Cases - 1927 term

Olmstead v. United States

Mon, 20 Feb 1928 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Olmstead

10628 Fremont Avenue Seattle WA 98133

Seattle, WA 98133

United States

47° 42' 23.1624" N, 122° 21' 0.2052" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

493

Petitioner

Olmstead

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

277 U.S. 438 (1928)

Argued

Monday, February 20, 1928

Decided

Monday, June 4, 1928

Facts of the Case

Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.

Question

Did the use of evidence disclosed in wiretapped private telephone conversations, violate the recorded party's Fourth and Fifth Amendments?

Conclusion

No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they was not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).

J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States

Thu, 01 Mar 1928 13:00:00 +0000

Location

J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co.

161 Rockaway Boulevard Jamaica NY 11434

Jamaica, NY 11434

United States

40° 39' 45.9936" N, 73° 46' 34.8528" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

242

Petitioner

J.W. Hampton & Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

276 U.S. 394 (1928)

Argued

Thursday, March 1, 1928

Decided

Monday, April 9, 1928

Facts of the Case

The Tariff Act of 1922 delegated the authority to set and impose customs duties on articles of imported merchandise. When, under a proclamation of the President, J.W. Hampton & Company was assessed a higher customs duty than was fixed by statute, the company sought relief in the courts.

Question

Did the Tariff Act's delegation of commerce power to the Executive Branch violate the Separation of Powers principle?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress, within "defined limits," could vest discretion in Executive officers to make public regulations and direct the details of statutory execution. The Court argued that the same principle that allowed Congress to fix rates in interstate commerce also enabled it to remit to a rate-making body under the control of the Executive branch.

Miller v. Schoene

jgoldman — Fri, 20 Jan 1928 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Farm in Shenandoah County New Market, VA

United States

38° 50' 28.9608" N, 78° 33' 57.906" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

199

Petitioner

Miller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Schoene

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

276 U.S. 272 (1928)

Argued

Friday, January 20, 1928

Decided

Monday, February 20, 1928

Advocates

Randolph Harrison (for the plaintiffs in error)

F. S. Tavenner (for the defendant in error)

Facts of the Case

Miller owned a large stand of ornamental red cedar trees on his property in Shenandoah County, Virginia. Schoene, the Virginia State Entomologist, ordered Miller to cut down his red cedar trees, under the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia. Miller's property was near an apple orchard, and Virginia did not want the cedar rust plant disease to spread from Miller's trees to the apple orchard. Miller challenged the statute in Shenandoah County Circuit Court, alleging that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court upheld the tree removal order. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the decision.

Question

Did Virginia's Cedar Rust Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld Virginia's statute and the order to remove Miller's cedar trees. In an opinion written by Justice Harlan F. Stone, the Court recognized Virginia's interest in preventing cedar rust from damaging apple orchards, since apple growing was a "principal agricultural pursuit" in Virginia. While the destruction of Miller's trees would be a taking of his property, Virginia "[did] not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public." The Virginia Legislature, through the Cedar Rust Act, had decided that the preservation of apple trees – an agricultural product -- was of greater importance than the preservation of ornamental red cedar trees. Therefore, the statute was a legitimate exercise of Virginia's power.