No. 89-5120)

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Powers v. Ohio (No. 89-5011)

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Primate Protection League v. Tulane Ed. Fund (No. 90-89)

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Renne v. Geary (No. 90-769)

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Riverside County v. McLaughlin (No. 89-1817)

Did Riverside violate the Court's holding in Gerstein v. Pugh (420 U.S. 103), which required prompt probable cause determinations?

The Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.

Rust v. Sullivan (No. 89-1391)

Do the regulations violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of clients and health providers?

No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).

Salve Regina College v. Russell (No. 89-1629)

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Schad v. Arizona (No. 90-5551)

Does the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment require juries in capital cases to be instructed on every lesser offense, includeding non-capital offenses, (e.g., robbery) that are supported by the evidence?

No. In a complex decision, Souter's plurality opinion acknowledged that jury instructions offering all-or-nothing alternatives in capital cases may overstep the Due Process Clause. But Schad's jury was not faced with such a choice. His jury had been instructed on the non-capital offense of second-degree murder.

Siegert v. Gilley (No. 90-96)

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Stevens v. Department Of Treasury (No. 89-1821)

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Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas (No. 89-1679)

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Toibb v. Radloff (No. 90-368)

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Touby v. United States (No. 90-6282)

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Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. Of Treasury (No. 89-1106)

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United States v. Centennial Savings Bank (No. 89-1926)

Can a bank list the exchange of properties that have equal fair market value as a loss on its federal Income Tax return if the property it loses is worth significantly less at the time of the exchange than it was when the property was initially acquired? May a bank treat money received from early withdrawal penalties as "income from the discharge ... of indebtedness" under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C)?

Yes and no. On the exchanged mortgage question, the Supreme Court referred to a companion case, Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 499 U.S. 554, decided at the same time, in holding that the mortgages exchanged were "materially different" and could therefore be deducted as losses.

On the question of early withdrawal penalties, however, the Court sided with the IRS. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, stated that income comes from the "discharge ... of indebtedness" only when it is the result of the forgiveness of an obligation to repay assumed by the debtor (in this case the bank) at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship. Because the early withdrawal fee was stipulated in the contract agreed upon at the outset of the certificate of deposit agreements, its payment was not the forgiveness of any obligation on behalf of the bank but rather the fulfillment of an obligation on behalf of the creditor. The bank was therefore required to list the penalties as income.

United States v. France (No. 89-1363)

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United States v. Gaubert (No. 89-1793)

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United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc. (No. 89-1436)

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United States v. Smith (No. 89-1646)

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Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg (No. 89-1448)

First, can a proxy statement couched in conclusory or qualitative terms, such as "high value," purporting to explain the directors' reasons for recommending a corporate action, be materially misleading within the meaning of Rule 14a-9? Second, can causation of damages compensable under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78n(a), be shown by members of a class of minority shareholders whose votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw to authorize the corporate action subject to the proxy solicitation?

Yes and no, respectively. Terms like "high value," in a commercial context, are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis, and so could be shown to be misleading by garden-variety evidence. Furthermore, they can be materially misleading even if other information is available in the statement upon which an expert could deduce that they are false. A proxy statement should inform, not challenge the reader's critical wits. However, the link between the statement and the merger process is too speculative and too procedurally intractable to find an implied private right of action in cases in which the minority shareholders' votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw, and where the plaintiff's theory is that the vote was cosmetic.

West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (No. 89-994)

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Wilson v. Seiter (No. 89-7376)

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Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier (No. 89-1905)

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Yates v. Evatt (No. 89-7691)

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Ylst v. Nunnemaker (No. 90-68)

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