Cases - 1901-1939 term

Olmstead v. United States

Mon, 20 Feb 1928 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Olmstead

10628 Fremont Avenue Seattle WA 98133

Seattle, WA 98133

United States

47° 42' 23.1624" N, 122° 21' 0.2052" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

493

Petitioner

Olmstead

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

277 U.S. 438 (1928)

Argued

Monday, February 20, 1928

Decided

Monday, June 4, 1928

Facts of the Case

Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.

Question

Did the use of evidence disclosed in wiretapped private telephone conversations, violate the recorded party's Fourth and Fifth Amendments?

Conclusion

No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they was not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).

J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States

Thu, 01 Mar 1928 13:00:00 +0000

Location

J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co.

161 Rockaway Boulevard Jamaica NY 11434

Jamaica, NY 11434

United States

40° 39' 45.9936" N, 73° 46' 34.8528" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

242

Petitioner

J.W. Hampton & Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

276 U.S. 394 (1928)

Argued

Thursday, March 1, 1928

Decided

Monday, April 9, 1928

Facts of the Case

The Tariff Act of 1922 delegated the authority to set and impose customs duties on articles of imported merchandise. When, under a proclamation of the President, J.W. Hampton & Company was assessed a higher customs duty than was fixed by statute, the company sought relief in the courts.

Question

Did the Tariff Act's delegation of commerce power to the Executive Branch violate the Separation of Powers principle?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress, within "defined limits," could vest discretion in Executive officers to make public regulations and direct the details of statutory execution. The Court argued that the same principle that allowed Congress to fix rates in interstate commerce also enabled it to remit to a rate-making body under the control of the Executive branch.

Bunting v. Oregon

Tue, 18 Apr 1916 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Bunting

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oregon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1916)

Decided By

White Court (1916-1921)

Opinion

243 U.S. 426 (1917)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 1916

Decided

Monday, April 9, 1917

Facts of the Case

A 1913 state law prescribed a 10-hour day for men and women, expanding the law regulating women's hours upheld in Muller v. Oregon. The measure also required time-and-a-half wages for overtime up to 3 hours a day. The State asserted that the law was an appropriate exercise of its police powers. Bunting failed to comply with the overtime regulations of the statute.

Question

Did the law interfere with liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court upheld the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and found the law constitutional. Relying on the justifications made by the Oregon court and legislature, Justice McKenna dismissed Bunting's contention that the law did nothing to preserve the health of employees. The Court found that the law did not provide an unfair advantage to certain types of employers in the labor market since it regulated the hours of service for workers and not the wages that they earned. Under the Oregon statute, workers and their employers were still free to implement a wage scheme which was agreeable to both of them.

ICC v. Illinois Central Railroad Company

Fri, 15 Oct 1909 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

233

Petitioner

ICC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois Central Railroad Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1910)

Opinion

215 U.S. 452 (1910)

Argued

Friday, October 15, 1909

Decided

Monday, January 10, 1910

Facts of the Case

The railroad's policy did not supply enough coal cars to meet the demand from the mines along its right of way. The ICC ordered the railroad to end its practice. The railroad refused to obey the ICC order.

Question

Is the ICC order valid?

Conclusion

Though the Court had engaged in second-guessing the ICC, in this case the justices signaled that they would review commission orders only with regard to constitutional issues, construction of the statute, and the practical substance of the order. In upholding the order, Chief Justice White declared for the Court that the "[p]ower to make the order and not the mere expediency or wisdom of having made it is the question."

Standard Oil Co. of NJ v. United States

Mon, 14 Mar 1910 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

398

Petitioner

Standard Oil Co. of NJ

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1910)

Decided By

White Court (1911)

Opinion

221 U.S. 1 (1911)

Argued

Monday, March 14, 1910

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1911

Facts of the Case

John D. Rockefeller owned the largest and richest trust in America. He controlled the nation's oil business and scorned congressional efforts to outlaw combinations in restraint of trade (i.e., antitrust). In 1909, a federal court found Rockefeller's company, Standard Oil, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court ordered the dissolution of the company.

Question

Did Standard Oil violate the Sherman Act?

Conclusion

Standard Oil lost, but White, for the majority, managed to amend the language of the Sherman Act such that only "unreasonable" contracts and combinations in restraint of trade would violate the law. Heretofore, the Act made all contracts and combinations in retraint of trade into law violations. In this case, the record shows that the Standard Oil trust was unreasonable.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

Thu, 19 Nov 1936 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation Headquarters

Kenmore Avenue and Vulcan Street Buffalo NY 14207

Buffalo, NY 14207

United States

42° 57' 59.238" N, 78° 53' 55.5144" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

299 U.S. 304 (1936)

Argued

Thursday, November 19, 1936

Decided

Monday, December 21, 1936

Advocates

Martin Conboy (Argued the cause for the United States)

Neil P. Cullom (Argued the cause for appellees Barr Shipping Corp)

Homer S. Cummings (Argued the cause for the United States)

William Wallace (Argued the cause for appellees Curtiss-Wright)

Facts of the Case

Curtiss-Wright was charged with conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia, which was engaged in an armed conflict in the Chaco. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt.

Question

Did Congress in its Joint Resolution unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art. II

The Court agreed that the President was allowed much room to operate in executing the Joint Resolution; it found no constitutional violation. Making important distinctions between internal and foreign affairs, Justice Sutherland argued because "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically.

Steward Machine Company v. Davis

Thu, 08 Apr 1937 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Steward Machine Co.

1236 North Apalachee Street Birmingham AL 35222

Birmingham, AL 35222

United States

33° 32' 15.54" N, 86° 46' 46.164" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

837

Petitioner

Steward Machine Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Davis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

301 U.S. 548 (1937)

Argued

Thursday, April 8, 1937

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1937

Facts of the Case

The Steward Machine Company challenged the validity of a tax imposed by the Social Security Act. The Act established a federal payroll tax on employers; however, if employers paid taxes to a state unemployment compensation fund (created by the states subject to federal standards), they were allowed to credit those payments toward the federal tax.

Question

Did the Act arbitrarily impose taxes in violation of the Fifth Amendment or subvert principles of federalism?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the tax under the Social Security Act was a constitutional exercise of congressional power. The Court found that the tax was uniform throughout the states and did not coerce the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment. The Court took note of recent unemployment statistics from the years 1929 to 1936, maintaining that "[i]t is too late today for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general welfare. . .The nation responded to the call of the distressed."

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish

Wed, 16 Dec 1936 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Cascadian Hotel

102 North Wenatchee Avenue Wenatche WA 98801

Wenatche, WA 98801

United States

47° 25' 33.528" N, 120° 18' 46.9296" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

293

Petitioner

West Coast Hotel Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Parrish

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

300 U.S. 379 (1937)

Argued

Wednesday, December 16, 1936

Decided

Monday, March 29, 1937

Facts of the Case

Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received sub- minimum wage compensation for her work. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law.

Question

Did the minimum wage law violate the liberty of contract as construed under the Fifth Amendment as applied by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Parrish, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Minimum Wages for Women Act, 1913 Wash. Laws 174; 14th Amendment

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutionally legitimate. The Court noted that the Constitution did not speak of the freedom of contract and that liberty was subject to the restraints of due process. The Court also noted that employers and employees were not equally "free" in negotiating contracts, since employees often were constrained by practical and economic realities. This was found to be especially true in the case of women. This case explicitly overruled the Court's decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923).

De Jonge v. Oregon

Wed, 09 Dec 1936 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

123

Petitioner

De Jonge

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oregon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

299 U.S. 353 (1937)

Argued

Wednesday, December 9, 1936

Decided

Monday, January 4, 1937

Advocates

Maurice E. Tarshis (Multnomah County, Oregon, argued the cause for the appellee)

Osmond K. Fraenkel (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

On July 27, 1934, at a meeting held by the Communist Party, Dirk De Jonge addressed the audience regarding jail conditions in the county and a maritime strike in progress in Portland. While the meeting was in progress, police raided it. De Jonge was arrested and charged with violating the State's criminal syndicalism statute. The law defines criminal syndicalism as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." After being convicted, De Jonge moved for an acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his conviction. Disagreeing, the State Supreme Court distinguished that the indictment did not charge De Jonge with criminal syndicalism, but rather that he presided at, conducted and assisted in conducting an assemblage of persons, organization, society and group called by the Communist Party, which was unlawfully teaching and advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage.

Question

Does Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes, the Court held that the Oregon statute, as applied, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the record, the Court determined that De Jonge's sole offense was assisting in a public meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court reasoned that to preserve the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly - principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment - not the auspices under which a meeting is held, but the purpose of the meeting and whether the speakers' remarks transcend the bounds of freedom of speech must be examined, which had not occurred in De Jonge's case. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

Wed, 10 Feb 1937 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.

4650 2nd Avenue Pittsburgh PA 15207

Pittsburgh, PA 15207

United States

40° 24' 45.1116" N, 79° 56' 44.1348" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

419

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

301 U.S. 1 (1937)

Argued

Wednesday, February 10, 1937

Decided

Monday, April 12, 1937

Facts of the Case

With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Congress determined that labor- management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. In this case, the National Labor Relations Board charged the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. with discriminating against employees who were union members.

Question

Was the Act consistent with the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for NLRB, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; US Const. Amend 5; National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

Yes. The Court held that the Act was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The justices abandoned their claim that labor relations had only an indirect effect on commerce. Since the ability of employees to engage in collective bargaining (one activity protected by the Act) is "an essential condition of industrial peace," the national government was justified in penalizing corporations engaging in interstate commerce which "refuse to confer and negotiate" with their workers.

United States v. Belmont

Thu, 04 Mar 1937 13:00:00 +0000

Location

August Belmont & Co.

78 Wall Street New York NY 10005

New York, NY 10005

United States

40° 42' 19.836" N, 74° 0' 28.2852" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

532

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Belmont

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

301 U.S. 324 (1937)

Argued

Thursday, March 4, 1937

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1937

Facts of the Case

In 1933, the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This case involved a Russian metal works company which had deposited money in an American bank prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Soviet Union nationalized the company and attempted to reclaim its assets with the help of the United States. The bank refused to cooperate, citing protection of a New York law.

Question

Did the diplomatic agreements between the two countries compel the bank to release the assets?

Conclusion

Yes. Even though the diplomatic agreements had not been implemented as formal treaties with Senate approval, they did empower the United States to seek assets on the Soviet Union's behalf. Justice Sutherland argued for a unanimous Court that different kinds of treaties existed which did not require Senate approval, but nonetheless overrode state statutes. "Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies," he reasoned.

Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Company

Fri, 27 Jan 1911 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

372

Petitioner

Gompers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Buck's Stove & Range Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1911)

Decided By

White Court (1911)

Opinion

221 U.S. 418 (1911)

Argued

Friday, January 27, 1911

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1911

Facts of the Case

Samuel Gompers and two other labor leaders were convicted of violating an antiboycott injunction. The American Federation of Labor (headed by Gompers) had run a notice in its magazine listing Buck's Stove & Range Company along with other companies under the heading "We Don't Patronize."

Question

Does the injunction abridge free speech and press?

Conclusion

The Court refused to reexamine the validity of the injunction issued by the lower court. However, the convictions were reversed on the ground that the contempts were civil but the lower court had treated them as criminal in nature. The aim of civil contempt is remediation while the purpose of crminal contempt is punitive.

Bailey v. Alabama

Thu, 20 Oct 1910 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

300

Petitioner

Bailey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Interim Court (1910)

Decided By

White Court (1910-1911)

Opinion

219 U.S. 219 (1911)

Argued

Thursday, October 20, 1910

Decided

Tuesday, January 3, 1911

Facts of the Case

Bailey contracted to work on a farm for a year at $12 a month. He quit after a month and did not return $15 advanced to him. Under Alabama law, Bailey's act was criminal. He was convicted and sentenced to 136 days of hard labor under the Alabama peonage law.

Question

Did the Alabama law violate the Thirteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court, through Hughes, argued that the law was a restriction on personal rights. Judged by its effect and not by its pretense, the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment. Involuntary servitude meant more than slavery.

Coyle v. Smith

Wed, 05 Apr 1911 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

941

Petitioner

Coyle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1911)

Decided By

White Court (1911)

Opinion

221 U.S. 559 (1911)

Argued

Wednesday, April 5, 1911

Decided

Monday, May 29, 1911

Facts of the Case

In 1910, Oklahoma enacted a law moving its state capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City. In admitting Oklahoma to the Union, the Congress declared the temporary capital to be Briscoe and that a change to some other location would not occur until 1913.

Question

Does Oklahoma have the power to locate its seat of government when Congress has imposed conditions limiting that location?

Conclusion

Yes. This was congressional overreaching. States are on an equal footing to determine their own location for the seat of government.

McCray v. United States

Wed, 02 Dec 1903 13:00:00 +0000

Location

McCray's Business Cincinnati, OH

United States

39° 8' 9.9996" N, 84° 30' 11.0016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

301

Petitioner

McCray

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Opinion

195 U.S. 27 (1904)

Argued

Wednesday, December 2, 1903

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1904

Facts of the Case

At the urging of dairy farmers, Congress passed an act imposing a tax of 10 cents per pound on oleomargarine that was artificially colored yellow. Noncolored margarine was taxed only one-quarter of a cent per pound. McCray, a licensed dealer, did not pay the higher tax while selling the colored product. After losing his case in lower courts, McCray appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Did the congressional act overstep the boundaries of the taxing powers established in the Constitution?

Conclusion

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the taxes levied on colored and noncolored oleomargarine were constitutional. The Court held that the right of Congress to tax within its delegated powers was essentially "unrestrained," and that "no want of due process of law could possibly result" from exercises of that power. The Court argued that to question the purpose and motive of Congress in exerting its delegated powers would be to "usurp the functions of the legislative in order to control that branch of the government in the performance of its lawful duties."

Swift & Co. v. United States

Fri, 06 Jan 1905 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

103

Petitioner

Swift & Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Opinion

196 U.S. 375 (1905)

Argued

Friday, January 6, 1905

Decided

Monday, January 30, 1905

Facts of the Case

A "meat trust" developed in Chicago, in which major dealers of meat agreed not to bid against one another in order to control prices. The trust also pressured the railroads into charging them lower-than-normal rates. The U.S. government attacked the trust as an unlawful economic monopoly.

Question

Did Congress have the authority to regulate the meat trust under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that congressional power under the Commerce Clause justified regulations of the meat trust. The Court held that the effect of the trust on commerce among states was not "accidental, secondary, remote or merely probable," but rather a direct attempt to monopolize commerce. Business done at the stockyards was found to be one part of a continuous stream of commerce. The Court drew a distinction between manufacturing monopolies, which had only indirect effects on commerce, and sales monopolies, which had direct and intended effects on commerce.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts

Tue, 06 Dec 1904 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Board of Health for the City of Cambridge

119 Windsor Street Cambridge MA 02139

Cambridge, MA 02139

United States

42° 21' 52.4484" N, 71° 5' 47.706" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Jacobson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Massachusetts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Opinion

197 U.S. 11 (1905)

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 1904

Decided

Monday, February 20, 1905

Facts of the Case

A Massachusetts law allowed cities to require residents to be vaccinated against smallpox. Cambridge adopted such an ordinance, with some exceptions. Jacobson refused to comply with the requirement and was fined five dollars.

Question

Did the mandatory vaccination law violate Jacobson's Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty?

Conclusion

The Court held that the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens. Local boards of health determined when mandatory vaccinations were needed, thus making the requirement neither unreasonable nor arbitrarily imposed.

Lochner v. New York

Thu, 23 Feb 1905 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Joseph Lochner's Bakery

82-84 South Street Utica NY 13501

Utica, NY 13501

United States

43° 5' 50.1756" N, 75° 14' 8.088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

292

Petitioner

Lochner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1903-1906)

Opinion

198 U.S. 45 (1905)

Argued

Thursday, February 23, 1905

Decided

Monday, April 17, 1905

Facts of the Case

The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day.

Question

Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lochner, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: NY Bakeshop Act

The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor.

Weeks v. United States

Tue, 02 Dec 1913 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Weeks

1834 Penn Street Kansas City MO 64507

Kansas City, MO 64507

United States

39° 45' 22.3884" N, 94° 50' 16.3896" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

461

Petitioner

Weeks

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1912-1914)

Decided By

White Court (1912-1914)

Opinion

232 U.S. 383 (1914)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1913

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 1914

Facts of the Case

Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.

Question

Did the search and seizure of Weeks' home violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights. The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule."

Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Atchison T & SF R Co.

Wed, 14 Jan 1914 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Interstate Commerce Comm.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Atchison T & SF R Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1912-1914)

Decided By

White Court (1912-1914)

Opinion

234 U.S. 294 (1914)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1914

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1914

Facts of the Case

A railroad company in Texas charged higher haulage rates for service between Shreveport, Louisiana and Dallas, Texas, than it did for service involving greater distances within Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroad to charge similar rates for similar distances within and between states.

Question

Did the ICC have the power to regulate intrastate rates?

Conclusion

The regulation was legitimate. Justice Hughes argued that in situations where interstate and intrastate commerce are "so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other," Congress may lawfully exercise authority. In fostering and regulating interstate commerce, Congress may take "all measures necessary or appropriate" even if that means affecting intrastate commerce as well.

Hammer v. Dagenhart

Mon, 15 Apr 1918 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Cotton mill Charlotte, NC

United States

35° 13' 37.5132" N, 80° 50' 35.2572" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

704

Petitioner

Hammer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dagenhart

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1916-1921)

Decided By

White Court (1916-1921)

Opinion

247 U.S. 251 (1918)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1918

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1918

Facts of the Case

The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.

Question

Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dagenhart, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; US Const. Amend 10; Keating-Owen Act of 1916

Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government.

Powell v. Alabama

Mon, 10 Oct 1932 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jackson County Circuit Court

102 E. Laurel Street Scottsboro AL 35768

Scottsboro, AL 35768

United States

34° 40' 22.188" N, 86° 2' 5.0352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Powell

Respondent

Alabama

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

287 U.S. 45 (1932)

Argued

Monday, October 10, 1932

Decided

Monday, November 7, 1932

Facts of the Case

Nine black youths -- young, ignorant, and illiterate -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.

Question

Did the trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.

Twining v. New Jersey

Thu, 19 Mar 1908 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance

20 West State Street Trenton NJ 08625

Trenton, NJ 08625

United States

40° 13' 14.7612" N, 74° 45' 58.8168" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Twining

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New Jersey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Opinion

211 U.S. 78 (1908)

Argued

Thursday, March 19, 1908

Decided

Monday, November 9, 1908

Facts of the Case

Twining, a bank director, was charged with a misdemeanor (deceiving a bank examiner). Twining declined to testify at his trial. Under New Jersey law, the prosecutor commented upon Twining's failure to testify. A jury convicted Twining; he appealed.

Question

Does comment upon a defendant's failure to testify violate the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Due Process Clause embraces the right against self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment. Moody rested the Court's opinion on the historical record, which led him to the view that the right against self-incrimination was not fundamental.

Adair v. United States

Tue, 29 Oct 1907 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company

315 West Southern Avenue Covington KY 41015

Covington, KY 41015

United States

39° 2' 52.8" N, 84° 30' 29.4444" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

293

Petitioner

Adair

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Opinion

208 U.S. 161 (1908)

Argued

Tuesday, October 29, 1907

Decided

Monday, January 27, 1908

Facts of the Case

A law passed by Congress in 1898 made it illegal for employers to fire employees solely on the basis of their participation in labor unions. The law essentially made the "yellow dog" contract illegal. William Adair, a representative of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, violated the law by firing a locomotive fireman who had joined a union.

Question

Did the law violate the right of employers and employees to enter into contracts with each other as protected by the Fifth Amendment which prevents government from depriving an individual of liberty or property without due process of law?

Conclusion

The Court found that the statute violated the Constitution and was not a legitimate exercise of congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. Justice Harlan argued that it is important to preserve the balance of freedoms which exists between employers and employees: "The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it." The law violated the liberties of both employers and employees since it compelled them to accept certain conditions in the purchasing and selling of labor.

Muller v. Oregon

Wed, 15 Jan 1908 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Grand Laundry

320 N. 17th Avenue Portland OR 97209

Portland, OR 97209

United States

45° 31' 30.4932" N, 122° 41' 17.664" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

107

Petitioner

Muller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oregon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1906-1909)

Opinion

208 U.S. 412 (1908)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 1908

Decided

Monday, February 24, 1908

Facts of the Case

Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries.

Question

Does the Oregon law violate a woman's freedom of contract implicit in the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

There was no constitutional violation. The factory and laundry owners claimed that there was no reasonable connection between the law and public health, safety, or welfare. In a famous brief in defense of the Oregon law, attorney Louis Brandeis elaborately detailed expert reports on the harmful physical, economic and social effects of long working hours on women. Brewer's opinion was based on the proposition that physical and social differences between the sexes warranted a different rule respecting labor contracts. Theretofore, gender was not a basis for such distinctions. Brewer's opinion conveyed the accepted wisdom of the day: that women were unequal and inferior to men.

Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson

Thu, 30 Jan 1930 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Saturday Press

240 South 4th Street Minneapolis MN 55401

Minneapolis, MN 55401

United States

44° 58' 41.7972" N, 93° 15' 58.2912" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Near

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Minnesota ex rel. Olson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1930-1932)

Opinion

283 U.S. 697 (1931)

Argued

Thursday, January 30, 1930

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1931

Facts of the Case

Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his newspaper under a state law that allowed such action against periodicals. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined (stopped) from further committing or maintaining the nuisance.

Question

Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding.

Coppage v. Kansas

Fri, 30 Oct 1914 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Coppage

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kansas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1914-1916)

Decided By

White Court (1914-1916)

Opinion

236 U.S. 1 (1915)

Argued

Friday, October 30, 1914

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1915

Facts of the Case

A Kansas law banned "yellow dog contracts." These were employer agreements barring employees from joining a labor union. Coppage, an employer, fired an employee who refused to sign such an agreement. Coppage was charged and convicted of violating the Kansas law. He appealed.

Question

Does the Kansas statute violate freedom of contract protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. The law was so arbitrary as to overcome the general presumption in favor of its validity. Legitimate exercises of the state police power could restrict freedom of contract, but there was no relationship here between the statute's purpose and the state's police-power goal.

Schenck v. United States

Thu, 09 Jan 1919 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Socialist Headquarters

1326 Arch Street Philadelphia PA 19107

Philadelphia, PA 19107

United States

39° 57' 15.5304" N, 75° 9' 44.7732" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

437

Petitioner

Schenck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

White Court (1916-1921)

Decided By

White Court (1916-1921)

Opinion

249 U.S. 47 (1919)

Argued

Thursday, January 9, 1919

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1919

Facts of the Case

During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.

Question

Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 1917 Espionage Act; US Const Amend 1

Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

Nixon v. Herndon

Tue, 04 Jan 1927 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

117

Petitioner

Nixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Herndon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

273 U.S. 536 (1927)

Argued

Tuesday, January 4, 1927

Decided

Monday, March 7, 1927

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Buck v. Bell

Fri, 22 Apr 1927 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Virginia General Assembly

9th and Grace Street Richmond VA 23219

Richmond, VA 23219

United States

37° 32' 23.8416" N, 77° 26' 4.758" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

292

Petitioner

Buck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

274 U.S. 200 (1927)

Argued

Friday, April 22, 1927

Decided

Monday, May 2, 1927

Facts of the Case

Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.

Question

Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

Whitney v. California

Thu, 18 Mar 1926 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Socialist Convention at Loring Hall

11th and Clay Street Oakland CA 94607

Oakland, CA 94607

United States

37° 48' 11.556" N, 122° 16' 29.6076" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Whitney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

274 U.S. 357 (1927)

Argued

Thursday, March 18, 1926

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1927

Facts of the Case

Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership. . .or effecting any political change."

Question

Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court argued "that a State. . .may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances. . .tending to. . .endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means" and was not open to question. The decision is most notable for the concurring opinion written by Justice Brandeis, in which he argued that only clear, present, and imminent threats of "serious evils" could justify suppression of speech.

Myers v. United States

Mon, 13 Apr 1925 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Myers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

272 U.S. 52 (1926)

Argued

Monday, April 13, 1925

Decided

Monday, October 25, 1926

Facts of the Case

An 1876 law provided that postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. President Woodrow Wilson removed Myers, a postmaster first class, without seeking Senate approval.

Question

Did the Act unconstitutionally restrict the President's power to remove appointed officials?

Conclusion

Yes. After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with the interpretation of the President's appointment power, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone. According to Taft, to deny the President that power would not allow him to "discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed."

McGrain v. Daugherty

Fri, 05 Dec 1924 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

McGrain

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Daugherty

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1923-1925)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

273 U.S. 135 (1927)

Argued

Friday, December 5, 1924

Decided

Monday, January 17, 1927

Facts of the Case

This case was a challenge to Daugherty's contempt conviction. He failed to appear before a Senate committee investigating the failure of Daugherty's brother (Harry Daugherty, the former Attorney General)to prosecute wrongdoers in the Teapot Dome scandal.

Question

Was the Senate committee out-of-bounds in issuing its contempt order since the purpose of the investigation had nothing to do with the committee's legislative purpose?

Conclusion

The Court upheld Daugherty's contempt conviction, establishing a presumption that congressional investigations have a legislative purpose. This presumption was not overcome by showing that the committee also had another purpose, such as exposure of wrongdoing. This presumption would later restrict the Court's hand in clear cases of congressional overreaching while investigating communists after World War II.

Ex parte Grossman

Mon, 01 Dec 1924 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Saloon

800 West Madison Street Chicago IL 60661

Chicago, IL 60661

United States

41° 52' 55.146" N, 87° 38' 50.946" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Ex parte Grossman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taft Court (1923-1925)

Opinion

267 U.S. 87 (1925)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1924

Decided

Monday, March 2, 1925

Facts of the Case

In 1920, legal action was taken against Philip Grossman for selling liquor at his place of business in violation of the National Prohibition Act. He violated a federal court injunction by continuing to sell alcoholic beverages. He was found guilty of criminal contempt of court and sentenced to one year in prison and a $1,000 fine. In 1923, President Calvin Coolidge issued a pardon that reduced Grossman's sentence to payment of the fine.

Question

Did the president have the constitutional authority to commute a sentence for criminal contempt of court?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court found that a presidential pardon for a criminal contempt of court sentence was within the powers of the executive. There is nothing in the words "offenses against the United States" that excludes criminal contempts in the Constitution. Actions that violate the dignity or authority of the federal courts violate the law of the United States, making these contempts offenses against the United States. The president's pardon authority includes such offenses. Without destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment, the president's powers are to act as checks against undue prejudice or needless severity in such sentencing by the judicial branch.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

Mon, 16 Mar 1925 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

583

Petitioner

Pierce

Respondent

Society of Sisters

Heard By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Decided By

Taft Court (1925-1930)

Opinion

268 U.S. 510 (1925)

Argued

Monday, March 16, 1925

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1925

Facts of the Case

The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.

Question

Did the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children?

Conclusion

Yes. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."

Minersville School District v. Gobitis

Thu, 25 Apr 1940 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Minersville School District

1 Battlin' Miner Drive Minsersville PA 17954

Minsersville, PA 17954

United States

40° 41' 25.2168" N, 76° 15' 29.9232" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

690

Petitioner

Minersville School District

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gobitis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Opinion

310 U.S. 586 (1940)

Argued

Thursday, April 25, 1940

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1940

Facts of the Case

Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses; they believed that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by Biblical commands.

Question

Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country" and upheld the mandatory flag salute. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" and that national unity was "the basis of national security." The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country."

Thornhill v. Alabama

Thu, 29 Feb 1940 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

514

Petitioner

Thornhill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Opinion

310 U.S. 88 (1940)

Argued

Thursday, February 29, 1940

Decided

Monday, April 22, 1940

Facts of the Case

Byron Thornhill joined a picket line that was protesting against his former employer. Section 3448 of Alabama state law made it an offense to picket. Pursuant to the law, Thornhill was arrested and fined $100. Thornhill, a union president, was the only picketer to be arrested and tried under the law.

Question

Did the Alabama law violate Thornhill's right to free expression under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that Section 3448 of the Alabama State Code was facially invalid. The Court held that labor relations were "not matters of mere local or private concern," and that free discussion concerning labor conditions and industrial disputes was "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society." The Court found that no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property or of breach of the peace was inherent to labor picketing, and thus deserved First Amendment protection.

Cantwell v. State of Connecticut

Fri, 29 Mar 1940 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Neighborhood Street

Cassius Street New Haven CT 06519

New Haven, CT 06519

United States

41° 17' 32.8416" N, 72° 55' 49.5156" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

632

Petitioner

Cantwell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

State of Connecticut

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1940-1941)

Opinion

310 U.S. 296 (1940)

Argued

Friday, March 29, 1940

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1940

Facts of the Case

Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by travelling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of the peace.

Question

Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights?

Conclusion

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.

Nixon v. Condon

Tue, 15 Mar 1932 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

265

Petitioner

Nixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Condon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

286 U.S. 73 (1932)

Argued

Tuesday, March 15, 1932

Decided

Monday, May 2, 1932

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States

Thu, 02 May 1935 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Schechter Poultry Slaughterhouse Markets

858 E. 52 Street Brooklyn NY 11203

Brooklyn, NY 11203

United States

40° 38' 21.3" N, 73° 55' 37.5924" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

854

Petitioner

Schechter Poultry Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

295 U.S. 495 (1935)

Argued

Thursday, May 2, 1935

Decided

Monday, May 27, 1935

Facts of the Case

Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the President to implement industrial codes to regulate weekly employment hours, wages, and minimum ages of employees. The codes had standing as penal statutes.

Question

Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Schechter Poultry Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: U.S. Const. Art I; U.S. Const. Amend. 10; 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933) (National Industrial Recovery Act § 3)

The Court held that Section 3 was "without precedent" and violated the Constitution. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity. In other words, it did not make codes, but simply empowered the President to do so. A unanimous Court found this to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

Humphrey's Executor v. United States

Wed, 01 May 1935 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

667

Petitioner

Humphrey's Executor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

295 U.S. 602 (1935)

Argued

Wednesday, May 1, 1935

Decided

Monday, May 27, 1935

Facts of the Case

President Hoover appointed, and the Senate confirmed, Humphrey as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In 1933, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey's resignation since the latter was a conservative and had jurisdiction over many of Roosevelt's New Deal policies. When Humphrey refused to resign, Roosevelt fired him because of his policy positions. However, the FTC Act only allowed a president to remove a commissioner for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Since Humphrey died shortly after being dismissed, his executor sued to recover Humphrey's lost salary.

Question

Did section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfere with the executive power of the President?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Humphrey's Executor, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const Art 1 and 2; Federal Trade Commission Act

The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was constitutional and that Humphrey's dismissal on policy grounds was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the Constitution had never given "illimitable power of removal" to the president. Justice Sutherland dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which relied heavily on the Court's decision in Meyers v. United States (1926). In that case the Court upheld the president's right to remove officers who were "units of the executive department." The FTC was different, argued Sutherland, because it was a body created by Congress to perform quasi- legislative and judicial functions. The Meyers precedent, therefore, did not apply in this situation.

Perry v. United States

Thu, 10 Jan 1935 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

532

Petitioner

Perry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

294 U.S. 330 (1935)

Argued

January 10-11, 1935

Decided

Monday, February 18, 1935

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan

Mon, 10 Dec 1934 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

135

Petitioner

Panama Refining Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ryan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Ryan, No. 260

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

293 U.S. 388 (1935)

Argued

December 10-11, 1934

Decided

Monday, January 7, 1935

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.

Mon, 11 Feb 1935 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

604

Appellee

G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Baldwin, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, et al.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. v. Baldwin, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, et al., No. 605

Heard By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1932-1937)

Opinion

294 U.S. 511 (1935)

Argued

February 11-12, 1935

Decided

Monday, March 4, 1935

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins

Mon, 31 Jan 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

367

Petitioner

Erie Railroad Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tompkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938)

Opinion

304 U.S. 64 (1938)

Argued

Monday, January 31, 1938

Decided

Monday, April 25, 1938

Facts of the Case

Tompkins brought a lawsuit in federal court in New York against the Erie Railroad for personal injuries. Tompkins had been walking along the railroad tracks in Pennsylvania when he was hit by an open railcar door. Under Pennsylvania law, where the accident occurred, the railroad owed no duty to Tompkins. But this was the "law" according to the Pennsylvania courts. There was no statute of the state legislature declaring the law. In the federal courts, the railroad had a duty to take care. A federal court jury awarded Tompkins damages. The verdict was upheld on appeal.

Question

Does the law of the several states applied by the federal courts as rules of decision in civil cases include all the decisional or common law of the states?

Conclusion

In 1842, the Supreme Court held that the laws of the several states embraces only the statutes authored by the state legislatures. Federal judges were free to ignore the states' common (judge-made) law and substitute their own rules. Brandeis rejected this long-standing precedent on several grounds including the view that the 1842 decision represented "an unconstitutional assumption of power by the Courts of the United States." This case was a grand victory for states to express public policy through the decisions of state courts without interference from federal judges.

United States v. Carolene Products Co.

Wed, 06 Apr 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Carolene Products

2nd block of West Sargent Street Litchfield IL 62056

Litchfield, IL 62056

United States

39° 10' 25.7772" N, 89° 39' 42.1884" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

640

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carolene Products Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1938)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938)

Opinion

304 U.S. 144 (1938)

Argued

Wednesday, April 6, 1938

Decided

Monday, April 25, 1938

Facts of the Case

A 1923 act of Congress banned the interstate shipment of "filled milk" (milk with skimmed milk and vegetable oil added). A manufacturer, indicted for shipping filled milk, challenged the law.

Question

Does the law violate the Commerce Power granted to Congress in Article Section 8 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court upheld the act. In this otherwise unremarkable case, the Court planted the seeds for a new jurisprudence in a footnote to Stone's opinion for the Court. Here Stone gives a presumption of constitutionality to economic regulation. The Court would no longer substitute its views on economic policy for the views of Congress. Stone went further in footnote four by cautiously asserting that certain types of legislation might not merit deference toward constitutional validity. The most controversial element in the footnote was the suggestion that prejudice directed against discrete and insular minorities may call for "more searching judicial inquiry."

Palko v. Connecticut

Fri, 12 Nov 1937 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Fairfield County Trial Court

1061 Main St Brdigeport CT 06604

Brdigeport, CT 06604

United States

41° 10' 44.382" N, 73° 11' 21.8256" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

135

Petitioner

Palko

Respondent

Connecticut

Heard By

Hughes Court (1937-1938)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1937-1938)

Opinion

302 U.S. 319 (1937)

Argued

Friday, November 12, 1937

Decided

Monday, December 6, 1937

Facts of the Case

Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.

Question

Does Palko's second conviction violate the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment because this protection applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Connecticut, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend 5 (double jeopardy); US Const. Amend 14

The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell

Tue, 04 Jan 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Barnwell Brothers Inc. Burlington, NC

United States

36° 5' 44.4912" N, 79° 26' 16.0764" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

161

Petitioner

South Carolina State Highway Dept.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barnwell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1937-1938)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938)

Opinion

303 U.S. 177 (1938)

Argued

Tuesday, January 4, 1938

Decided

Monday, February 14, 1938

Advocates

Frank Coleman (Argued the cause for the appellees)

S. King Funkhouser (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Thomas W. Davis (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Steve C. Griffith (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

A South Carolina law banned from its state highways trucks which were more than 90 inches wide and weighed over 20,000 pounds.

Question

Did the law impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce?

Conclusion

The Court upheld the law. The Court acknowledged that the law posed a burden on interstate commerce. However, regulating state highways is "so peculiarly of local concern." Moreover, Congress had not previously invoked the commerce power to implement national standards on this issue. Hence, South Carolina had the right to act. The law was carefully drawn and applied equally to intrastate and interstate travelers.

State Of Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canada

Wed, 09 Nov 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

State Of Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Canada

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Decided By

Hughes Court (1938-1939)

Opinion

305 U.S. 337 (1938)

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 1938

Decided

Monday, December 12, 1938

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Coleman v. Miller

Mon, 10 Oct 1938 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Kansas State Legislature

300 SW 10th Ave Topeka KS 66612

Topeka, KS 66612

United States

39° 2' 48.12" N, 95° 40' 43.1544" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Rolla W. Coleman et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clarence W. Miller et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Hughes Court (1939)

Opinion

307 U.S. 433 (1939)

Argued

Monday, October 10, 1938

Reargued:

April 17-18, 1939

Decided

Monday, June 5, 1939

Advocates

Robert Stone (argued and reargued the cause for the petitioners)

Rolla W. Coleman (argued and reargued the cause for the petitioners)

E. R. Sloan (argued the cause for the respondents)

Clarence V. Beck (reargued the cause for the respondents)

Robert H. Jackson (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

In June 1924 the Child Labor Amendment passed both houses of Congress. Under Article V of the Constitution, three-fourths of state legislatures must ratify an amendment passed by Congress before it becomes part of the Constitution. Initially, the Kansas state legislature rejected the amendment, but in January 1937 it was reintroduced before the state senate. Of forty state senators, twenty voted for the amendment and twenty against it. Under Kansas law this left the deciding vote to the lieutenant governor in his capacity as presiding officer of the senate, who voted in favor of passage. After subsequent passage by the Kansas state house, Rolla W. Coleman, a state senator and twenty-three other members of the Kansas legislature filed suit against Clarence W. Miller, the secretary of the state senate challenging the constitutionality of Kansas' ratification process. Further, they claimed that by 1937, thirteen years after Congress initially proposed it, the amendment had "lost vitality" and could no longer be considered.

Question

Did the participation of the lieutenant governor, the prior rejection by the Kansas state legislature, or the length of time between the proposal and ratification of the Child Labor Amendment conflict with the ratification process laid out by Article V of the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

The Court's 7-2 decision addressed primarily the prior rejection and the length of time between proposal and ratification, and found this question nonjusticiable, meaning it was not the function of the Court to decide the matter. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, described the question as inherently political, analogous to its 1849 decision in Luther v. Borden, and noted that no legal criteria exists for its determination. Thus, the Court reasoned, Congress alone has authority to decide. The Court also chose not to address the participation of the lieutenant governor, describing itself as "equally divided" on the matter.