The Oyez Project: 1978 Term Decisions

Addington v. Texas (No. 77-5992)

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Alexander v. U.S. Dept. Of HUD (No. 77-874)

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Ambach v. Norwick (No. 76-808)

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Andrus v. Sierra Club (No. 78-625)

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Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead (No. 77-1810)

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Arkansas v. Sanders (No. 77-1497)

Did the warrantless search of the suitcase by the police violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments which prohibit unreasonable searches?

Yes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since "luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects" it is "associated with the expectation of privacy."

Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. (No. 77-1413)

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Babbitt v. Farm Workers (No. 78-225)

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Baker v. Mccollan (No. 78-752)

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Barry v. Barchi (No. 77-803)

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Bell v. Wolfish (No. 77-1829)

Do certain conditions of confinement violate the individual liberty, due process, and privacy of pretrial detainees as protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court found that that the conditions of confinement did not infringe upon a pretrial detainee's rights. Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that the issue of prison management is ripe with "judgment calls" which rest outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As long as administrative practices are implemented in the genuine interest of "safeguarding institutional security" then they do not warrant judicial scrutiny and are consistent with the Constitution.

Bellotti v. Baird (No. 78-329)

Did the law unconstitutionally restrict the right of a minor to have an abortion?

The Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.

Board Of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp. (No. 77-832)

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Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Cbs (No. 77-1578)

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Brown v. Felsen (No. 78-58)

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Brown v. Texas (No. 77-6673)

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Burch v. Louisiana (No. 78-90)

Does a conviction by a nonunanimous six-member jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty offense violate the accused's right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court found that convictions by the nonunanimous six-member jury violated the Constitution. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by nonunanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This "near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.

Burks v. Lasker (No. 77-1724)

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Butner v. United States (No. 77-1410)

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Caban v. Mohammed (No. 77-6431)

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Califano v. Aznavorian (No. 77-991)

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Califano v. Boles (No. 78-808)

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Califano v. Westcott (No. 78-437)

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Califano v. Yamasaki (No. 77-1511)

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California v. Arizona (No. 78 ORIG)

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Cannon v. University Of Chicago (No. 77-926)

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Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org. (No. 77-719)

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Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (No. 77-922)

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Colautti v. Franklin (No. 77-891)

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Columbus Board Of Education v. Penick (No. 78-610)

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Corbitt v. New Jersey (No. 77-5903)

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County Of Los Angeles v. Davis (No. 77-1553)

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Dalia v. United States (No. 77-1722)

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Davis v. Passman (No. 78-5072)

Did the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause afford Davis a right to a civil remedy against Passman?

Yes. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) and Butz v. Economou (1978), the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case, Passman violated Davis's rights through sexual discrimination. The Court added that Passman's actions and words did not constitute protected speech and that a damage remedy provided a ready mechanism for remedial action.

Dayton Board Of Education v. Brinkman (No. 78-627)

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Delaware v. Prouse (No. 77-1571)

Did the officer's search of Prouse's automobile constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.

Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB (No. 77-968)

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Director, Workers' Comp. Progs. v. Rasmussen (No. 77-1465)

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Dougherty County Bd. Of Ed. v. White (No. 77-120)

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Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest (No. 77-1547)

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Dunaway v. New York (No. 78-5066)

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Dunn v. United States (No. 77-6949)

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Duren v. Missouri (No. 77-6067)

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Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatl. (No. 78-479)

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Electrical Workers v. Foust (No. 78-38)

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Fare v. Michael C. (No. 78-334)

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FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (No. 77-1575)

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Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill (No. 77-1387)

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Ferc v. Pennzoil Producing Co. (No. 77-648)

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FERC v. Shell Oil Co. (No. 77-1652)

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Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB (No. 77-1806)

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Friedman v. Rogers (No. 77-1163)

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Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (No. 77-1301)

Did the press and members of the public have a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to attend the trial?

The Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had "an affirmative constitutional duty" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred.

Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist. (No. 77-1051)

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Gladstone, Realtors v. Village Of Bellwood (No. 77-1493)

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Great A & P Tea Co. v. Ftc (No. 77-654)

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Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny (No. 78-753)

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Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates (No. 78-201)

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Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co. (No. 77-952)

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Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin (No. 78-443)

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Helstoski v. Meanor (No. 78-546)

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Herbert v. Lando (No. 77-1105)

In an accusation of libel, do the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect members of the press from inquiries into their thoughts, opinions, and conclusions that go into the editorial process?

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would "substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice," a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; "only reckless error will be discouraged," which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.

Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (No. 77-533)

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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa (No. 77-515)

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Hughes v. Oklahoma (No. 77-1439)

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Hunter v. Dean (No. 77-6248)

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Hutchinson v. Proxmire (No. 78-680)

Were Proxmire's activities and statements against Hutchinson's research protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution?

No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the legislature's "deliberative process."

Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party (No. 77-1248)

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Jackson v. Virginia (No. 78-5283)

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Japan Line, Ltd. v. County Of Los Angeles (No. 77-1378)

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Jones v. Wolf (No. 78-91)

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Kentucky v. Whorton (No. 78-749)

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Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy. (No. 77-1327)

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Lalli v. Lalli (No. 77-1115)

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Leis v. Flynt (No. 77-1618)

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Leo Sheep Co. v. United States (No. 77-1686)

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Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. (No. 78-759)

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Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York (No. 78-511)

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Mackey v. Montrym (No. 77-69)

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Marchioro v. Chaney (No. 78-647)

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Marquette Nat. Bank v. First Of Omaha Corp. (No. 77-1265)

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Massachusetts v. White (No. 77-1388)

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Michigan v. Defillippo (No. 77-1680)

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Michigan v. Doran (No. 77-1202)

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Miller v. Youakim (No. 77-742)

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Mobile v. Bolden (No. 77-1844)

Did the at-large system violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments?

No. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not entail "the right to have Negro candidates elected," and that only purposefully discriminatory denials of the freedom to vote on the basis of race demanded constitutional remedies. The Court also found that multimember legislative districts were not unconstitutional per se; such legislative apportionments only violated the Fourteenth Amendment if they were "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial. . .discrimination." In short, the Court held that facially neutral actions were unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes.

Montana v. United States (No. 77-1134)

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Moore v. Sims (No. 78-6)

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National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States (No. 77-1172)

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Nevada v. Hall (No. 77-1337)

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New Jersey v. Portash (No. 77-1489)

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New Motor Vehicle Bd. Of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co. (No. 77-837)

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New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dept. (No. 77-961)

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New York Transit Authority v. Beazer (No. 77-1427)

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NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc. (No. 78-223)

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NLRB v. Catholic Bishop Of Chicago (No. 77-752)

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North Carolina v. Butler (No. 78-354)

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Orr v. Orr (No. 77-1119)

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Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans (No. 78-275)

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P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford (No. 78-425)

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Parham v. Hughes (No. 78-3)

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Parker v. Randolph (No. 78-99)

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Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (No. 77-1305)

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Payton v. New York (No. 78-5420)

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Personnel Administrator MA v. Feeney (No. 78-233)

Did the law discriminate against women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefitted from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that "veteran status is not uniquely male." Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.

Quern v. Jordan (No. 77-841)

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Rakas v. Illinois (No. 77-5781)

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Ramsey v. New York (No. 77-6540)

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Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. (No. 78-690)

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Rose v. Mitchell (No. 77-1701)

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Sandstrom v. Montana (No. 78-5384)

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Scott v. Illinois (No. 77-1177)

Did the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require Illinois to provide Scott with trial counsel?

A plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning "the central premise of Argersinger."

Secy. Of Pub. Welf. v. Institutionalized Juveniles (No. 77-1715)

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Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees (No. 78-1223)

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Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (No. 78-482)

Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that governmental attempts to restrict the publication of truthful information "seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." As long as the information is lawfully obtained, as it was in this case involving a shooting at a junior high school, the state cannot restrict a newspaper from publishing a juvenile offender's name unless the restriction serves a substantial state interest. No such interest was present in this case.

Smith v. Maryland (No. 78-5374)

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Southeastern Community College v. Davis (No. 78-711)

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Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp. (No. 78-575)

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Stafford v. Briggs (No. 77-1546)

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Teamsters v. Daniel (No. 77-753)

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Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner (No. 77-920)

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Toll v. Moreno (No. 77-154)

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Torres v. Puerto Rico (No. 77-1609)

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Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington (No. 78-309)

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Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (No. 77-1645)

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Ulster County Court v. Allen (No. 77-1554)

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United California Bank v. United States (No. 77-1016)

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United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mccombs (No. 78-17)

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United States v. 564.54 Acres Of Land (No. 78-488)

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United States v. Addonizio (No. 78-156)

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United States v. Batchelder (No. 78-776)

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United States v. Caceres (No. 76-1309)

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United States v. Helstoski (No. 78-349)

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United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. (No. 77-1359)

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United States v. Naftalin (No. 78-561)

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United States v. Rutherford (No. 78-605)

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United States v. Timmreck (No. 78-744)

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United Steelworkers of America v. Weber (No. 78-432)

Did United and Kaiser Aluminum's training scheme violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race?

No. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act "did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.

Vance v. Bradley (No. 77-1254)

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Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn. (No. 77-983)

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Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation (No. 77-388)

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Williams v. Brown (No. 78-357)

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Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe (No. 78-160)

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Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. (No. 78-5414)

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