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  <title>The Oyez Project: 1979 Term Arguments</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  <itunes:image>http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg</itunes:image>
  <itunes:category text="Government &amp; Organizations"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</itunes:subtitle>
    
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Chiarella v. United States (No. 78-1202) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Nov 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did Chiarella violate Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act by failing to disclose the impending takeover before trading in the target company's securities?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-1202_19791105-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1202/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1202/argument/78-1202_19791105-argument.mp3" length="15857000" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Is the creation of a live, human-made organism patentable under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-136_19800317-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_136/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_136/argument/79-136_19800317-argument.mp3" length="14537021" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Fullilove v. Klutznick (No. 78-1007) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did the provision of the statute for minority business enterprises violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-1007_19791127-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1007/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1007/argument/78-1007_19791127-lq-argument.mp3" length="16134399" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Harris v. McRae (No. 79-1268) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 21 Apr 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did the Hyde Amendment violate the right to privacy, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-1268_19800421-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_1268/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_1268/argument/79-1268_19800421-lq-argument.mp3" length="15808400" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Industrial Union Dept. v. Amer. Petroleum Inst. (No. 78-911) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did the Secretary exceed his authority to set standards?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-911_19791010-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_911/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_911/argument/78-911_19791010-lq-argument.mp3" length="24314433" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (No. 79-289) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 18 Mar 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did PruneYard's regulations violate the students' free speech rights?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-289_19800318-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_289/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_289/argument/79-289_19800318-lq-argument.mp3" length="15420681" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Reeves Inc. v. Stake (No. 79-677) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did South Dakota's preferential system violate the Commerce Clause?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-677_19800416-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_677/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_677/argument/79-677_19800416-lq-argument.mp3" length="16870042" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Rhode Island v. Innis (No. 78-1076) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 30 Oct 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did the police "interrogation" en route to the station violate Innis's Miranda rights?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-1076_19791030-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1076/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1076/argument/78-1076_19791030-lq-argument.mp3" length="15422255" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia (No. 79-243) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-243_19800219-mq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_243/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_243/argument/79-243_19800219-mq-argument.mp3" length="15449253" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Rummel v. Estelle (No. 78-6386) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the sentence.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;After being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the sentence.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did Rummel's life sentence under the Texas recidivist law constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-6386_19800107-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_6386/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_6386/argument/78-6386_19800107-lq-argument.mp3" length="15274761" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (No. 78-1078) - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-1078_19791003-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1078/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1078/argument/78-1078_19791003-argument.mp3" length="15571691" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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