Cases - 1940-1949 term

Communications Assn. v. Douds

Mon, 10 Oct 1949 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Communications Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Douds

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1949-1953)

Opinion

339 U.S. 382 (1950)

Argued

October 10-11, 1949

Decided

Monday, May 8, 1950

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

United States v. Rabinowitz

Wed, 11 Jan 1950 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

293

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rabinowitz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1949-1953)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1949-1953)

Opinion

339 U.S. 56 (1950)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1950

Decided

Monday, February 20, 1950

Facts of the Case

FBI agents arrested Rabinowitz in his one-room office. Rabinowitz was charged with selling and possessing forged government stamps. The officers searched his office without a search warrant and seized the stamps. The stamps were introduced as evidence. Rabinowitz was convicted. He appealed.

Question

Did the search violate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement?

Conclusion

The Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. The search may be of the person arrested and of the premises where the arrest occurs.

Sweatt v. Painter

Tue, 04 Apr 1950 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Texas Law School

727 E Dean Keeton St Austin TX 78705

Austin, TX 78705

United States

30° 17' 20.4288" N, 97° 43' 49.0296" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Heman Marion Sweatt

Respondent

Painter

Heard By

Vinson Court (1949-1953)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1949-1953)

Opinion

339 U.S. 629 (1950)

Argued

Tuesday, April 4, 1950

Decided

Monday, June 5, 1950

Facts of the Case

In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.

Question

Did the Texas admissions scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.

West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette

Thu, 11 Mar 1943 13:00:00 +0000

Location

West Virginia Board of Education

1900 Kanawha Boulevard East Charleston WV 25305

Charleston, WV 25305

United States

38° 20' 16.6344" N, 81° 36' 36.72" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

591

Petitioner

West Virginia State Board of Ed.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barnette

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

319 U.S. 624 (1943)

Argued

Thursday, March 11, 1943

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1943

Facts of the Case

The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the Flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency.

Question

Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Barnette, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend 1; W. Va. Code § 1734

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and was antithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson argued that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

Hirabayashi v. United States

Mon, 10 May 1943 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

870

Petitioner

Hirabayashi

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

320 U.S. 81 (1943)

Argued

Monday, May 10, 1943

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1943

Facts of the Case

In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United States. He issued two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of War the power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from them. The second established the War Relocation Authority which had the power to remove, maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order.

Question

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry."

Wickard v. Filburn

Tue, 13 Oct 1942 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Roscoe Filburn's Farm

5200 Salem Ave Dayton OH 45426

Dayton, OH 45426

United States

39° 49' 17.5332" N, 84° 16' 50.1456" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Wickard

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Filburn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1942-1943)

Decided By

Stone Court (1942-1943)

Opinion

317 U.S. 111 (1942)

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 1942

Decided

Monday, November 9, 1942

Facts of the Case

Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the government to set production quotas for wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment. He claimed that he wanted thewheat for use on his farm, including feed for his poultry and livestock. Fiburn was penalized. He argued that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use.

Question

Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Wickard, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Agricultural Adjustment Act

According to Filburn, the act regulated production and consumption, which are local in character. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is local and not regarded as commerce, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"

Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.

Mon, 08 Nov 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Nebraska State Capitol

1445 K St Lincoln NE 68508

Lincoln, NE 68508

United States

40° 48' 29.124" N, 98° 41' 58.5132" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellant

Lincoln Federal Labor Union

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Consolidation

No. 34, Whitaker et al. v. North Carolina

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

335 U.S. 525 (1949)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1948

Decided

Monday, January 3, 1949

Advocates

Herbert S. Thatcher (argued the cause for appellants in both cases )

George Pennell (argued the cause for the appellants in No. 34)

Irving Hill (argued the cause for the Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., appellee in No. 47)

Edson Smith (argued the cause for the Nebraska Small Business Men's Association, appellees in No. 47)

Robert A. Nelson (Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska, for the State of Nebraska, appellees in No. 47)

Ralph Moody (Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, argued the cause for appellee in No. 34)

Facts of the Case

In 1946, Nebraska amended its Constitution to provide that no one could be denied employment on the basis of membership or non-membership in a labor organization. A number of labor unions challenged the provision and several other right-to-work laws. This case was decided together with Whitaker v. North Carolina.

Question

Did the Nebraska Constitution as amended violate either the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not prevent states from prohibiting contracts to engage in conduct banned by valid state laws. The liberty of persons to make contracts did not prevent Nebraska from enacting anti-discrimination statutes. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause was "no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions that they regard as offensive to the public welfare."

Wolf v. Colorado

Tue, 19 Oct 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Wolf

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

338 U.S. 25 (1949)

Argued

Tuesday, October 19, 1948

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1949

Facts of the Case

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld a number of convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.

Question

Were the states required to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient.

Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond

Mon, 13 Dec 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Hood & Sons Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

DuMond

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

336 U.S. 525 (1949)

Argued

Monday, December 13, 1948

Decided

Monday, April 4, 1949

Facts of the Case

The Hood Company, a Massachusetts company, owned three milk-receiving stations in New York. The company distributed milk from these facilities in Boston. When the company sought a license for another receiving station in New York, state officials denied its request on the grounds that expanding Hood's facilities would reduce the local supply of milk and result in destructive competition. The company appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

Question

Was New York's denial of the license unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that New York's restriction on business activity was an unconstitutional application of the Commerce Clause. The Court held that the system fostered by the Clause must be one in which "every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty he will have free access to every market in the Nation." The Court also emphasized the economic interdependence of the states, warning that "fantastic rivalries. . .and reprisals" would ensue if the states were allowed to enact local protectionist measures.

Terminiello v. Chicago

Tue, 01 Feb 1949 13:00:00 +0000

Location

A municipal Auditorium

S Ashland Avenue and W Monroe Street Chicago IL 60607

Chicago, IL 60607

United States

41° 52' 48.6084" N, 87° 40' 0.6096" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

272

Petitioner

Terminiello

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chicago

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

337 U.S. 1 (1949)

Argued

Tuesday, February 1, 1949

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1949

Advocates

L. Louis Karton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Albert W. Dilling (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot.

Question

Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corporation

Thu, 05 Apr 1945 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

656

Petitioner

Sinclair & Carroll Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Interchemical Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

325 U.S. 327

Argued

Thursday, April 5, 1945

Decided

Monday, May 21, 1945

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Thomas v. Collins

Wed, 11 Oct 1944 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Thomas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Collins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

323 U.S. 516 (1945)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 1944

Decided

Monday, January 8, 1945

Facts of the Case

A Texas law required union officials to obtain an organizer's card before soliciting possible members. A judge convicted a labor organizer of contempt for speaking at a union rally without a permit.

Question

Does the Texas law requiring labor organizers to secure permission to solicit members violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes, the law was unconstitutional. It interfered with freedom of speech and freedom of assembly which possesses "a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

Korematsu v. United States

Wed, 11 Oct 1944 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Korematsu

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

323 U.S. 214 (1944)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 1944

Decided

Monday, December 18, 1944

Facts of the Case

During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.

Question

Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Executive Order 9066; U.S. Const. amend. 5

The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan

Mon, 26 Mar 1945 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Southern Pacific Co. headquarters

1 Market Street San Francisco CA 94117

San Francisco, CA 94117

United States

37° 47' 38.7636" N, 122° 23' 42.396" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Southern Pacific Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona ex rel. Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

325 U.S. 761 (1945)

Argued

Monday, March 26, 1945

Decided

Monday, June 18, 1945

Facts of the Case

Arizona banned operation of trains more than 14 passenger cars of 70 freight cars long.

Question

Was the Arizona law an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Southern Pacific Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912

Yes it was such a burden. The Arizona law imposed a stiff burden on the railroad. It had to operate 30 percent more trains in the state, and it had to break up and remake trains passing through the state. The total cost was several million dollars a year. Moreover, more trains would produce more accidents and the state's safety argument was empirically weak. The innovation in this decision was Stone's use of an "interest-balancing" standard of review, which proved more demanding than the earlier "rational basis" test.

Associated Press v. U. S.

Tue, 05 Dec 1944 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Associated Press

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U. S.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Tribune Co. and McComick v. United States, No. 58

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

326 U.S. 1 (1945)

Argued

December 5-6, 1944

Decided

Monday, June 18, 1945

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Betts v. Brady

Mon, 13 Apr 1942 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Circuit Court for Carroll County

55 N. Court Street Westminster MD 21157

Westminster, MD 21157

United States

39° 34' 14.9016" N, 76° 59' 15.7308" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

837

Petitioner

Betts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brady

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Opinion

316 U.S. 455 (1942)

Granted

Monday, February 16, 1942

Argued

April 13-14, 1942

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1942

Advocates

Jesse Slingluff Jr. (argued the cause for the petitioner)

G. Van Velsor Wolf (argued the cause for the petitioner)

William C. Walsh (Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for the respondent)

Robert E. Clapp Jr. (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. An indigent, he was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty while maintaining he had a right to counsel and arguing his own defense.

Question

Does denying a request for counsel for an indigent defendant violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces the defendant's right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. The Court ruled that the previously discovered right to counsel provided by the fourteenth amendment does not compel states to provide counsel to any defendant. Justice Owen Roberts' opinion asserted that the right to counsel merely prevented the state from interfering in a defendant’s request for representation rather than requiring a state to offer counsel.

Parker v. Brown

Tue, 05 May 1942 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Parker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1942-1943)

Opinion

317 U.S. 341 (1943)

Argued

Tuesday, May 5, 1942

Reargued:

Monday, October 12, 1942

Decided

Monday, January 4, 1943

Advocates

Walter L. Bowers (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Robert L. Stern (As amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

G. Levin Aynesworth (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

In 1933, the state of California enacted the California Prorate Act. The Act restricted competition among producers in order to stabilize prices. Brown, a raisin producer, attempted to enjoin enforcement of the Act on the ground that he was sustaining irreparable economic injuries under the program because of its regulations on contracts.

Question

Did the California Act violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the program created by the California Prorate Act of 1933 was a regulation of state industry of local concern that did not impair national control over commerce. The Court noted that states had authority to regulate local matters so long as they did not materially obstruct commerce. The Court also found that the effects of the California Act paralleled the desired effects of congressional legislation. Since both California and the Congress were attempting to stabilize agricultural prices, no conflict between local and national interests was present.

Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire

Thu, 05 Feb 1942 13:00:00 +0000

Location

East side of Wakefield Street

Wakefield Street Rochester NH 03867

Rochester, NH 03867

United States

43° 18' 42.2208" N, 70° 58' 38.8596" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

255

Petitioner

Chaplinsky

Respondent

State of New Hampshire

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Opinion

315 U.S. 568 (1942)

Argued

Thursday, February 5, 1942

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1942

Facts of the Case

Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a city marshal a "God-damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for violating a breach of the peace.

Question

Does the application of the statute violate Chaplinsky's freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

No. Some forms of expression--among them obscenity and fighting words--do not convey ideas and thus are not subject to First Amendment protection. In this case, Chaplinsky uttered fighting words, i.e., words that "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."

Edwards v. California

Tue, 21 Oct 1941 13:00:00 +0000

Location

California border near Yuma, AZ CA

United States

32° 43' 42.15" N, 114° 37' 25.968" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Opinion

314 U.S. 160 (1941)

Argued

Tuesday, October 21, 1941

Decided

Monday, November 24, 1941

Advocates

Samuel Slaff (Argued the cause for the appellant )

W. T. Sweigert (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

At the height of the Great Depression, anyone who knowingly assisted a pauper in entering the state of California was guilty of a misdemeanor. A Californian named Edwards drove to Texas and then returned to California with his indigent brother-in-law. Edwards was found guilty of violating the state's "Okie law;" he was given a six-month suspended jail sentence.

Question

Does the Calfornia law violate the Constitution's Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Yes, the Commerce Clause forbids a state to exclude indigents. California's interest in the health of its citizens and the sufficiency of its welfare funds do not justify the burden on interstate commerce occasioned by the law. Byrnes's unanimous opinion observed that "the indigent non-residents who are the real victims of this statute are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy." (See Mayor of New York v. Miln.)

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson

Wed, 06 May 1942 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Oklahoma General Assembly

2300 N Lincoln Blvd. Oklahoma City OK 73105

Oklahoma City, OK 73105

United States

35° 29' 27.492" N, 97° 30' 12.258" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

782

Petitioner

Skinner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Opinion

316 U.S. 535 (1942)

Argued

Wednesday, May 6, 1942

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1942

Facts of the Case

Oklahoma's Criminal Sterilization Act allowed the state to sterilize a person who had been convicted three or more times of crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude."

Question

Did the Act violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

A unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since some crimes such as embezzlement, punishable as felonies in Oklahoma, were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction, Justice Douglas reasoned that the law had laid "an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense." Moreover, Douglas viewed procreation as one of the fundamental rights requiring the judiciary's strict scrutiny.

United States v. Pink

Mon, 15 Dec 1941 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New York State Insurance Department

25 Beaver Street New York NY 10004

New York, NY 10004

United States

40° 42' 18.0072" N, 74° 0' 44.2836" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pink

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Opinion

315 U.S. 203 (1942)

Argued

Monday, December 15, 1941

Decided

Monday, February 2, 1942

Facts of the Case

In a case similar to United States v. Belmont (1937), the United States attempted to assist the Soviet Union in recovering assets of the First Russian Insurance Company which the New York Superintendent of Insurance refused to release.

Question

Did U.S. agreements with the U.S.S.R. compel New York to release the assets?

Conclusion

The Court required New York to release the assets. Justice Douglas affirmed Justice Sutherland's reasoning in Belmont and argued that New York could not "rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs . . . is vested in the national government exclusively."

FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.

Wed, 20 Oct 1943 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Federal Power Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hope Natural Gas Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

City of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co., No. 35

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

320 U.S. 591 (1944)

Argued

October 20-21, 1943

Decided

Monday, January 3, 1944

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Smith v. Allwright

Wed, 12 Jan 1944 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Harris County Clerk

201 Caroline Street Houston TX 77002

Houston, TX 77002

United States

29° 45' 38.934" N, 95° 21' 27.4572" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Smith

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Allwright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

321 U.S. 649 (1944)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1944

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1944

Facts of the Case

A resolution of the Democratic Party of Texas, a group that the Texas Supreme Court had deemed a "voluntary association," allowed only whites to participate in Democratic primary elections. S.S. Allwright was a county election official; he denied Lonnie E. Smith, a black man, the right to vote in the 1940 Texas Democratic primary.

Question

Did denying blacks the right to vote in primary elections violate the Fifteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court overruled its decision in Grovey v. Townsend (1935) and found the restrictions against blacks unconstitutional. Even though the Democratic Party was a voluntary organization, the fact that Texas statutes governed the selection of county-level party leaders, the party conducted primary elections under state statutory authority, and state courts were given exclusive original jurisdiction over contested elections, guaranteed for blacks the right to vote in primaries. Allwright engaged in state action abridging Smith's right to vote because of his race. A state cannot "permit a private organization to practice racial discrimination" in elections, argued Justice Reed. (The Court's decision in this matter was amended on June 12, 1944.)

Yakus v. U.S.

Fri, 07 Jan 1944 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

374

Petitioner

Yakus

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Rottenberg, et al. v. United States, No. 375

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

321 U.S. 414 (1944)

Argued

Friday, January 7, 1944

Decided

Monday, March 27, 1944

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

United Public Workers v. Mitchell

Thu, 17 Oct 1946 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

United Public Workers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mitchell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

330 U.S. 75 (1947)

Argued

Thursday, October 17, 1946

Decided

Monday, February 10, 1947

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Adamson v. California

Wed, 15 Jan 1947 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Stella Blauvelt's apartment (murder victim)

"744 South Catalina Street**** Apartment 410" Los Angeles CA 90005

Los Angeles, CA 90005

United States

34° 3' 30.3696" N, 118° 17' 42.1332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

102

Petitioner

Dewey Adamson

Respondent

California

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

332 U.S. 46 (1947)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 1947

Decided

Thursday, January 23, 1947

Advocates

Walter L. Bowers (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Morris Lavine (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

Adamson was convicted in California of murder in the first degree. During the trial, the prosecutor, in accordance with a California law, made comments to the jury which highlighted Adamson's decision not to testify on his own behalf.

Question

Is a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against himself applicable in state courts and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend 14, Section 1; Amend 5

A divided Court found that the the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause did not extend to defendants a Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against themselves in state courts. Citing past decisions such as Twining v. New Jersey (1908), which explicitly denied the application of the due process clause to the right against self-incrimination, and Palko v. Connecticut (1937), Justice Reed argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend carte blanche all of the immunities and privileges of the first ten amendments to individuals at the state level. In a lengthy dissent which included a deep investigation of the Fourteenth Amendment's history, Justice Black argued for the absolute and complete application of the Bill of Rights to the states.

Louisiana v. Resweber

Mon, 18 Nov 1946 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

142

Petitioner

Louisiana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Resweber

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

329 U.S. 459 (1947)

Argued

Monday, November 18, 1946

Decided

Monday, January 13, 1947

Advocates

Michael E. Culligan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

L. O. Pecot (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James Skelly Wright (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Willie Francis, a 16-year-old black youth, was convicted of murder in Louisiana and sentenced to death by electrocution. On the appointed day, Francis was strapped in the chair and the executioner threw the switch. Electric current passed through Francis's body but it was insufficient to kill him. The malfunction required a repair of the chair. In the meantime Francis sought to prevent the second execution attempt.

Question

Does the second attempted execution deny Francis due process of law because of double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and because of cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

No and no. The equipment failure does not bring due process into play. This was not the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence. And the cruelty of the Eighth Amendment refers to cruelty in method, not that cruelty which is part of the actual suffering accompanying a lawful sentence of death.

Everson v. Board of Education

Wed, 20 Nov 1946 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Everson

508 Maple Avenue Ewing NJ 08618

Ewing, NJ 08618

United States

40° 14' 39.2136" N, 74° 46' 46.2432" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Everson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Board of Education

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

330 U.S. 1 (1947)

Argued

Wednesday, November 20, 1946

Decided

Monday, February 10, 1947

Advocates

Edward R. Burke (Argued the cause for the appellant)

William H. Speer (Argued the cause for the appellees)

E. Hilton Jackson (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

A New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school on buses operated by the public transportation system. Children who attended Catholic schools also qualified for this transportation subsidy.

Question

Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history and importance of the Establishment Clause, Justice Black argued that services like bussing and police and fire protection for parochial schools are "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function" that for the state to provide them would not violate the First Amendment. The law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was simply a law enacted as a "general program" to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.

Bute v. Illinois

Thu, 12 Feb 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

398

Petitioner

Bute

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

333 U.S. 640 (1948)

Argued

Thursday, February 12, 1948

Decided

Monday, April 19, 1948

Facts of the Case

Bute was charged with taking indecent liberties with children. He did not have an attorney and the trial court did not appoint one for him. Bute pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twenty years in prison.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require an attorney for Bute's defense?

Conclusion

No, an attorney is not required. Due process does not require states to provide counsel or to determine whether the defendant wants counsel. State courts are not bound by the procedures that federal courts are bound to follow. State court procedures are permissible unless they violate "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." This case was reversed by Gideon v. Wainwright (1963).

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.

Tue, 13 Jan 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

280

Petitioner

Funk Bros. Seed Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kalo Inoculant Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

333 U.S. 127

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 1948

Decided

Monday, February 16, 1948

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Shelley v. Kraemer

Thu, 15 Jan 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Shelley and Kraemer's Neighborhood

Labadie Avenue St. Louis MO

St. Louis, MO

United States

38° 39' 56.4012" N, 90° 14' 38.7312" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Shelley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kraemer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

McGhee v. Sipes, No. 87

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

334 U.S. 1 (1948)

Argued

January 15-16, 1948

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1948

Facts of the Case

The Kraemers were a white couple who owned a residence in a Missouri neighborhood governed by a restrictive covenant. This was a private agreement that prevented blacks from owning property in the Kraemers' subdivision. The Shelleys were a black couple who moved into the Kraemers neighborhood. The Kraemers went to court to enforce the restrictive covenant against the Shelleys.

Question

Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Shelley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const Amend 14

State courts could not constitutionally prevent the sale of real property to blacks even if that property is covered by a racially restrictive covenant. Standing alone, racially restrictive covenants violate no rights. However, their enforcement by state court injunctions constitute state action in violation of the 14th Amendment.

McCollum v. Board of Education Dist. 71

Mon, 08 Dec 1947 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Public School Champaign, IL

United States

40° 6' 59.112" N, 88° 14' 36.1788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

McCollum

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Board of Education Dist. 71

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

333 U.S. 203 (1948)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1947

Decided

Monday, March 8, 1948

Facts of the Case

In 1940, members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and some Protestant faiths formed a voluntary association called the Champaign (Illinois) Council on Religious Education. Cooperating with the Champaign Board of Education, the Council offered voluntary classes in religious instruction to public school pupils. The courses were conducted in the regular classrooms of the school building. Students who did not attend the religious instruction were required to go to some other place in the building to pursue secular studies.

Question

Did the use of the public school system for religious classes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Yes. The Court held that the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council violated the Establishment clause. Because pupils were required to attend school and were released in part from this legal duty if they attended the religious classes, the Court found that the Champaign system was "beyond question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups and to spread the faith."

Marsh v. Alabama

Thu, 06 Dec 1945 13:00:00 +0000

Location

US Post Office

120 North Craft Highway Chickasaw AL 36611

Chickasaw, AL 36611

United States

30° 45' 43.38" N, 88° 4' 26.6772" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

114

Appellant

Grace Marsh

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

State of Alabama

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Stone Court (1945-1946)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

326 U.S. 501 (1945)

Argued

Thursday, December 6, 1945

Decided

Sunday, January 7, 1945

Advocates

Hayden C. Covington (argued the cause for the appellant)

William N. McQueen (Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, attempted to distribute religious literature on the sidewalk near a post office in Chickasaw, Alabama. The town of Chickasaw is owned and run by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation and is not a public municipality. Despite this, the town exhibits most of the same characteristics as any other town. After being informed that she was on private property and told to stop distribution of her religious material, Marsh refused. She was arrested, tried, and convicted of trepass.

Question

Did Alabama violate Marsh's rights under the First and Fourteenth amendments by refusing to allow her to distribute religious material in the privately owned town of Chickasaw?

Conclusion

Yes. In an opinion by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court found, 5 to 3, that there was no significant difference between the relationship between Chickasaw and private citizens and the relationship between any other town and its citizens. As such, it employed a balancing test, weighing private property rights against an individual's right to free speech. Favoring the latter, the Court ruled in Marsh's favor.

Colegrove v. Green

Thu, 07 Mar 1946 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Illinois General Assembly

S 2nd Street and E Capitol Avenue Springfield IL 62701

Springfield, IL 62701

United States

39° 47' 53.9124" N, 89° 38' 52.638" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

804

Petitioner

Colegrove

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Green

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1945-1946)

Decided By

Stone Court (1946)

Opinion

328 U.S. 549 (1946)

Argued

Thursday, March 7, 1946

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1946

Facts of the Case

Kenneth W. Colegrove, a citizen of Illinois and a Northwestern University political scientist, brought suit against Illinois officials to enjoin them from holding an upcoming election. Colegrove argued that the congressional districts "lacked compactness of territory and approximate equality of population."

Question

Did the Illinois congressional districts unconstitutionally violate principles of fair apportionment?

Conclusion

The Court held that the Illinois districts were constitutional, largely because existing laws imposed no requirements "as to the compactness, contiguity and equality in population of districts." In a plurality opinion, Frankfurter declined to involve the Court in the districting process, arguing that the political nature of apportionment precluded judicial intervention. "The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress."

United States v. Classic

Mon, 07 Apr 1941 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New Orleans 10th Ward New Orleans, LA

United States

29° 56' 11.2272" N, 90° 4' 3.612" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

618

Appellant

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Patrick B. Classic et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Hughes Court (1941)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1941)

Opinion

313 U.S. 299 (1941)

Argued

Monday, April 7, 1941

Decided

Monday, May 26, 1941

Advocates

Herbert Wechsler (argued the cause for the United States)

Warren O. Coleman (argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

Two federal indictments were brought against Patrick B. Classic and five other election commissioners for the Louisiana second congressional district alleging conspiracy and corruption in the Democratic primary contest for U.S. Representative. The charges stated that the commissioners willfully miscounted and altered ballots cast in the primary. A federal statute makes it a crime to deny citizens rights guaranteed to them under the U.S. Constitution, and this includes the right to choose representatives. The defendants successfully challenged the indictment, citing the 1921 decision Newberry v. United States which held that primaries were not subject to the same Congressional oversight as general elections.

Question

Does Article I, section 4 permit Congress to regulate primary elections, specifically to protect voters from the fraudulent misrepresentation or alteration of their ballot?

Conclusion

Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the marjority argued that Newberry was deeply divided over the matter of primaries. He chose instead to rely on logic applied in concurring opinions. Stone rejected the narrow interpretation that Congressional power did not extend to primaries because the framers were unaware of the primary process. Instead, the Stone argued that primary contests are fundamental to elections in that they are the only real chance voters have of choosing whomever they prefer without ballot access limitations.

United States v. Darby

Thu, 19 Dec 1940 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Darby

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1941)

Opinion

312 U.S. 100 (1941)

Argued

Thursday, December 19, 1940

Decided

Monday, February 3, 1941

Facts of the Case

In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act to regulate many aspects of employment including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. Corporations which engaged in interstate commerce or produced goods which were sold in other states were punished for violating the statute.

Question

Was the act a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards Act; US Const. Art 1, Section 8

The unanimous Court affirmed the right of Congress to exercise "to its utmost extent" the powers reserved for it in the Commerce Clause. Relying heavily on the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone argued that the "motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment . . . over which the courts are given no control." Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce.

Murdock v. Pennsylvania

jgoldman — Wed, 10 Mar 1943 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Borough of Jeannette Jeannette, PA 15644

United States

40° 19' 40.9224" N, 79° 36' 50.7636" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

480

Petitioner

Robert Murdock et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 481, Perisich v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

No. 482, Mowder v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

No. 483, Seders v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

No. 484, Lamborn v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

No. 485, Maltezos v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

No. 486, Anastasia Tzanes v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

No. 487, Ellaine Tzanes v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)

Heard By

Stone Court (1942-1943)

Decided By

Stone Court (1942-1943)

Opinion

319 U.S. 105 (1943)

Argued

March 10-11, 1943

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1943

Advocates

Hayden C. Covington (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Fred B. Trescher (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Borough of Jeannette, Pennsylvania mandated that all solicitors that sold goods within the borough purchase a solicitation license. Robert Murdock was a Jehovah's Witness who canvassed door to door within Jeannette, offering religious texts in exchange for donations. He and other Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested for their solicitation of their texts. They were convicted and fined for violating Jeannette's ordinance. The Jehovah's Witnesses appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, alleging that the ordinance violated the Free Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise of Religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Superior Court upheld the ordinance and their convictions, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear their appeal.

Question

Did Jeannette's ordinance violate the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Religion clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and held the ordinance unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice William O. Douglas characterized the Jehovah's Witnesses' activities in the borough as "more than preaching" and "more than distribution of religious literature." Their door-to-door activities, though unconventional, "occupie[d] the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits." The Court recognized the need of the Jehovah's Witnesses to sustain themselves. Though the organization solicited donations in their distribution of literature, "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." While the borough did have an interest in preserving the public peace, the Jehovah's Witnesses were soliciting "peacefully and quietly." The ordinance did not further the borough's interest in restricting the activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses, and was therefore unconstitutional.

Bridges v. California

jgoldman — Fri, 18 Oct 1940 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Los Angeles Superior Court

111 N Hill St Los Angeles CA 90189

Los Angeles, CA 90189

United States

34° 3' 15.9984" N, 118° 14' 47.2956" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Harry Bridges

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 3, Times-Mirror Co. et al. v. Superior Court of California in and for the County of Los Angeles

Heard By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Decided By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Opinion

314 U.S. 252 (1941)

Argued

Friday, October 18, 1940, Monday, October 21, 1940

Reargued:

Monday, October 13, 1941

Decided

Monday, December 8, 1941

Advocates

A. L. Wirin (argued the cause for the petitioner Bridges)

T. B. Cosgrove (argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 3)

Osmond K. Fraenkel (reargued the cause for the petitioner Bridges)

Allen W. Ashburn (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Harry Bridges, the leader of a longshoreman's union, sent a telegram to Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor, regarding a case pending that was in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Bridges implied that he would have his union go on strike if the Superior Court ruled unfavorably. A copy of the telegram was given to James D. O'Neil, who distributed the telegram to various West Coast Newspapers. The Superior Court found Bridges in contempt of court and fined him. Similarly, the Los Angeles Times was also found in contempt of court and fined for publishing several editorials regarding a case pending in the Superior Court. Bridges and the Times challenged their punishments separately in the Superior Court. The Superior Court upheld their fines, and both appealed separately to the Supreme Court of California. The California Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. Bridges and the Times appealed separately to the Supreme Court, where the cases were consolidated.

Question

Was the Superior Court's findings of contempt against Bridges and the Times in violation of the free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of California and found the fines for contempt unconstitutional. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for the majority, relied on the "clear and present danger" standard set forth in Schenk v. United States. Bridges' telegram was his exercise of his First Amendment right to petition the government, and his supposed intention to call a strike was consistent with California law. The Times editorials, meanwhile, had "negligible" effect "on the course of justice." The dangers that the California Superior Court attributed to the telegram and the editorials were neither "serious" nor "substantial." Therefore, they did not pose the "clear and present danger" required to justify the restrictions placed by the California Superior Court.

Kovacs v. Cooper

jgoldman — Sat, 19 May 2012 05:06:48 +0000

Location

Where Kovacs was amplifying his speech

South Stockton Street Trenton NJ

Trenton, NJ

United States

40° 13' 8.6304" N, 74° 45' 33.9012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Charles Kovacs

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Albert Cooper Jr., Judge of the First District Police Court of Trenton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

336 U.S. 77 (1949)

Decided

Monday, January 31, 1949

Facts of the Case

Charles Kovacs was driven around Trenton, New Jersey. He played music and spoke through an amplifier that he had placed on the truck in which he was riding. He was convicted for violating Ordinance No. 430 of the City of Trenton, which prohibited the use of sound amplifiers and other instruments that emitted "loud and raucous noises" on public streets. He appealed his conviction to the New Jersey Supreme Court, alleging that the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld his conviction, as did the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals.

Question

Did Trenton's Ordinance 430 violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a 5-4 decision, the court affirmed the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals and upheld Kovacs' conviction. Writing for the three-justice plurality, Justice Stanley F. Reed reiterated that the "fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute", and as in Saia v. New York, "the hours and place of public discussion can be controlled." Trenton was granted the authority to prevent "disturbing noises" and "protect the wellbeing and tranquility of a community." Since the ordinance furthered Trenton's interest in maintaining "the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers," the ordinance did not violate the Free Speech Clause. Justices Robert H. Jackson and Felix Frankfurter each concurred separately.

Ex parte Quirin

jgoldman — Wed, 29 Jul 1942 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Atlantic Avenue Beach East Hampton, NY 11937

United States

40° 58' 8.76" N, 72° 7' 22.8" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

1_ORIG

Plaintiff

Richard Quirin

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

United States

Respondent Type

Defendant

Consolidation

Original, Ex parte Haupt

Original, Ex parte Kerling

Original, Ex parte Burger

Original, Ex parte Heinck

Original, Ex parte Thiel

Original, Ex parte Neubauer

No. 1, US ex rel. Quirin v. Cox

No. 2, US ex rel. Haupt v. Cox

No. 3, US ex rel. Kerling v. Cox

No. 4, US ex rel. Burger v. Cox

No. 5, US ex rel. Heinck v. Cox

No. 6, US ex rel. Thiel v. Cox

No. 7, US ex rel. Neubauer v. Cox

Heard By

Stone Court (1941-1942)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

317 U.S. 1 (1942)

Argued

July 29-30, 1942

Decided

Friday, July 31, 1942

Advocates

Kenneth C. Royall (argued the cause for the plaintiffs)

Francis Biddle (Attorney General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

These cases concern Operation Pastorius, a failed attempt in June 1942 by Nazi agents to sabotage various U.S. targets. Following the declaration of war between the United States and Germany, eight German residents, Richard Quirin, Ernst Burger, George Dasch, Herbert Haupt, Heinrich Heinck, Edward Keiling, Herman Neubauer, and Werener Thiel, received training on sabotage at a school near Berlin. The men traveled to the United States via submarine. On the night of June 13, 1942, Burger, Heinrich, Quirin, and Dasch landed near Long Island, New York wearing German uniforms and carrying explosives. On the night of June 17, 1942, the remaining four came ashore in similar fashion at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. Shortly after the landings, Burger and Dasch backed out of the mission. Dasch turned himself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigations. All eight conspirators were subsequently arrested and, on the orders of President Franklin Roosevelt, tried by military commission. The commission found all eight men guilty and sentenced them to death. Because of their confessions and cooperation, President Roosevelt later commuted Burger and Dasch's sentences to life in prison. Arguing that the President exceeded his power in ordering the commission and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution protect their rights to a regular trial, seven of the eight conspirators, not including Dasch, filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Their claims were denied, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Before the court ruled, however, they filed for hearing before the Supreme Court and, separately, filed petitions for habeas corpus directly with the Court. The Court, sitting in a special term, agreed to hear the cases.

Question

Did the President exceed his authority in ordering a trial by military commission for the German saboteurs, thereby violating their rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Conclusion

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Harlan Fisk Stone, the Court concluded that the conspirators, as spies without uniform whose purpose was sabotage, violated the law of war and were therefore unlawful enemy combatants. Noting that Congress had, under the Articles of War, authorized trial by military commission for unlawful enemy combatants, the Court therefore determined that the President had not exceeded his power. Furthermore, the Court asserted that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "did not enlarge the right to jury trial" beyond those cases where it was understood by the framers to have been appropriate. Therefore, because the amendments cannot be read "as either abolishing all trials by military tribunals, save those of the personnel of our own armed forces, or, what in effect comes to the same thing, as imposing on all such tribunals the necessity of proceeding against unlawful enemy belligerents only on presentment and trial by jury," the rights of the conspirators were not violated.

Goesaert v. Cleary

jgoldman — Fri, 19 Nov 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Goesaert's Bar

23481 Michigan Avenue Dearborn MI 48124

Dearborn, MI 48124

United States

42° 18' 4.7808" N, 83° 15' 53.0928" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellant

Goesaert et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Cleary et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

335 U.S. 464 (1948)

Argued

Friday, November 19, 1948

Decided

Monday, December 20, 1948

Advocates

Anne R. Davidow (argued the cause for the appellants)

Edmund E. Shepherd (Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three- judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the bartenders' claim.

Question

Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."

Martin v. Struthers

jgoldman — Thu, 11 Mar 1943 13:00:00 +0000

Location

City of Struthers

6 Elm Street Struthers OH 44471

Struthers, OH 44471

United States

41° 3' 23.2056" N, 80° 35' 28.68" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

238

Appellant

Martin

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

City of Struthers, Ohio

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Decided By

Stone Court (1943-1945)

Opinion

319 U.S. 141 (1943)

Argued

Thursday, March 11, 1943

Decided

Tuesday, May 11, 1943

Advocates

Hayden C. Covington (argued the cause for the appellant)

David C. Haynes (argued the cause for the appellee)

T. T. Macejko (argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Martin was a Jehovah's Witness in Struthers, Ohio. She canvassed neighborhoods knocking on doors and ringing doorbells to distribute leaflets promoting a meeting. She was convicted and fined $10 for violating a city ordinance that prohibited a person who was distributing leaflets and other flyers from knocking on doors and ringing doorbells. She appealed her conviction in the Circuit Court of Mahoning County, alleging that the city ordinance violated her First Amendment free speech and free press rights. The Circuit Court upheld the ordinance and her conviction. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed her appeal.

Question

Did the city ordinance prohibiting the ringing of doorbells and knocking on doors by a person distributing promotional materials violate the free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio and held Struthers' ordinance unconstitutional. In the majority opinion written by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court acknowledged the city's interest in preventing crime and reducing nuisances. However, alternative solutions, such as trespassing laws, were also available that could achieve the city's purpose. Activities like Martin's were "so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved." The ordinance was overly restrictive on door-to-door distributors, and therefore unconstitutional.

Railway Express Agency v. New York

jgoldman — Mon, 06 Dec 1948 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Railway Express Agency

219 East 42nd Street New York NY 10017

New York, NY 10017

United States

40° 45' 2.286" N, 73° 58' 22.8504" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellant

Railway Express Agency, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

New York

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Decided By

Vinson Court (1946-1949)

Opinion

336 U.S. 106 (1949)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1948

Decided

Monday, January 31, 1949

Advocates

Ralph M. Carson (argued the cause for the appellants)

Stanley Buchsbaum (argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

A New York City traffic ordinance prohibited the display of commercial advertising on vehicles using public streets. The ordinance exempted advertisements displayed on vehicles that related to the business interests of the owners. Express Railway Agency(ERA) sold space on the sides of its trucks for unrelated advertising until a police court convicted it for violating the ordinance. A state court of special sessions and the Court of Appeals of the State of New York both affirmed. ERA argued that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause since the distinction between related and unrelated advertisements was not relevant to the purpose of the ordinance.

Question

Did a New York City traffic ordinance that prohibited vehicles from displaying advertisements unrelated to the owner's business interests violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court found that the ordinance was valid because it functioned to limit distractions to motorists, the purpose for which it was intended. The Court ruled that "it is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Therefore, a city could ban some advertisements that distracted pedestrians without having to eliminate every distraction. Though concurring with the Court's decision, Justice Robert H. Jackson famously wrote that "there is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose on a minority must be imposed generally."

United States v. Causby

jgoldman — Wed, 01 May 1946 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Farm outside Greensboro, NC

U.S. Route 421 Greensboro NC 27409

Greensboro, NC 27409

United States

36° 4' 58.44" N, 79° 57' 23.4" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

630

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thomas Lee Causby et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Stone Court (1946)

Decided By

Stone Court (1946)

Opinion

328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Argued

Wednesday, May 1, 1946

Decided

Monday, May 27, 1946

Advocates

Walter J. Cummings Jr. (argued the cause for the United States)

William E. Comer (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.

Question

Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)