Cases - 1938 term

State Of Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canada

Wed, 09 Nov 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

State Of Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Canada

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Opinion

305 U.S. 337 (1938)

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 1938

Decided

Monday, December 12, 1938

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Coleman v. Miller

Mon, 10 Oct 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Kansas State Legislature

300 SW 10th Ave Topeka KS 66612

Topeka, KS 66612

United States

39° 2' 48.12" N, 95° 40' 43.1544" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Rolla W. Coleman et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clarence W. Miller et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Hughes Court (1939)

Opinion

307 U.S. 433 (1939)

Argued

Monday, October 10, 1938

Reargued:

April 17-18, 1939

Decided

Monday, June 5, 1939

Advocates

Robert Stone (argued and reargued the cause for the petitioners)

Rolla W. Coleman (argued and reargued the cause for the petitioners)

E. R. Sloan (argued the cause for the respondents)

Clarence V. Beck (reargued the cause for the respondents)

Robert H. Jackson (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

In June 1924 the Child Labor Amendment passed both houses of Congress. Under Article V of the Constitution, three-fourths of state legislatures must ratify an amendment passed by Congress before it becomes part of the Constitution. Initially, the Kansas state legislature rejected the amendment, but in January 1937 it was reintroduced before the state senate. Of forty state senators, twenty voted for the amendment and twenty against it. Under Kansas law this left the deciding vote to the lieutenant governor in his capacity as presiding officer of the senate, who voted in favor of passage. After subsequent passage by the Kansas state house, Rolla W. Coleman, a state senator and twenty-three other members of the Kansas legislature filed suit against Clarence W. Miller, the secretary of the state senate challenging the constitutionality of Kansas' ratification process. Further, they claimed that by 1937, thirteen years after Congress initially proposed it, the amendment had "lost vitality" and could no longer be considered.

Question

Did the participation of the lieutenant governor, the prior rejection by the Kansas state legislature, or the length of time between the proposal and ratification of the Child Labor Amendment conflict with the ratification process laid out by Article V of the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

The Court's 7-2 decision addressed primarily the prior rejection and the length of time between proposal and ratification, and found this question nonjusticiable, meaning it was not the function of the Court to decide the matter. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, described the question as inherently political, analogous to its 1849 decision in Luther v. Borden, and noted that no legal criteria exists for its determination. Thus, the Court reasoned, Congress alone has authority to decide. The Court also chose not to address the participation of the lieutenant governor, describing itself as "equally divided" on the matter.

Graves v. People Of State Of New York

Mon, 06 Mar 1939 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

478

Petitioner

Graves

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

People Of State Of New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1939)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1939)

Opinion

306 U.S. 466 (1939)

Argued

Monday, March 6, 1939

Decided

Monday, March 27, 1939

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Mulford v. Smith

Wed, 08 Mar 1939 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

505

Petitioner

Mulford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1939)

Opinion

307 U.S. 38 (1939)

Argued

Wednesday, March 8, 1939

Decided

Monday, April 17, 1939

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization

jgoldman — Mon, 27 Feb 1939 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jersey City

76 Montgomery Street Jersey City NJ 07302

Jersey City, NJ 07302

United States

40° 43' 0.804" N, 74° 2' 15.0324" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

651

Petitioner

Frank Hague, Mayor et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Committee for Industrial Organization et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Opinion

307 U.S. 496 (1939)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1939

Decided

Monday, June 5, 1939

Advocates

Charles Hershenstein (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edward J. O'Mara (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Morris L. Ernst (argued the cause for the respondents)

Spaulding Frazer (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

On November 29, 1937, several individuals gathered at the headquarters of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) in Jersey City, New Jersey to initiate a recruitment drive and discuss the National Labor Relations Act. Acting on the orders of Mayor Frank Hague, police seized the group's recruitment materials and refused to allow the meeting to take place. Hague argued that he was enforcing a 1930 city ordinance that forbade gatherings of groups that advocated obstruction of the government by unlawful means. Hague referred to CIO members as "communists." Arguing that the ordinance violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of assembly, the group filed suit against several city officials, including Hague. A District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed and invalidated the ordinance.

Question

Did enforcement of the 1930 Jersey City ordinance violate the CIO's right to assembly under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Owen J. Roberts, the Court concluded that the actions taken by police clearly violated the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. "Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom." Relying on the Court's previous ruling in the Slaughter House Cases, Justice Roberts wrote that freedom of assembly is "a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States" and that no "contrary view has ever been voiced" by the Court.

United States v. Miller

jgoldman — Thu, 30 Mar 1939 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

36° 11' 17.2932" N, 94° 32' 25.7856" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

696

Appellant

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Jack Miller and Frank Layton

Respondent Type

Appellee

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Opinion

307 U.S. 174 (1939)

Argued

Thursday, March 30, 1939

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1939

Advocates

Gordon Dean (argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act ("NFA") when they transported a double barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. In part, Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

Question

Does the Second Amendment protect an individual's right to keep and bear arms?

Conclusion

No. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to keep and bear a sawed- off double barrel shotgun. With Justice James Clark McReynolds writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because the possession of a sawed-off double barrel shotgun does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of such an instrument.