Cases - 1948 term

Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.

Mon, 08 Nov 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Nebraska State Capitol

1445 K St Lincoln NE 68508

Lincoln, NE 68508

United States

40° 48' 29.124" N, 98° 41' 58.5132" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellant

Lincoln Federal Labor Union

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Consolidation

No. 34, Whitaker et al. v. North Carolina

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

335 U.S. 525 (1949)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1948

Decided

Monday, January 3, 1949

Advocates

Herbert S. Thatcher (argued the cause for appellants in both cases )

George Pennell (argued the cause for the appellants in No. 34)

Irving Hill (argued the cause for the Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., appellee in No. 47)

Edson Smith (argued the cause for the Nebraska Small Business Men's Association, appellees in No. 47)

Robert A. Nelson (Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska, for the State of Nebraska, appellees in No. 47)

Ralph Moody (Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, argued the cause for appellee in No. 34)

Facts of the Case

In 1946, Nebraska amended its Constitution to provide that no one could be denied employment on the basis of membership or non-membership in a labor organization. A number of labor unions challenged the provision and several other right-to-work laws. This case was decided together with Whitaker v. North Carolina.

Question

Did the Nebraska Constitution as amended violate either the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not prevent states from prohibiting contracts to engage in conduct banned by valid state laws. The liberty of persons to make contracts did not prevent Nebraska from enacting anti-discrimination statutes. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause was "no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions that they regard as offensive to the public welfare."

Wolf v. Colorado

Tue, 19 Oct 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Wolf

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

338 U.S. 25 (1949)

Argued

Tuesday, October 19, 1948

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1949

Facts of the Case

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld a number of convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.

Question

Were the states required to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient.

Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond

Mon, 13 Dec 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Hood & Sons Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

DuMond

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

336 U.S. 525 (1949)

Argued

Monday, December 13, 1948

Decided

Monday, April 4, 1949

Facts of the Case

The Hood Company, a Massachusetts company, owned three milk-receiving stations in New York. The company distributed milk from these facilities in Boston. When the company sought a license for another receiving station in New York, state officials denied its request on the grounds that expanding Hood's facilities would reduce the local supply of milk and result in destructive competition. The company appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

Question

Was New York's denial of the license unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that New York's restriction on business activity was an unconstitutional application of the Commerce Clause. The Court held that the system fostered by the Clause must be one in which "every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty he will have free access to every market in the Nation." The Court also emphasized the economic interdependence of the states, warning that "fantastic rivalries. . .and reprisals" would ensue if the states were allowed to enact local protectionist measures.

Terminiello v. Chicago

Tue, 01 Feb 1949 13:00:00 +0000

Location

A municipal Auditorium

S Ashland Avenue and W Monroe Street Chicago IL 60607

Chicago, IL 60607

United States

41° 52' 48.6084" N, 87° 40' 0.6096" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

272

Petitioner

Terminiello

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chicago

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

337 U.S. 1 (1949)

Argued

Tuesday, February 1, 1949

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1949

Advocates

L. Louis Karton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Albert W. Dilling (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot.

Question

Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Kovacs v. Cooper

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 08:01:20 +0000

Location

Where Kovacs was amplifying his speech

South Stockton Street Trenton NJ

Trenton, NJ

United States

40° 13' 8.6304" N, 74° 45' 33.9012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Charles Kovacs

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Albert Cooper Jr., Judge of the First District Police Court of Trenton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

336 U.S. 77 (1949)

Decided

Monday, January 31, 1949

Facts of the Case

Charles Kovacs was driven around Trenton, New Jersey. He played music and spoke through an amplifier that he had placed on the truck in which he was riding. He was convicted for violating Ordinance No. 430 of the City of Trenton, which prohibited the use of sound amplifiers and other instruments that emitted "loud and raucous noises" on public streets. He appealed his conviction to the New Jersey Supreme Court, alleging that the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld his conviction, as did the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals.

Question

Did Trenton's Ordinance 430 violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a 5-4 decision, the court affirmed the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals and upheld Kovacs' conviction. Writing for the three-justice plurality, Justice Stanley F. Reed reiterated that the "fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute", and as in Saia v. New York, "the hours and place of public discussion can be controlled." Trenton was granted the authority to prevent "disturbing noises" and "protect the wellbeing and tranquility of a community." Since the ordinance furthered Trenton's interest in maintaining "the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers," the ordinance did not violate the Free Speech Clause. Justices Robert H. Jackson and Felix Frankfurter each concurred separately.

Goesaert v. Cleary

jgoldman — Fri, 19 Nov 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Goesaert's Bar

23481 Michigan Avenue Dearborn MI 48124

Dearborn, MI 48124

United States

42° 18' 4.7808" N, 83° 15' 53.0928" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellant

Goesaert et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Cleary et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

335 U.S. 464 (1948)

Argued

Friday, November 19, 1948

Decided

Monday, December 20, 1948

Advocates

Anne R. Davidow (argued the cause for the appellants)

Edmund E. Shepherd (Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three- judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the bartenders' claim.

Question

Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."

Railway Express Agency v. New York

jgoldman — Mon, 06 Dec 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Railway Express Agency

219 East 42nd Street New York NY 10017

New York, NY 10017

United States

40° 45' 2.286" N, 73° 58' 22.8504" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellant

Railway Express Agency, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

New York

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

336 U.S. 106 (1949)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1948

Decided

Monday, January 31, 1949

Advocates

Ralph M. Carson (argued the cause for the appellants)

Stanley Buchsbaum (argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

A New York City traffic ordinance prohibited the display of commercial advertising on vehicles using public streets. The ordinance exempted advertisements displayed on vehicles that related to the business interests of the owners. Express Railway Agency(ERA) sold space on the sides of its trucks for unrelated advertising until a police court convicted it for violating the ordinance. A state court of special sessions and the Court of Appeals of the State of New York both affirmed. ERA argued that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause since the distinction between related and unrelated advertisements was not relevant to the purpose of the ordinance.

Question

Did a New York City traffic ordinance that prohibited vehicles from displaying advertisements unrelated to the owner's business interests violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court found that the ordinance was valid because it functioned to limit distractions to motorists, the purpose for which it was intended. The Court ruled that "it is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Therefore, a city could ban some advertisements that distracted pedestrians without having to eliminate every distraction. Though concurring with the Court's decision, Justice Robert H. Jackson famously wrote that "there is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose on a minority must be imposed generally."