The Oyez Project: 1985 Term Decisions

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie (No. 84-1601)

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Allen v. Illinois (No. 85-5404)

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (No. 84-1602)

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Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. (No. 85-437)

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At&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (No. 84-1913)

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Atkins v. Rivera (No. 85-632)

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Attorney General Of N. Y. v. Soto-Lopez (No. 84-1803)

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Automobile Workers v. Brock (No. 84-1777)

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Baker v. General Motors Corp. (No. 85-117)

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Batson v. Kentucky (No. 84-6263)

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Bazemore v. Friday (No. 85-93)

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Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist. (No. 84-773)

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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (No. 84-1667)

Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers?

The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the perogatives of the executive branch.

Board Of Governors, Frs v. Dimension Financial (No. 84-1274)

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Bowen v. Agencies Opposed To Soc. Sec. Entrap. (No. 85-521)

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Bowen v. American Hospital Assn. (No. 84-1529)

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Bowen v. City Of New York (No. 84-1923)

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Bowen v. Mich. Academy Of Family Physicians (No. 85-225)

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Bowen v. Owens (No. 84-1905)

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Bowen v. Roy (No. 84-780)

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Bowers v. Hardwick (No. 85-140)

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Bowsher v. Synar (No. 85-1377)

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Brock v. Pierce County (No. 85-385)

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Brown-Forman Distillers v. N. Y. Liquor Auth. (No. 84-2030)

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Cabana v. Bullock (No. 84-1236)

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California v. Ciraolo (No. 84-1513)

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (No. 85-198)

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Cleavinger v. Saxner (No. 84-732)

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Colorado v. Connelly (No. 85-660)

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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor (No. 85-621)

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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (No. 84-1555)

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Crane v. Kentucky (No. 85-5238)

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Daniels v. Williams (No. 84-5872)

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Darden v. Wainwright (No. 85-5319)

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Darden v. Wainwright (No. 85-5319)

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Davidson v. Cannon (No. 84-6470)

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Davis v. Bandemer (No. 84-1244)

Did the state supreme court's decision violate the First Amendment?

Yes. Relying on its reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (1974), the Court reversed the state court's decision. The Gertz standard for evaluating potentially libelous speech required that "the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages."

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (No. 84-1279)

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Department Of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans (No. 85-289)

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Department Of Treasury v. Galioto (No. 84-1904)

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Diamond v. Charles (No. 84-1379)

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Dow Chemical Co. v. United States (No. 84-1259)

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East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc. (No. 84-1726)

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EEOC v. FLRA (No. 84-1728)

Is an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 "unreasonable" within the meaning of the statute if it exceeds the amount of damages recovered by the plaintiff in the underlying civil rights action?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held, 5-4, that there was no requirement under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 that attorneys' fees be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff might recover. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens, reasoned that such plaintiffs seek to vindicate important constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms, and a proportionality requirement would seriously undermine Congress's purpose under the Act to insure the availability of counsel in civil rights cases. Concurring, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., reasoned that neither the prior decisions of the Supreme Court nor the legislative history of the Act supported such a requirement.

Evans v. Jeff D. (No. 84-1288)

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Exxon Corp. v. Hunt (No. 84-978)

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FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear (No. 84-1972)

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Firefighters v. Cleveland (No. 84-1999)

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Fisher v. Berkeley (No. 84-1538)

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Ford v. Wainwright (No. 85-5542)

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Ftc v. Indiana Federation Of Dentists (No. 84-1809)

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Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles (No. 84-1644)

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Goldman v. Weinberger (No. 84-1097)

Did Indiana's 1981 state apportionment violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that while the apportionment law may have had a discriminatory effect on the Democrats, that effect was not "sufficiently adverse" to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The mere lack of proportional representation did not unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. The Court also ruled that political gerrymandering claims were properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that judicially manageable standards could be discerned and applied in such cases.

Green v. Mansour (No. 84-6270)

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Heath v. Alabama (No. 84-5555)

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Henderson v. United States (No. 84-1744)

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Hill v. Lockhart (No. 84-1103)

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Holbrook v. Flynn (No. 84-1606)

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Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington (No. 85-195)

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Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc. (No. 85-954)

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Kimmelman v. Morrison (No. 84-1661)

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Kuhlmann v. Wilson (No. 84-1479)

Can the Secretary of Energy or his delegates impose new hydro-electricity prices on an interim basis under Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Secretary of Energy could impose rate hikes on an interim basis without violating the Act. The Court found that the language of the Act and its legislative history did not conclusively show whether Congress intended the Secretary to impose rate hikes on an interim basis. The Secretary's decision, therefore, only needed to be a reasonable attempt to balance the competing interests in the act: preventing unnecessarily high charges to customers while still allowing the dams to be self-sufficient (and therefore not a burden on government resources). Justice Marshall wrote "Interim ratesetting appears well suited to accommodating that dual goal... [and therefore] the procedures established by the Secretary to exercise his powers under the Flood Control Act both are within his delegated authority and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the policies underlying that Act." The Court further found that the rate increases were consistent with the cities' electricity contracts, which were based largely on the language of the Act.

Lake Coal Co., Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co. (No. 84-1240)

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Lee v. Illinois (No. 84-6807)

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Library Of Congress v. Shaw (No. 85-54)

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Local 28 v. EEOC (No. 84-1656)

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Lockhart v. McCree (No. 84-1865)

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Longshoremen v. Davis (No. 85-217)

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Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc. (No. 85-390)

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Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (No. 84-871)

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Lyng v. Castillo (No. 85-250)

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Lyng v. Payne (No. 84-1948)

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Macdonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County (No. 84-2015)

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Maine v. Moulton (No. 84-786)

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Maine v. Taylor (No. 85-62)

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Malley v. Briggs (No. 84-1586)

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Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio (No. 83-2004)

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McLaughlin v. United States (No. 85-5189)

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Mcmillan v. Pennsylvania (No. 85-215)

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Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura (No. 85-410)

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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (No. 84-1979)

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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson (No. 85-619)

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Michigan v. Jackson (No. 84-1531)

Is a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note insured as a "deposit" under the federal deposit insurance program?

No. In light of the longstanding interpretation of the FDIC, such a letter does not create a deposit. This interpretation is consistent with Congress' intent in creating the FDIC, namely ensuring that a deposit of "hard earnings" entrusted to a bank would not lead to a tangible loss in the event of a bank failure. In this case, the standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note did not entrust any noncontingent assets to the Bank. Therefore, such a letter of credit does not give rise to an insured deposit.

Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N. J. Dept. Of E. P. (No. 84-801)

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Miller v. Fenton (No. 84-5786)

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Moran v. Burbine (No. 84-1485)

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Morris v. Mathews (No. 84-1636)

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Murray v. Carrier (No. 84-1554)

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Nantahala Power & Light v. Thornburg (No. 85-568)

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New Mexico v. Earnest (No. 85-162)

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New York v. Class (No. 84-1181)

Did the Renton ordinance violate either the First or Fourteenth Amendment?

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication."

New York v. P. J. Video, Inc. (No. 85-363)

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Nix v. Whiteside (No. 84-1321)

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NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees (No. 84-1493)

Did the law violate the First Amendment?

No. The Court held that the Act passed the constitutional test for restrictions on commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist argued that Puerto Rico's desire to protect the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" by attempting to isolate them from casino advertising served a "substantial government interest." The law was clearly drawn and directly related to the government's goal of minimizing the ill effects, such as prostitution and crime, that gambling cultivates in local communities.

Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire (No. 85-202)

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Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Schools (No. 85-488)

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Pa. Bureau Of Correction v. U.S. Marshals (No. 84-489)

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Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n (No. 84-1044)

Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.

Papasan v. Allain (No. 85-499)

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Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank (No. 84-1616)

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Paulussen v. Herion (No. 85-88)

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Pembaur v. Cincinnati (No. 84-1160)

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Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council (No. 85-5)

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Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council (No. 85-5)

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Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps (No. 84-1491)

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Poland v. Arizona (No. 85-5023)

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Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass. v. Tourism Co. of PR (No. 84-1903)

Is an unloaded handgun a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an unloaded handgun is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC section 2113(d). The Court articulated three reasons supporting the conclusion that such a gun is a dangerous weapon: First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous. Second, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon.

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (No. 84-1560)

Did the Pennsylvania requirements unconstitutionally interfere with the right to privacy?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania requirements "wholly subordinate[d] constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal health" and were attempts to deter women from making their own choices concerning abortion. The Court held that 1) the "informed consent" and printed materials provisions unduly intruded upon the priva cy of patients and physicians; 2) the reporting and viability determination provisions were designed to identify and deter women from having abortions through the threat of harassment; and 3) the post-viability care and second physician provisions unconstitutionally interfered with the health of the mother by increasing delays and medical risks.

Private Truck Council Of America, Inc. v. Quinn (No. 85-1423)

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Public Service Comm'n v. C. & P. Tel. Co. (No. 84-1362)

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Randall v. Loftsgaarden (No. 85-519)

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Reed v. Campbell (No. 85-755)

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Regents Of University Of Michigan v. Ewing (No. 84-1273)

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Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc. (No. 84-1360)

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Riverside v. Rivera (No. 85-224)

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Rose v. Clark (No. 84-1974)

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Schiavone v. Fortune (No. 84-1839)

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Skipper v. South Carolina (No. 84-6859)

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Smalis v. Pennsylvania (No. 85-227)

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Smith v. Murray (No. 85-5487)

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Sorenson v. Secretary Of Treasury (No. 84-1686)

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South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc. (No. 84-782)

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Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bur. (No. 85-21)

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Teachers v. Hudson (No. 84-1503)

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Texas v. Mccullough (No. 84-1198)

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Thomas v. Arn (No. 84-5630)

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Thornburg v. Gingles (No. 83-1968)

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Thornburgh v. Amer. Coll. of Obst. & Gyn. (No. 84-495)

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Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering (No. 84-1973)

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Transcontinental Pipe Line v. State Oil & Gas Bd. (No. 84-1076)

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Turner v. Murray (No. 84-6646)

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United States v. American Bar Endowment (No. 85-599)

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United States v. American College of Physicians (No. 84-1737)

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United States v. City of Fulton (No. 84-1725)

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United States v. Dion (No. 85-246)

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United States v. Hemme (No. 84-1944)

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United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc. (No. 85-554)

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United States v. Inadi (No. 84-1580)

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United States v. James (No. 85-434)

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United States v. Koecher (No. 84-1922)

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United States v. Lane (No. 84-744)

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United States v. Loud Hawk (No. 84-1361)

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United States v. Maine (No. 35 ORIG)

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United States v. Mechanik (No. 84-1640)

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United States v. Mottaz (No. 85-546)

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United States v. Quinn (No. 84-1717)

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United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (No. 84-701)

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United States v. Rojas-Contreras (No. 84-1023)

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United States v. Von Neumann (No. 84-1144)

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University Of Tennessee v. Elliott (No. 85-588)

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Vasquez v. Hillery (No. 84-836)

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Wainwright v. Greenfield (No. 84-1480)

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Wardair Canada v. Florida Dept. Of Revenue (No. 84-902)

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Whitley v. Albers (No. 84-1077)

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Wisconsin Dept. Of Industry v. Gould Inc. (No. 84-1484)

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Witters v. Wash. Dept. Of Services For Blind (No. 84-1070)

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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (No. 84-1340)

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Young v. Community Nutrition Institute (No. 85-664)

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