The Oyez Project: 1975 Term Decisions

A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell (No. 74-1148)

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Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists (No. 74-1274)

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Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona (No. 74-125)

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Aldinger v. Howard (No. 74-6521)

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American Foreign S. S. Co. v. Matise (No. 74-966)

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American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes (No. 74-1481)

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Andresen v. Maryland (No. 74-1646)

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Barrett v. United States (No. 74-5566)

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Baxter v. Palmigiano (No. 74-1187)

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Beckwith v. United States (No. 74-1243)

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Bellotti v. Baird (No. 75-73)

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Bishop v. Wood (No. 74-1303)

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Brown v. GSA (No. 74-768)

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Bryan v. Itasca County (No. 75-5027)

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Buckley v. Valeo (No. 75-436)

Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses?

In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.

Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers (No. 75-339)

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Burrell v. Mcray (No. 75-44)

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Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. (No. 75-122)

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Cappaert v. United States (No. 74-1107)

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Carey v. Sugar (No. 74-858)

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Chandler v. Roudebush (No. 74-1599)

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City Of Charlotte v. Firefighters (No. 75-250)

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Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. U.S. (No. 74-940)

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Commissioner v. Shapiro (No. 74-744)

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Dann v. Johnston (No. 74-1033)

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De Canas v. Bica (No. 74-882)

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Dept. Of Air Force v. Rose (No. 74-489)

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Doyle v. Ohio (No. 75-5014)

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Drew Municipal School Dist. v. Andrews (No. 74-1318)

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East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall (No. 73-861)

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Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. (No. 74-1563)

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Elrod v. Burns (No. 74-1520)

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Epa v. State Water Resources Control Board (No. 74-1435)

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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (No. 74-1042)

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Estelle v. Williams (No. 74-676)

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Examining Board v. Flores De Otero (No. 74-1267)

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Fea v. Algonquin Sng, Inc. (No. 75-382)

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Fisher v. United States (No. 74-18)

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Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (No. 75-251)

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Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn. (No. 75-510)

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Foremost-Mckesson v. Provident Securities (No. 74-742)

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FPC v. Conway Corp. (No. 75-342)

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FPC v. Moss (No. 74-883)

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FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (No. 75-584)

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Francis v. Henderson (No. 74-5808)

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Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. (No. 74-728)

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Garner v. United States (No. 74-100)

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Geders v. United States (No. 74-5968)

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General Electric Co. v. Gilbert (No. 74-1589)

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Goldberg v. United States (No. 74-6293)

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Greer v. Spock (No. 74-848)

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Gregg v. Georgia (No. 74-6257)

Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

Hampton v. United States (No. 74-5822)

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Hancock v. Train (No. 74-220)

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Henderson v. Morgan (No. 74-1529)

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Hills v. Gautreaux (No. 74-1047)

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Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight (No. 74-1025)

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Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Assn. (No. 74-1606)

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Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees (No. 74-1452)

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Hudgens v. NLRB (No. 74-773)

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Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. (No. 74-1607)

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Hynes v. Mayor Of Oradell (No. 74-1329)

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Imbler v. Pachtman (No. 74-5435)

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Jurek v. Texas (No. 75-5394)

Is the death penalty a "cruel and unusual" punishment? Is Texas' capital-sentencing procedure unconstitutional?

The Court held that the death penalty was not per se a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Furthermore, the capital sentencing procedure in Texas was not unconstitutional on the theory that it would result in arbitrary and freakish impositions of the death penalty. While death penalty sentencing systems which permit juries to consider only aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances are unconstitutional, Texas' sentencing system is not like this. Under its sentencing scheme, Texas juries may consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances there may be - thus allowing them to ponder not only why the death penalty should be imposed, but also why it should not. These options sufficiently focus the juries' attention on the defendant's unique circumstances and character, thus meeting constitutional requirements of particularity.

Kelley v. Johnson (No. 74-1269)

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Kerr v. United States District Court (No. 74-1023)

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Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc. (No. 74-521)

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Kleppe v. New Mexico (No. 74-1488)

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Kleppe v. Sierra Club (No. 75-552)

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Lavine v. Milne (No. 74-1137)

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Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel (No. 74-1245)

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Ludwig v. Massachusetts (No. 75-377)

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Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n (No. 75-185)

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Mass. Board of Retirement v. Murgia (No. 74-1044)

Did the Massachusetts law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the right of governmental employment was not per se fundamental, and that uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class under the Clause. Applying a rational relationship test, the Court reasoned that the statute was sufficiently justified as a means of protecting the public "by assuring physical preparedness of [the] uniformed police." The Court noted that while the law may not have been the best means to accomplish this purpose, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because of its imperfections.

Mathews v. Eldridge (No. 74-204)

Did the lack of an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

No. In an 6-to-2 decision, the Court held that the initial termination of Eldridge's benefits without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court noted that due process was "flexible" and called for "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." The Court found that there were numerous safeguards to prevents errors in making decisions to terminate disability benefits and argued that "[a]t some point the benefit or an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society, in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."

Mathews v. Lucas (No. 75-88)

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Mathews v. Weber (No. 74-850)

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Mcdonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. (No. 75-260)

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Mckinney v. Alabama (No. 74-532)

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Meachum v. Fano (No. 75-252)

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Michelin Tire Corporation v. Wages (No. 74-1396)

Did the Gwinnett County tax violate the Import-Export Clause by taxing goods that maintained the character of imports?

The Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, finding the tax to be valid. The Court stated that the Framers of the Constitution had adopted the Import-Export Clause to give the federal government a source of revenue and the superior position to regulate such foreign trade. This was to overcome the problems under the Articles of Confederation where states lacked uniformity in import regulation, burdening inter-state trade. The property tax was consistent with the Import-Export Clause because it did not (1) interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce (2) deprive the Federal Government of its exclusive right to revenues from imposts and duties on imports (3) interfere with the free flow of goods between the states. It taxed the use of the property and was not based on the origin of the goods.

Michigan v. Mosley (No. 74-653)

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Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes (No. 74-1656)

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Montanye v. Haymes (No. 74-520)

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NAACP v. FPC (No. 74-1608)

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Nader v. Allegheny Airlines (No. 75-455)

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National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe (No. 73-2066)

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Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart (No. 75-817)

Did the judge's order violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."

New Hampshire v. Maine (No. 64 ORIG)

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New Orleans v. Dukes (No. 74-775)

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North v. Russell (No. 74-1409)

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Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast (No. 75-145)

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Norton v. Mathews (No. 74-6212)

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Ohio v. Gallagher (No. 74-492)

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Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp. (No. 74-1254)

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Pasadena City Bd. Of Education v. Spangler (No. 75-164)

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Paul v. Davis (No. 74-891)

Did the distribution of the flyer violate Davis's right to privacy and liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of any constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The Court also emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover Davis's claims. The Court argued that the constitutional right to privacy was limited to matters relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." The publication of records of official acts, such as arrests, did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights.

Pennsylvania v. New Jersey (No. 68 ORIG)

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Planned Parenthood Of Missouri v. Danforth (No. 74-1151)

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Proffitt v. Florida (No. 75-5706)

Is the death penalty a "cruel and unusual" punishment? Is Florida's capital-sentencing procedure unconstitutional?

No and no. The Court held that the death penalty was not a "cruel and unusual" punishment per se, and that Florida's capital-sentencing procedure was not unconstitutionally arbitrary and/or capricious. Although empowering trial judges with sole sentencing authority, the statutory procedure tightly prescribed their relevant decision-making process. The procedure requires sentencing judges to focus on both the crime's circumstances and the defendant's character by weighing eight statutory aggravating factors against seven statutory mitigating factors. Furthermore, sentencing judges are required to submit a written explanation of their death-sentence finding for the purpose of automatic review by Florida's Supreme Court. Such strict requirements sufficiently safeguard against the presence of any constitutional deficiencies arising from an arbitrary and/or capricious imposition of the death penalty.

Quinn v. Muscare (No. 75-130)

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Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co. (No. 75-268)

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Ristaino v. Ross (No. 74-1216)

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Rizzo v. Goode (No. 74-942)

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Roberts v. Louisiana (No. 75-5844)

Does Louisiana's death-penalty sentencing scheme violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' safeguards against arbitrary and capricious death penalty impositions?

Yes. By mandating the death penalty's imposition for certain crimes, Louisiana's sentencing scheme fails to afford juries the constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating factors presented either by the circumstances of the crime or the individual offender's character. The Supreme Court also held that by requiring jurors to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second-degree murder, even if no evidence exits to support such verdicts, Louisiana's sentencing scheme encourages them to disregard their oaths by recommending a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel that the death penalty is inappropriate.

Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd. (No. 74-730)

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Runyon v. Mccrary (No. 75-62)

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Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. (No. 75-110)

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Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (No. 75-292)

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Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (No. 74-1124)

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Singleton v. Wulff (No. 74-1393)

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South Dakota v. Opperman (No. 75-76)

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Stone v. Powell (No. 74-1055)

Were federal courts obligated to consider claims of illegal searches and seizures after such claims had been decided by state courts?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that where states had provided opportunities for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, the Constitution did not require the granting of federal habeas corpus relief. The Court also held that any additional benefits from considering search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review would be small in relation to the costs. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment values protected by the exclusionary rule would not be significantly enhanced in such situations and that deterrence of police misconduct was unlikely to increase.

Tennessee v. Dunlap (No. 75-95)

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Texas v. Louisiana (No. 36 ORIG)

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Texas v. White (No. 75-124)

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Thermtron Products, Inc., v. Hermansdorfer (No. 74-206)

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Time, Inc. v. Firestone (No. 74-944)

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Train v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research Group (No. 74-1270)

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Transamerican Freight v. Brada Miller (No. 74-54)

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Tsc Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. (No. 74-1471)

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Union Electric Co. v. Epa (No. 74-1542)

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United States v. Agurs (No. 75-491)

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United States v. Bornstein (No. 74-712)

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United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. (No. 75-420)

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United States v. Dinitz (No. 74-928)

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United States v. Foster Lumber Co. (No. 74-799)

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United States v. Gaddis (No. 74-1141)

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United States v. Hopkins (No. 75-246)

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United States v. Janis (No. 74-958)

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United States v. Maccollom (No. 74-1487)

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United States v. Mandujano (No. 74-754)

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United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (No. 74-1560)

Do such stops violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures?

No, because if there is a reasonable collective suspicion, then individuals can be searched in the interest of public safety. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the 7-to-2 majority, said: "The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.... But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."

Prepared by Michael Brandow.

United States v. Miller (No. 74-1179)

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United States v. Moore (No. 74-687)

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United States v. Moore (No. 74-759)

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United States v. Orleans (No. 75-328)

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United States v. Powell (No. 74-884)

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United States v. Santana (No. 75-19)

Did the search violate the Fourth Amendment?

The Court upheld the search. Relying on the the Court's decision in United States v. Watson (1976), Justice Rehnquist argued that by standing on her porch when the officers arrived, Santana was "not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy." Since the police had probable cause to arrest and search her at that point, their behavior was consistent with the Court's Watson precedent.

United States v. Testan (No. 74-753)

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United States v. United Continental Tuna (No. 74-869)

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United States v. Watson (No. 74-538)

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Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. (No. 74-1302)

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Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council (No. 74-895)

Is a statutory ban on advertising prescription drug prices by licensed pharmacists a violation of "commercial speech" under the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.

Washington v. Davis (No. 74-1492)

Did the recruiting procedures violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification.

Woodson v. North Carolina (No. 75-5491)

Did the mandatory death penalty law violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the North Carolina law was unconstitutional. The Court found three problems with the law: First, the law "depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards" concerning death sentences. The historical record indicated that the public had rejected mandatory death sentences. Second, the law provided no standards to guide juries in their exercise of "the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die." Third, the statute failed to allow consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before inflicting the death penalty. The Court noted that "the fundamental respect for humanity" underlying the Eighth Amendment required such considerations.

Youakim v. Miller (No. 73-6935)

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Young v. American Mini Theatres (No. 75-312)

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