The Oyez Project Virtual Tour of the Supreme Court Building

Abstract

Argument: Tuesday, October 14, 1980
Decision: Tuesday, March 3, 1981
Issues: Economic Activity, Patentability of Computer Processes
Categories: patents

Advocates

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the petitioner)
Robert E. Wichersham ()
Robert E. Wickersham (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Engineers James Diehr and Theodore Lutton invented an improved press that cured rubber by controlled heating. The press contained a temperature probe which measured the temperature rise of the rubber from within the press. By repeatedly calculating the rubber cure time from this temperature measurement and comparing this computed cure time to the actual elapsed time, the computer was able to determine precisely when to open the press and eject the cured rubber, which then emerged perfectly cured. The patent examiner, viewing all computer programs as unpatentable because of the earlier Supreme Court decision Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), rejected their patent application because, he argued, the inventors had simply combined an unpatentable program with a conventional rubber curing press. An appellate court reversed the Examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney argued that the steps of continuously measuring temperature and repeatedly recalculating the rubber cure time and comparing it to the elapsed time were new steps that were worthy of patent protection.

Question

Can one patent a machine that transforms materials physically under the control of a programmed computer?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the court held that a machine which transforms materials physically under the control of a programmed computer is patentable. In addition, and without overruling the earlier Gottschalk v. Benson decision holding that a mathematical procedure cannot be patented, the majority in Diehr said the Benson decision did not render all computer programs unpatentable, contrary to what Justice John Paul Stevens argued in his strong dissenting opinion in Diehr. The Diehr court left undecided the question of whether computer programs standing by themselves could ever be patentable. Immediately following the Diehr ruling, software patent applications began flowing into the Patent Office in a steady stream that remains undiminished today. (Thirteen years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In re Alappat, ruled that virtually all computer programs are patentable.)

Supreme Court Justice Opinions and Votes (by Seniority)

Sort by Ideology
(More information here)
Decision: 5 votes for Diehr, 4 vote(s) against
Legal Provision: 35 U.S.C. 101
Voted with the majority
Burger
Voted with the minority, joined Stevens' dissent
Brennan
Voted with the majority
Stewart
Voted with the majority
White
Voted with the minority, joined Stevens' dissent
Marshall
Voted with the minority, joined Stevens' dissent
Blackmun
Voted with the majority
Powell
Wrote the majority opinion
Rehnquist
Wrote a dissent
Stevens
Full Opinion by Justice William H. Rehnquist

Cite this page

The Oyez Project, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981),
available at: <http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1112/>
(last visited ).