The Oyez Project: 1977 Term Decisions

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States (No. 76-911)

No details yet.

Agosto v. Ins (No. 76-1410)

No details yet.

Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (No. 77-747)

Did Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection Act violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution?

The Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it "substantially altered" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was "severe" as it nullified terms of t he company's obligations to its employees and imposed an "unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.

American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild (No. 76-1121)

No details yet.

Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co. (No. 77-380)

No details yet.

Arizona v. Washington (No. 76-1168)

No details yet.

Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana (No. 76-1150)

Did the Montana law violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution as delineated in Article IV, Section 2?

The Court affirmed the right of Montana to charge higher fees for out-of-state elk hunters. Justice Blackmun found that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only applied to activities which bear "on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity." Since elk hunting is a recreational activity and not fundamental to the survival of nonresidents of Montana, Blackmun argued that it did not fall within the scope of the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. "Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union," he concluded.

Ballew v. Georgia (No. 76-761)

Does a state criminal trial by a jury of only five persons deprive the accused of the right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The Court found that a trial by jury of less than six members violated the accused's right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun reasoned that small juries foster poor group deliberation. Group memory of the details of testimony, the ease with which group compromises can be made, and the desire of the group to be self-critical and reflective are all hindered as the size of the jury decreases. Blackmun also relied on statistical studies to claim that the risk of jury error increased with smaller juries.

Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis (No. 76-1359)

No details yet.

Bell v. Ohio (No. 76-6513)

No details yet.

Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB (No. 77-152)

No details yet.

Board Of Curators, Univ. Of Mo. v. Horowitz (No. 76-695)

No details yet.

Bordenkircher v. Hayes (No. 76-1334)

Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibit state prosecutors from carrying out a threat made during plea negotiations to re-indict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged?

No. The Court held that the defendant's due process rights were not violated in this case. Justice Stewart spent some time describing the important role that plea bargaining plays in the nation's legal system, a role that has been accepted by the Supreme Court in cases such as Blackledge v. Allison (1977) and Brady v. United States (1970). This acceptance, in turn, implies that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in persuading a defendant to relinquish his or her right to plead not guilty. Threatening a stiffer sentence is permissible and part of "any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas," Stewart declared.

Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. Of Corrections (No. 76-5325)

No details yet.

Burks v. United States (No. 76-6528)

No details yet.

Butz v. Economou (No. 76-709)

Are federal administrators entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in the face of challenges to their conduct of public business?

In a 4-to-5 opinion, the Court began by noting that absent exceptional circumstances federal executive officials are only entitled to qualified immunity, since such officials must abide by constitutional and statutory scope-of-power limitations. Federal officials who perform adjudicatory, or other similar prosecutorial functions, cannot, however, be held liable for mere "good faith" judgment errors. The Court reasoned that the risk of making unconstitutional determinations is outweighed by the need to preserve independent judgement, through grants of absolute immunity to judges and other similarly situated decision makers. The Court concluded that the similarity between the type of decision-making required of federal prosecutors and other administrative agents is sufficiently strong to warrant an extension of absolute immunity to the latter for decisions made in the course of their official conduct.

Califano v. Jobst (No. 76-860)

No details yet.

California v. Southland Royalty Co. (No. 76-1114)

No details yet.

California v. Texas (No. 76 ORIG)

No details yet.

California v. United States (No. 77-285)

No details yet.

Carey v. Piphus (No. 76-1149)

No details yet.

Carter v. Miller (No. 76-1171)

No details yet.

Central Illinois Public Serv. Co. v. United States (No. 76-1058)

No details yet.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (No. 76-1383)

No details yet.

Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas (No. 76-398)

No details yet.

Commissioner v. Kowalski (No. 76-1095)

No details yet.

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay (No. 76-1836)

No details yet.

Crist v. Bretz (No. 76-1200)

No details yet.

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En v. Study Group (No. 77-262)

No details yet.

Durst v. United States (No. 76-5935)

No details yet.

Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB (No. 77-453)

No details yet.

Elkins v. Moreno (No. 77-154)

No details yet.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor Of Maryland (No. 77-10)

No details yet.

FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (No. 76-1471)

No details yet.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (No. 77-528)

Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances?

No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

First Federal S. & L. v. Massachusetts Tax Comm'n (No. 77-334)

No details yet.

First National Bank Of Boston v. Bellotti (No. 76-1172)

No details yet.

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks (No. 77-25)

No details yet.

Fmc v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (No. 76-938)

No details yet.

Foley v. Connelie (No. 76-839)

Did the New York law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the states had an "historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions" and that the New York statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Noting that states need only to show some rational relationship between a valid state interest and a classification involving aliens, the Court held that the police function was "one of the basic functions of government" and thereby the province of actual United States citizens.

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States (No. 76-624)

No details yet.

Franks v. Delaware (No. 77-5176)

No details yet.

Fulman v. United States (No. 76-1137)

No details yet.

Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters (No. 77-369)

No details yet.

Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (No. 77-560)

No details yet.

Greene v. Massey (No. 76-6617)

No details yet.

Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. (No. 77-598)

No details yet.

Hicklin v. Orbeck (No. 77-324)

Did the Alaska statute violate the Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

The unanimous Court held that the Alaska Local Hire Act violated the Constitution. Citing past decisions of the Court, Justice Brennan argued that the Alaska law did not meet the strict standard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, namely, that discrimination against non-citizens of a state is only allowed when those non-citizens "constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed." Since no evidence indicated that non-residents were the major cause of state unemployment or any other evil, there was no justification for the law.

Holloway v. Arkansas (No. 76-5856)

No details yet.

Houchins v. KQED Inc. (No. 76-1310)

Did the First Amendment guarantee news media a right of access to jails over and above that of other persons?

No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."

Hutto v. Finney (No. 76-1660)

Did punitive isolation for more than thirty days in the Arkansas prison system constitute cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court held that punitive isolation for longer than thirty days in Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. Justice Stevens conceded that isolation in and of itself was not necessarily unconstitutional and may in fact serve an important, legitimate interest in administering a prison. However, when taken as a whole, continued Stevens, the conditions in Arkansas's prisons, combined with the severe risks to an inmate's health and safety which accompanied confinement in isolation, did constitute cruel and unusual punishment. "A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'gruel' might be tolerated for a few days and be intolerably cruel for weeks or months," Stevens concluded.

In Re Primus (No. 77-56)

No details yet.

J. W. Bateson Co. v. Board Of Trustees (No. 76-1476)

No details yet.

Key v. Doyle (No. 76-1057)

No details yet.

Kulko v. California Superior Court (No. 77-293)

No details yet.

Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (No. 76-864)

No details yet.

Lakeside v. Oregon (No. 76-6942)

No details yet.

Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia (No. 76-1450)

No details yet.

Lockett v. Ohio (No. 76-6997)

Did the Ohio law violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by limiting the consideration of mitigating factors?

Yes. The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required, in all but the rarest capital cases, that sentencers not be precluded from considering a range of mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty. These factors included any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense proffered as a reason for a sentence less than death. The Court held that the Ohio statute did not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Constitution.

Lorillard v. Pons (No. 76-1346)

No details yet.

Los Angeles Dept. Of Water & Power v. Manhart (No. 76-1810)

No details yet.

Malone v. White Motor Corp. (No. 76-1184)

No details yet.

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (No. 76-1143)

No details yet.

Massachusetts v. United States (No. 76-1500)

Did the tax on civil aircraft violate the implied immunity of state governments from federal taxation?

No. The Court held that so long as charges did not discriminate against state functions, were based on fair approximations of uses of the system of navigable airspace, and were structured to produce revenues that did not exceed the total cost of the benefits to be supplied to national airsystem, there could be no basis for claims that the National Government was "using its taxing powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy" Massachusetts' ability to perform "essential services." The Court emphasized its reluctance to enlarge the scope of state immunity from federal taxation.

Mcadams v. Mcsurely (No. 76-1621)

No details yet.

Mcdaniel v. Paty (No. 76-1427)

No details yet.

Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft (No. 76-39)

No details yet.

Michigan v. Tyler (No. 76-1608)

No details yet.

Mincey v. Arizona (No. 77-5353)

No details yet.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham (No. 76-1726)

No details yet.

Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Services (No. 75-1914)

No details yet.

Moore v. Illinois (No. 76-5344)

No details yet.

Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair (No. 77-454)

No details yet.

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty (No. 75-536)

No details yet.

National Broiler Marketing Assn. v. U.S. (No. 77-117)

No details yet.

National Soc. Of Professional Engineers v. U.S. (No. 76-1767)

No details yet.

New York v. Cathedral Academy (No. 76-616)

No details yet.

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (No. 76-944)

No details yet.

NLRB v. Iron Workers (No. 76-719)

No details yet.

NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. (No. 77-911)

No details yet.

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn. (No. 76-1650)

No details yet.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (No. 76-5729)

No details yet.

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders (No. 77-335)

No details yet.

Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger (No. 77-677)

No details yet.

Parham v. J. R. (No. 75-1690)

No details yet.

Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642)

No details yet.

Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York (No. 77-444)

Did the restriction against Penn Central constitute a "taking" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York's objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to "enhance" the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms (No. 76-1830)

Do police officers violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures when, during a routine traffic stop, they obtain evidence through a search conducted after asking the suspect to exit the vehicle without a justifiable reason to do so?

No. In a 6-3 per curiam decision, the Court held that the search did not violate Mimms' rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that the officers had already detained Mimms in order to issue him a traffic summons and felt that asking him to exit the vehicle was a minimal and reasonable intrusion of his freedom. Whether the search occurred inside or outside the car was irrelevant to the Court: the officers had stopped Mimms for a legitimate reason and, upon observing the bulge in his jacket, any person of reasonable caution would have conducted the search.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that such searches, in order to conform to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, must relate to the reason for the stop. Because the officers had detained Mimms for an expired license plate, searching him for concealed weapons was not within the scope of the stop and therefore made it an unlawful search. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, filed a separate dissent arguing that the majority opinion gave too much discretion to police officers, allowing them to search detainees whenever they could invent any basis for concern.

Pfizer Inc. v. India (No. 76-749)

No details yet.

Philadelphia v. New Jersey (No. 77-404)

Did New Jersey's waste importation law violate the Commerce Clause?

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had "overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for projectionist reasons."

Pinkus v. United States (No. 77-39)

No details yet.

Procunier v. Navarette (No. 76-446)

No details yet.

Quern v. Mandley (No. 76-1159)

No details yet.

Quilloin v. Walcott (No. 76-6372)

No details yet.

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (No. 76-930)

No details yet.

Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice (No. 76-558)

No details yet.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (No. 76-811)

Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

Richmond Unified School District v. Berg (No. 75-1069)

No details yet.

Rinaldi v. United States (No. 76-6194)

No details yet.

Robertson v. Wegmann (No. 77-178)

No details yet.

Sanabria v. United States (No. 76-1040)

No details yet.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (No. 76-682)

No details yet.

Scott v. United States (No. 76-6767)

No details yet.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (No. 76-750)

No details yet.

SEC v. Sloan (No. 76-1607)

No details yet.

Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt (No. 76-678)

No details yet.

Simpson v. United States (No. 76-5796)

No details yet.

Slodov v. United States (No. 76-1835)

No details yet.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry (No. 77-240)

No details yet.

Stump v. Sparkman (No. 76-1750)

No details yet.

Swisher v. Brady (No. 77-653)

No details yet.

Taylor v. Kentucky (No. 77-5549)

No details yet.

Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases (No. 77-452)

No details yet.

Tva v. Hill (No. 76-1701)

No details yet.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm. (No. 76-635)

Did the formation of this group violate the the Compact Clause of Article I?

The Court found no constitutional violation. The Compact did not enhance state political power at the expense of the United States; it not confer to states powers which they did not already possess; it did not involve any delegation of state power to the Commission. Furthermore, argued Justice Powell, each state was free to withdraw from the group at any time.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mcmann (No. 76-906)

No details yet.

United States v. California (No. 5 ORIG)

No details yet.

United States v. Ceccolini (No. 76-1151)

No details yet.

United States v. Culbert (No. 77-142)

No details yet.

United States v. Grayson (No. 76-1572)

No details yet.

United States v. Jacobs (No. 76-1193)

No details yet.

United States v. John (No. 77-836)

No details yet.

United States v. Lasalle National Bank (No. 77-365)

No details yet.

United States v. Macdonald (No. 75-1892)

No details yet.

United States v. Mauro (No. 76-1596)

No details yet.

United States v. New Mexico (No. 77-510)

No details yet.

United States v. New York Telephone Co. (No. 76-835)

No details yet.

United States v. Scott (No. 76-1382)

No details yet.

United States v. Sheffield Board Of Comm'rs (No. 76-1662)

No details yet.

United States v. Sotelo (No. 76-1800)

No details yet.

United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (No. 76-1560)

No details yet.

United States v. Wheeler (No. 76-1629)

No details yet.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC (No. 76-419)

No details yet.

Vitek v. Jones (No. 77-888)

No details yet.

Washington Rev. Dept. v. Stevedoring Assn. (No. 76-1706)

No details yet.

Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. (No. 77-693)

No details yet.

Wise v. Lipscomb (No. 77-529)

No details yet.

Zablocki v. Redhail (No. 76-879)

No details yet.

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States (No. 77-539)

No details yet.

Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily (No. 76-1484)

Did the search of The Daily's newsroom violate the First and Fourth Amendments?

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "third party" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been "satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises." The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution "did not forbid warrants where the press was involved."