Cases - 1851-1900 term

Georgia v. Stanton

Thu, 17 May 2012 21:58:55 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Georgia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stanton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Chase Court (1867-1870)

Opinion

73 U.S. 50 (1868)

Decided

Monday, February 10, 1868

Facts of the Case

The state of Georgia brought suit against the Secretary of War and two of his generals in an effort to prevent the enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts following the Civil War. The case arose under the Court's original jurisdiction.

Question

Do the military laws invoked under the Reconstruction Acts unconstitutionally deprive Georgia of its sovereignty?

Conclusion

Nelson maintained that this was a "political" question and thus out-of-bounds for judicial inquiry. Georgia sought rights of a political character, not rights of persons or property. Thus the issue was outside the domain of a law or equity court.

Allgeyer v. Louisiana

Wed, 06 Jan 1897 13:00:00 +0000

Location

E. Allgeyer & Co

Gravier Street New Orleans LA

New Orleans, LA

United States

29° 57' 33.8616" N, 90° 4' 58.0188" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

446

Petitioner

Allgeyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Opinion

165 U.S. 578 (1897)

Argued

Wednesday, January 6, 1897

Decided

Monday, March 1, 1897

Facts of the Case

A Louisiana statute prohibited foreign (out-of-state) insurance corporations from conducting business in Louisiana without maintaining at least one place of business and an authorized agent in the State. Louisiana implemented the statute as an exercise of its police powers, intending to protect its citizens from deceitful insurance companies. Allgeyer and Company violated this statute by purchasing insurance from a firm based in the State of New York which did not meet the requirements of the Louisiana law.

Question

Does the Louisiana law violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause which, according to Allegyer and Company, protects its liberty to enter into contracts with businesses of its choice?

Conclusion

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the Louisiana statute deprived Allgeyer and Company of its liberty without due process of law as protected by the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that even though the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York did not maintain an office or agent in Louisiana, Allgeyer and Company could still, as it did, enter into a contract with Atlantic Mutual in the state of New York to insure its Louisiana property. Justice Peckham's opinion makes clear the linkage between an individual's economic liberty and the due process clause.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark

Fri, 05 Mar 1897 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

132

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wong Kim Ark

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1898-1902)

Opinion

169 U.S. 649 (1898)

Argued

Friday, March 5, 1897

Decided

Monday, March 28, 1898

Facts of the Case

The Chinese Exclusion Acts denied citizenship to Chinese immigrants. Moreover, by treaty no Chinese subject in the United States could become a naturalized citizen. Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco. At age 21, he returned to China to visit his parents who had previously resided in the United States for 20 years. When he returned to the United States, Wong was denied entry on the ground that he was not a citizen.

Question

Could the government deny naturalization to persons born in the United States in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. The government could not deny naturalization to anyone born in the United States. To reach this conclusion, Justice Gray's tedious majority opinion managed to traverse much of western civilization.

Ex parte Vallandigham

Fri, 22 Jan 1864 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Ex parte Vallandigham

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taney Court (1863-1864)

Decided By

Taney Court (1863-1864)

Opinion

68 U.S. 243 (1864)

Argued

Friday, January 22, 1864

Decided

Monday, February 15, 1864

Facts of the Case

In 1863, soldiers arrested, tried and found guilty Democratic Sen. Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio for violating Army orders against public expressions of Confederate sympathies. He had denounced the War and the Administration at home and in Congress. President Abraham Lincoln banished Vallandigham to rebel territory. He returned and appealed the action in the Supreme Court.

Question

Are the military proceedings constitutional?

Conclusion

The Court held, unanimously, that it had no jurisdiction over appeals from military courts.

Gelpcke v. Dubuque

Tue, 15 Dec 1863 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Gelpcke

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dubuque

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Taney Court (1863-1864)

Decided By

Taney Court (1863-1864)

Opinion

68 U.S. 175 (1864)

Argued

Tuesday, December 15, 1863

Decided

Monday, January 11, 1864

Facts of the Case

Iowa's constitution limited the amount of state debt and forbade the state to own stock in private corporations. But Iowa was enamoured with railroading. The legislature authorized municipal governments to issue bearer bonds to aid railroad construction throughout the state. The idea was that permitting municipalities to do what the state government could not do would circumvent the state constitutional limitation. Railroad prosperity did not materialize and the taxpayers were taxed to pay off the bonds which had been used to buy railroad stock. Bondholders filed suit in federal court to recover interest on the bonds.

Question

Is the obligation to pay a debt a contract beyond impairment by any state?

Conclusion

The Court sided with the bondholders, holding that when contracts are made on the basis of trust in past judicial decisions those contracts could not be impaired by any subsequent construction of the law. "We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a state tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice."

United States v. E.C. Knight Co.

Wed, 24 Oct 1894 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

675

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

E.C. Knight Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1894-1895)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1894-1895)

Opinion

156 U.S. 1 (1895)

Argued

Wednesday, October 24, 1894

Decided

Monday, January 21, 1895

Facts of the Case

The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant combinations controlling tranportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.

Question

Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for E. C. Knight Co., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman Antitrust Act; US Const. Art 1, Section 8

The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly."

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.

Thu, 07 Mar 1895 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

893

Petitioner

Pollock

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1894-1895)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1894-1895)

Opinion

157 U.S. 429 (1895)

Argued

Thursday, March 7, 1895

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1895

Facts of the Case

The Constitution gave the states the power to impose direct taxation. The federal government could impose direct taxes as well, but only if those taxes were apportioned among the states in proportion to their representation in Congress. In this case the Court examined a national income tax passed by Congress in 1894. This case was decided together with Hyde v. Continental Trust Company of the City of New York.

Question

Was the income tax a direct tax in violation of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9)?

Conclusion

Yes. The Court held that the act violated the Constitution since it imposed taxes on personal income derived from real estate investments and personal property such as stocks and bonds; this was a direct taxation scheme, not apportioned properly among the states. The decision was negated by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens

Mon, 09 Feb 1852 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Aaron B. Cooley

Respondent

Board of Wardens

Heard By

Taney Court (1851-1852)

Decided By

Taney Court (1851-1852)

Opinion

53 U.S. 299 (1852)

Argued

February 9-11, 1852

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1852

Facts of the Case

A Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia hire a local pilot. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine, which would go to a fund for retire pilots and their dependents. This fund was administered by the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia. Cooley was a ship owner. He refused to hire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine.

Question

Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Board of Wardens, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3

According to Justice Curtis, who wrote the majority opinion, the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. Navigation was commerce; and, piloting was navigation. Though the subject to be regulated was commerce, the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exlusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for the whole nation, while others, like pilotage, demand diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.

Ex parte McCardle

Tue, 02 Mar 1869 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Vicksburg Times Newspaper Vicksburg, MS

United States

32° 21' 9.5256" N, 90° 52' 40.3752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Ex parte McCardle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Chase Court (1867-1870)

Decided By

Chase Court (1867-1870)

Opinion

74 U.S. 506 (1869)

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 1869

Decided

Monday, April 12, 1869

Facts of the Case

William McCardle was arrested by federal authorities in 1867 for writing and publishing a series of editorials in his Mississippi newspaper. The editorials were sharply critical of Reconstruction. McCardle sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Reconstruction Acts under which he was arrested were unconstitutional. McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867 congressional statute that conferred jurisdiction on appeal to the High Court. After hearing arguments in the case, but prior to announcing a decision, the Congress withdrew its 1867 act conferring jurisdiction.

Question

May the Congress withdraw jurisdiction from the High Court after that jurisdiction has been given?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for US Congress, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Military Reconstruction Act

The Court, speaking through Chase, validated congressional withdrawal of the Court's jurisdiction. The basis for this repeal was the exceptions clause of Article III Section 2. But Chase pointedly reminded his readers that the 1868 statute repealing jurisdiction "does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised."

Texas v. White

Fri, 05 Feb 1869 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Texas Legislature

1100 North Congress Avenue Austin TX 78701

Austin, TX 78701

United States

30° 16' 21.882" N, 97° 44' 28.0752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Texas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Chase Court (1867-1870)

Decided By

Chase Court (1867-1870)

Opinion

74 U.S. 700 (1869)

Argued

Friday, February 5, 1869

Decided

Monday, April 12, 1869

Facts of the Case

In 1851, Congress authorized the transfer of $10 million worth of United States bonds to the state of Texas. The bonds were payable to the state or bearer and were to be redeemable in 1864. In 1862, during the war of rebellion, an insurgent Texas legislature authorized the use of the bonds to purchase war supplies. Four years later, the reconstruction government tried to reclaim the bonds.

Question

Was Texas a state in the union eligible to seek redress in the Supreme Court? Could Texas constitutionally reclaim the bonds?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that Texas did indeed have the right to bring suit and that individuals such as White had no claim to the bonds in question. The Court held that individual states could not unilaterally secede from the Union and that the acts of the insurgent Texas legislature--even if ratified by a majority of Texans--were "absolutely null." Even during the period of rebellion, however, the Court found that Texas continued to be a state.

Brown v. Houston

Thu, 03 Apr 1884 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Brown

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Houston

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

114 U.S. 622 (1885)

Argued

Thursday, April 3, 1884

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1885

Facts of the Case

A Louisiana law assessed an annual tax on goods which remained stored on flat boats prior to sale. Brown, a representative of a Pennsylvania coal mining company, refused to pay the tax on a load of coal which had been shipped to an agent in New Orleans.

Question

Did the Louisiana law violate the Constitution by posing an improper restriction on interstate commerce?

Conclusion

No. The Court found that the Louisiana law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Bradley reasoned that since the law imposed a tax upon merchandise which had "already arrived at its destination," merchandise which was effectively "a commodity in the market of New Orleans," it was not offensive to the Commerce Clause. It was not a regulation on goods which were "in a state of transit." Furthermore, the law did not discriminate against foreign producers because it applied to all goods within the state, not exempting products which had been made locally.

Hurtado v. California

Tue, 22 Jan 1884 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Street Corner

Front St and I St. Sacramento CA 95814

Sacramento, CA 95814

United States

38° 35' 4.5528" N, 121° 30' 17.91" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Hurtado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

110 U.S. 516 (1884)

Argued

Tuesday, January 22, 1884

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1884

Facts of the Case

The State of California tried and convicted Hurtado on an information for murder. An information is a written set of accusations made by a prosecutor. Hurtado maintained that California denied him an indictment by a grand jury. A grand jury indictment is based on majority vote of the grand jurors on presentation by the prosecutor.

Question

Does a state criminal proceeding based on an information rather than a grand jury indictment violate the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

No, this was not a violation of due process. Any legal proceeding that protects liberty and justice is due process. The majority opinion, authored by Matthews, reasoned that the Constitution cannot be locked into static conceptions bound by time and place. The Court also took the position that nothing in the Constitution is superfluous. Since the Fifth Amendment contains both a guarantee of grand jury proceedings and a guarantee of due process, the latter cannot embrace the former.

In re Neagle

Tue, 04 Mar 1890 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Restaurant in Train Station Lathrop, CA

United States

37° 49' 21.738" N, 121° 16' 35.796" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

1472

Petitioner

In re Neagle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1890)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1890)

Opinion

135 U.S. 1 (1890)

Argued

Tuesday, March 4, 1890

Decided

Monday, April 14, 1890

Facts of the Case

Suspecting a plot against Justice Stephen J. Field's life, the U.S. Attorney General appointed Neagle, a U.S. Marshall, to protect him. Acting as Field's bodyguard, Neagle shot and killed a man who appeared about to attack the justice. After California officials arrested and jailed Neagle, the U.S. sought his release by a writ of habeas corpus.

Question

Was the state obligated to obey the writ even though no national statute empowered the Attorney General to provide judges with bodyguards?

Conclusion

Yes. The Court held that the Attorney General acted appropriately since assigning Neagle as Field's bodyguard assured that the nation's laws would be faithfully executed. Furthermore, Neagle's actions were consistent with a congressional statute which provided U.S. Marshalls with "the same powers, in executing the laws" as state sheriffs and deputies (who would have been allowed to deter an attack on Field's life).

Chicago, Minn. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota

Mon, 13 Jan 1890 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

762

Petitioner

Chicago, Minn. & St. Paul Ry. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Minnesota

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1890)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1890)

Opinion

134 U.S. 418 (1890)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 1890

Decided

Monday, March 24, 1890

Facts of the Case

A Minnesota law made its railroad commission the final judge of the reasonableness of railroad rates. The railroad maintained that "it is always a judicial question as to whether a statute is repugnant to provisions of the constitution."

Question

Does the Minnesota law violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. The statute did not provide procedural due process: railroads received no hearing or other chance to defend their rates before the commission. Moreover, a rate's reasonableness "is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination." A company denied the authority to charge a reasonable rate and unable to turn to a judicial mechanism for review would be deprived of the "lawful use of its property, and, thus, in substance, and effect, of the property without due process of law."

Dred Scott v. Sandford

Mon, 11 Feb 1856 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Fort Snelling

200 Tower Avenue St. Paul MN 55111

St. Paul, MN 55111

United States

44° 52' 35.1696" N, 93° 10' 58.7532" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Dred Scott

Respondent

Sandford

Heard By

Taney Court (1853-1857)

Decided By

Taney Court (1853-1857)

Opinion

60 U.S. 393 (1857)

Argued

February 11-14, 1856

Reargued:

December 15-18, 1856

Decided

Friday, March 6, 1857

Facts of the Case

Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.

Question

Was Dred Scott free or slave?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Sandford, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend. 5; Missouri Compromise

Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all.

Cummings v. Missouri

Thu, 15 Mar 1866 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Cummings

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Missouri

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Chase Court (1865-1867)

Decided By

Chase Court (1865-1867)

Opinion

71 U.S. 277 (1867)

Argued

Thursday, March 15, 1866

Decided

Monday, January 14, 1867

Facts of the Case

Following the Civil War, Congress and Missouri adopted provisions that required persons in specified professional occupations to take an oath that they have never given aid to the rebellion and secession. Missouri convicted a priest who refused to take the oath. A former Confederate congressman asked the Supreme Court for permission to practice without taking the federal oath.

Question

Do the state and national oaths violate prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Field, writing for a divided Court, held that both state and national oath laws were unconstitutional. The oath laws transformed acts that had not been forbidden into crimes and increased the punishment of acts that were known to be crimes. The oath laws were also bills of attainder since they were legislative acts that inflicted punishment without the benefit of a trial by a judge.

Mississippi v. Johnson

Fri, 12 Apr 1867 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Mississippi

Respondent

Johnson

Heard By

Chase Court (1865-1867)

Decided By

Chase Court (1865-1867)

Opinion

71 U.S. 475 (1867)

Argued

Friday, April 12, 1867

Decided

Monday, April 15, 1867

Facts of the Case

In 1867, Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts. Although President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Acts, Congress overrode the veto. In an attempt to delay or prevent Reconstruction, the state of Mississippi appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Mississippi asked the Court for an injunction preventing the President from enforcing the Acts on the ground that they were unconstitutional.

Question

Could the Supreme Court constitutionally issue an injunction directed against the President?

Conclusion

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that it had "no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties...." The Court held that the duties of the President as required by the Reconstruction Acts were "in no sense ministerial," and that a judicial attempt to interfere with the performance of such duties would be "an absurd and excessive extravagance." The Court noted that if the President chose to ignore the injunction, the judiciary would be unable to enforce the order.

Champion v. Ames

Wed, 27 Feb 1901 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Champion

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ames

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1898-1902)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1902-1903)

Opinion

188 U.S. 321 (1903)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 1901

Reargued:

Wednesday, October 16, 1901

Decided

Monday, February 23, 1903

Facts of the Case

The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of 1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines.

Question

Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce" that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders.

Ex parte Milligan

Mon, 05 Mar 1866 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Military Commission at United States Court House in Indianapolis

IN" 46 East Ohio Street Indianapolis IN

46 East Ohio Street IN

United States

56° 0' 0" S, 39° 46' 14.1096" E

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Ex parte Milligan

Heard By

Chase Court (1865-1867)

Decided By

Chase Court (1865-1867)

Opinion

71 U.S. 2 (1866)

Argued

Monday, March 5, 1866

Decided

Tuesday, April 3, 1866

Facts of the Case

Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War; he had engaged in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.

Question

Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Milligan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend 5

Davis, speaking for the Court, held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are unconstitutional. Martial law cannot exist where the civil courts are operating.

The Prize Cases

Tue, 10 Feb 1863 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

The Prize Cases

Heard By

Taney Court (1862-1863)

Decided By

Taney Court (1862-1863)

Opinion

67 U.S. 635 (1863)

Argued

Tuesday, February 10, 1863

Decided

Tuesday, March 10, 1863

Facts of the Case

Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports in April 1861. Congress authorized him to declare a state of insurrection by the Act of July 13, 1861. By the Act of August 6, 1861, Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. These cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13, 1861.

Question

Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he ordered the seizures absent a declaration of war?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Art 2

The President had the power to act. A state of civil war existed de facto after the firing on Fort Sumter (April 12, 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact into account. Though neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a state of the Union, when states waged war against the United States government, the President was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself,without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name."

The Civil Rights Cases

Thu, 29 Mar 1883 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

The Civil Rights Cases

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

109 U.S. 3 (1883)

Argued

Thursday, March 29, 1883

Decided

Monday, October 15, 1883

Facts of the Case

The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.

Question

Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violate the 10th Amendment of the Constitution which reserves all powers not granted to the national government to the states or to the people?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for , 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1875; US Const. Amend 13 and 14

The Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action. And the fifth section of the Amendment empowers Congress only to enforce the prohibition on state action. The amendment did not authorize national legislation on subjects which are within the domain of the state. Private acts of racial discrimination were simply private wrongs that the national government was powerless to correct.

United States v. Harris

Thu, 17 May 2012 21:58:57 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

106 U.S. 629 (1883)

Decided

Monday, January 22, 1883

Facts of the Case

Harris led an armed lynch mob into a Tennessee jail and captured four black prisoners. Though the deputy sheriff attempted to protect the prisoners, he was unsuccessful. One of the prisoners died. The United States government brought criminal charges against Sheriff Harris and others under Section 2 of the Force Act of 1871. This act made it a crime for two or more persons to conspire for the purpose of depriving anyone of the equal protection of the laws.

Question

Could the United States try Harris and others under the act?

Conclusion

The Force Act was unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment only authorized Congress to take remedial steps against state action that violated the amendment. The Amendment applied only to acts of the states, not to acts of individuals.

Mugler v. Kansas

Tue, 11 Oct 1887 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Petitioner

Mugler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kansas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1887-1888)

Decided By

Waite Court (1887-1888)

Opinion

123 U.S. 623 (1887)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1887

Decided

Monday, December 5, 1887

Facts of the Case

A Kansas law prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Mugler was arrested for making and selling beer. This case was decided together with Kansas v. Ziebold.

Question

Does the Kansas law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

According to Harlan, the Kansas prohibition does not infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights. Though Mugler has an abstract right to make liquor for his own use, such a right could be conditioned on its effect on others. Here the state legislature may exercise its police powers.

Kidd v. Pearson

Wed, 04 Apr 1888 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

779

Petitioner

Kidd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pearson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1888)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1888-1889)

Opinion

128 U.S. 1 (1888)

Argued

Wednesday, April 4, 1888

Decided

Monday, October 22, 1888

Facts of the Case

A state law made the manufacture of liquor in the state illegal, even when the liquor was for sale and consumption out-of-state.

Question

Was the state law in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce?

Conclusion

There is no conflict and the state law is valid. The Court erected a distinction between manufacture and commerce. The state law regulated manufacturing only. The justices feared that a broad view of commerce that would embrace manufacturing would also embrace the power to regulate "every branch of human industry." The distinction proved untenable but it took nearly a half-century to erase its pernicious consequences.

Munn v. Illinois

Fri, 14 Jan 1876 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Illinois General Assembly

S 2nd Street and E Capitol Avenue Springfield IL 62701

Springfield, IL 62701

United States

39° 47' 53.9124" N, 89° 38' 52.638" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Munn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1874-1877)

Decided By

Waite Court (1874-1877)

Opinion

94 U.S. 113 (1877)

Argued

Friday, January 14, 1876

Decided

Thursday, March 1, 1877

Facts of the Case

Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.

Question

Did the state-imposed rates deny the warehouse and elevator owners equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Illinois, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Illinois Warehouse Act of 1871; US Constitution, 14th Amendment

No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property "when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."

Plumley v. Massachusetts

Thu, 05 Apr 1894 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

406

Petitioner

Plumley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Massachusetts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1894-1895)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1894-1895)

Opinion

155 U.S. 461 (1894)

Argued

Thursday, April 5, 1894

Decided

Monday, December 10, 1894

Facts of the Case

Plumley was convicted of violating a 1891 Massachusetts law which banned the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine colored yellow to look like yellow butter produced from pure milk.

Question

Did the act violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

No. The Court held that the statute did not interfere with interstate commerce but served the important function of protecting the people of Massachusetts "against fraud and deception in the sale of food products." The law did not prohibit the sale of oleomargarine, just those forms of it which were colored to look like natural butter.

The Collector v. Day

Fri, 03 Feb 1871 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

The Collector

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Day

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Chase Court (1870-1872)

Decided By

Chase Court (1870-1872)

Opinion

78 U.S. 113 (1871)

Argued

Friday, February 3, 1871

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1871

Facts of the Case

In 1864, Congress created a tax on incomes over $1,000. The Congress maintained the tax for the next three years. J.M. Day, a state judge in Massachusetts, protested the tax and filed suit against the revenue service.

Question

Did Congress have the power to impose taxes on the states and state officials?

Conclusion

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the taxing power of the national government could not be used to interfere with the essential workings of state governments. The Court reasoned that the states and the "general government" were two distinct entities, and that the states' right to establish judicial departments could not be infringed. The national government could not tax the "means and instrumentalities" of state self-preservation.

Plessy v. Ferguson

Mon, 13 Apr 1896 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Former Louisiana State Capitol Building

100 North Blvd. Baton Rouge LA 70801

Baton Rouge, LA 70801

United States

30° 26' 49.2" N, 91° 11' 24" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

210

Petitioner

Plessy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ferguson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Opinion

163 U.S. 537 (1896)

Argued

Monday, April 13, 1896

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1896

Facts of the Case

The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.

Question

Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ferguson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend 14, Section 1

No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.

Wong Wing v. United States

Wed, 01 Apr 1896 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

204

Petitioner

Wong Wing

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Opinion

163 U.S. 228 (1896)

Argued

Wednesday, April 1, 1896

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1896

Facts of the Case

The Chinese Exclusion Act imposed imprisonment at hard labor and deportation to Chinese persons convicted of unlawful entry to or presence in the United States. Wong Wing was charged under the Act. A commissioner of the Circuit Court (who was not a judge) found that Wong Wing was an unlawful alien and sentenced him to 60 days at hard labor followed by deportation to China. Wong Wing sought a writ of habeas corpus, but it was denied. He appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Does penalty of imprisonment at hard labor and deportation without a jury trial constitute a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Conclusion

Yes; consequently, the imprisonment provisions of the Act are void. Congress may deport without a jury trial, but imprisonment at hard labor is an infamous offense calling for judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused. "It is not consistent with our theory of government that the legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt and adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents."

Strauder v. West Virginia

Tue, 21 Oct 1879 13:00:00 +0000

Location

West Virginia General Assembly

16th and Market Street Wheeling WV 26003

Wheeling, WV 26003

United States

40° 3' 50.1444" N, 80° 43' 19.146" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Strauder

Respondent

West Virginia

Heard By

Waite Court (1877-1880)

Decided By

Waite Court (1877-1880)

Opinion

100 U.S. 303 (1880)

Argued

Tuesday, October 21, 1879

Decided

Monday, March 1, 1880

Facts of the Case

A West Virginia law declared that only whites may serve on juries.

Question

Does the state law barring blacks from jury service violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. Strong, writing for the majority, declared that to deny citizen participation in the administration of justice solely on racial grounds "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."

Stone v. Mississippi

Thu, 04 Mar 1880 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society Warren County, MS

United States

32° 23' 56.2092" N, 90° 47' 28.7628" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Stone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1877-1880)

Decided By

Waite Court (1877-1880)

Opinion

101 U.S. 814 (1880)

Argued

Thursday, March 4, 1880

Decided

Monday, May 10, 1880

Facts of the Case

In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered to run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the Society were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they were protected by the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement legislation had repealed the grant.

Question

Did Mississippi violate the Contract Clause by repealing the Society's grant?

Conclusion

A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts was valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of the people and future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to bargain away the public health and morals. The Court viewed the lottery as a vice that threatened the public health and morals. The contracts protected in the Constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of the governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be revoked by the will of the people.

The Slaughterhouse Cases

Mon, 03 Feb 1873 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Former Louisiana State Capitol Building

100 North Blvd. Baton Rouge LA 70801

Baton Rouge, LA 70801

United States

30° 26' 49.4232" N, 91° 11' 24.5184" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

The Slaughterhouse Cases

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Chase Court (1873)

Decided By

Chase Court (1873)

Opinion

83 U.S. 36 (1873)

Argued

Monday, February 3, 1873

Decided

Monday, April 14, 1873

Facts of the Case

Louisiana had created a partial monopoly of the slaughtering business and gave it to one company. Competitors argued that this created "involuntary servitude," abridged "privileges and immunities," denied "equal protection of the laws," and deprived them of "liberty and property without due process of law."

Question

Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for , 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: US Const. Amend. 13, 14, 15

No. The involuntary servitude claim did not forbid limits on the right to use one's property. The equal protection claim was misplaced since it was established to void laws discriminating against blacks. The due process claim simply imposes the identical requirements on the states as the fifth amendment imposes on the national government. The Court devoted most of its opinion to a narrow construction of the privileges and immunities clause, which was interpreted to apply to national citizenship, not state citizenship.

Bradwell v. Illinois

Sat, 18 Jan 1873 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Illinois Supreme Court

200 E. Capitol Springfield IL 62701

Springfield, IL 62701

United States

39° 47' 54.2112" N, 89° 39' 12.0852" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Bradwell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Chase Court (1873)

Decided By

Chase Court (1873)

Opinion

83 U.S. 130 (1873)

Argued

Saturday, January 18, 1873

Decided

Tuesday, April 15, 1873

Facts of the Case

Myra Bradwell asserted her right to a license to practice law in Illinois by virtue of her status as a United States citizen. The judges of the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application with only one judge dissenting.

Question

Is the right to obtain a license to practice law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to all citizens of the United States?

Conclusion

No. While the Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and immunities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the right to practice law in a state's courts is one of them. There was no agreement, argued Justice Miller, that this right depended on citizenship. In his concurrence, Justice Bradley went above and beyond the constitutional explanations of the case to describe the reasons why it was natural and proper for women to be excluded from the legal profession. He cited the importance of maintaining the "respective spheres of man and woman," with women performing the duties of motherhood and wife in accordance with the "law of the Creator."

Ableman v. Booth

jgoldman — Wed, 19 Jan 1859 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Wisconsin Supreme Court

110 E Main St Madison WI 53703

Madison, WI 53703

United States

43° 4' 29.0352" N, 89° 22' 54.9012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Plaintiff in error

Stephen V. R. Ableman

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff In Error

Defendant in error

Sherman Booth

Respondent Type

Defendant In Error

Consolidation

United States v. Booth

Heard By

Taney Court (1858-1860)

Decided By

Taney Court (1858-1860)

Opinion

62 U.S. 506 (1859)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 1859

Decided

Monday, March 7, 1859

Advocates

Jeremiah S. Black (Attorney General of the United States, argued the cause for the plaintiffs in error)

Facts of the Case

Sherman Booth petitioned a local court judge for the release of Joshua Glover, a runaway slave held in federal custody in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Though the federal authorities did not accept the judge's order, a mob eventually freed Glover. Booth was charged with aiding the escape of a runaway slave in violation of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Booth then successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for his release, through a writ of habeas corpus. Booth was then convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin and detained again. Booth again petitioned the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for his release, alleging that the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional and that the Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction. Booth was again released by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Did the Supreme Court of Wisconsin have the authority to issue the writs of habeas corpus that released Booth?

Conclusion

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, the Court asserted the supremacy of federal courts on issues of federal law. The Court dismissed Wisconsin's claim of judicial power, since "it certainly has not been conferred on them by the United States; and it is equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it." Chief Justice Taney relied on the Constitution in that it is "the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby." While the state courts of Wisconsin certainly did have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to cases where the prisoner was held by the state of Wisconsin, the authority did not extend to prisoners held by the federal government.

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago

jgoldman — Fri, 06 Nov 1896 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Company

Rockwell and 18th Sts Chicago IL 60608

Chicago, IL 60608

United States

41° 51' 26.5608" N, 87° 41' 26.2932" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

129

Petitioner

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Chicago

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1896-1897)

Opinion

166 U.S. 226 (1897)

Argued

Friday, November 6, 1896, Monday, November 9, 1896

Decided

Monday, March 1, 1897

Advocates

John J. Herrick (for the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company)

E. E. Osborne (for the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company)

John S. Miller (for the City of Chicago)

Facts of the Case

The City of Chicago wanted to connect two disjoint sections of Rockwell Street between 18th and 19th Streets, over private property. This property was owned by various individuals but also included a right-of-way owned by the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Corporation. To accomplish this, the city petitioned in Cook County Circuit Court to have the necessary land condemned. The land was condemned. The individuals were awarded compensation, while the railroad was awarded just one dollar. The railroad appealed the judgment, alleging that the condemnation deprived it of its property in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment.

Question

Did Chicago's condemnation of and compensation for Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad's land violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a 7-1 decision, the Court held that the Due Process clause required the states to award just compensation when taking private property for public use. While the Court warned of the danger of a government that did not have any restraints in exercising eminent domain, fair compensation could address that danger. Since the procedures specified in Illinois' general statutes were followed in this case, the railroad's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated. [This case marked the first time that the Court 'incorporated' a specific provision of the Bill of Rights – the "just compensation" requirement of the Fifth Amendment – through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applied that requirement to the states. This approach set the stage for further incorporation of other Bill of Rights provisions.]

Davis v. Beason

jgoldman — Mon, 09 Dec 1889 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Samaria Village Election Precinct Samaria, ID

United States

42° 7' 4.0008" N, 112° 20' 9.9996" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

1261

Appellant

Samuel D. Davis

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Respondent

Beason

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1889-1890)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1889-1890)

Opinion

133 U.S. 333 (1890)

Argued

December 9-10, 1889

Decided

Monday, February 3, 1890

Advocates

F. S. Richards (argued the cause for the appellant)

S. Shellabarger (argued the cause for the appellant)

J. M. Wilson (argued the cause for the appellant)

H. W. Smith (argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

An Idaho Territory statute required voters swear an oath stating that they were neither a polygamist nor were they a member of any organization that promoted polygamy. In April 1889, Samuel D. Davis, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, whose members often practiced and advocated polygamy, was indicted for falsely swearing the oath prior to the 1888 election. Davis was convicted and sentenced to pay of fine of $500 and serve 250 days in county jail. On the same day as his conviction, Davis obtained a writ of habeas corpus, accusing the county sheriff of imprisoning him illegally. Davis claimed that requiring the oath violated his right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The federal territorial court denied Davis' claim.

Question

Did requiring Davis swear an oath that he was not a member of an organization that promoted polygamy violate Davis' rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen J. Field, the Court rejected the notion that polygamy was a meaningful tenet of a religion, and thus rejected Davis' claim to First Amendment protections. In his opinion, Justice Field condemned the practices of polygamy and bigamy, saying, "To extend exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the community. To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind." The opinion goes on to note that "religion," in the context of the First Amendment, refers primarily to "one's views of his relations to his Creator" and "modes of worship" and is not intended to be "invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society."

Davis v. Massachusetts

jgoldman — Fri, 26 Mar 1897 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Boston Commons

16 Common St Boston MA 02129

Boston, MA 02129

United States

42° 22' 27.48" N, 71° 3' 36.36" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

229

Petitioner

William F. Davis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Massachusetts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Fuller Court (1897-1898)

Decided By

Fuller Court (1897-1898)

Opinion

167 U.S. 43 (1897)

Argued

Friday, March 26, 1897

Decided

Monday, May 10, 1897

Advocates

James F. Pickering (argued the cause for the plaintiff in error)

Hosea M. Knowlton (Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for the defendant in error)

Facts of the Case

An ordinance in the City of Boston prohibited any person from making "any public address" on public grounds without permission of the mayor. In 1894, Rev. William F. Davis attempted to preach in Boston Commons, a public park. Davis was arrested, fined, and jailed for violating the ordinance. Davis appealed his conviction, arguing, in part, that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause's protection of property entailed a right to access public property. On appeal, in an opinion authored by future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rejected Davis' contention and denied his claim.

Question

Did Davis' arrest for violating the city ordinance banning addresses on public property violate his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property?

Conclusion

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Edward D. White, the Court found the law did not contain "any proof whatever as to the nature of the ownership in the common from which it can be deduced that the plaintiff…had any particular right to use the common apart from the general enjoyment." The Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the legislature and the state had the power to exercise authority over public property, the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding. "The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not destroy the power of the states to enact police regulations as to the subjects within their control."

Ex parte Crow Dog

jgoldman — Mon, 26 Nov 1883 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Great Sioux Reservation SD

United States

44° 31' 12" N, 101° 59' 9.96" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Crow Dog

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

109 U.S. 556 (1883)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 1883

Decided

Monday, December 17, 1883

Advocates

A. J. Plowman (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Samuel F. Phillips (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

In August, 1881, a Native American named Kan-gi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog, in English) shot and killed another Native American on the Great Sioux Reservation in present-day South Dakota. The Sioux tribal government convicted Crow Dog and, applying traditional Sioux law, ordered him to pay restitution to the victim's family. The government of the Dakota Territory also charged Crow Dog with murder, and, after being found guilty, Crow Dog was sentenced to death. Crow Dog appealed for a writ of habeas corpus, and argued that the federal court lacked jurisdiction, pointing to an 1834 act that specifically excluded crimes committed by one Native American on another from federal jurisdiction. The government argued that an 1868 treaty with the Sioux that required the tribe surrender criminals to United States superseded the earlier statute.

Question

Did federal law grant the Dakota Territory court jurisdiction over the murder for which Crow Dog was convicted?

Conclusion

No. In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Stanley Matthews, the Court concluded that Congress had not granted federal courts jurisdiction over the murder of one Native American by another. The Court interpreted the 1868 treaty's stipulation that criminals be surrendered to the federal government in context, and, given that the treaty was made between two parties, "the party of whites and their allies" and "tribe of Indians," concluded the provision did not conflict with or repeal the 1834 law. Justice Matthews' opinion goes on to note that, while the law is clearly conflicted on the question because the 1834 law was never expressly repealed, there was no "positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new laws and those of the old" that would entail an implied repeal.

Ex parte Yarbrough

jgoldman — Wed, 23 Jan 1884 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

Dilmus, James, Jasper, and Neal Yarbrough

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

110 U.S. 651 (1884)

Argued

January 23-24, 1884

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1884

Facts of the Case

The Enforcement Act of 1870, which targeted the violence caused by the Ku Klux Klan in the post-Civil War South, prohibited the use of violence or intimidation to prevent African-Americans from voting. In 1883, eight Georgia men, including Dilmus, James, Jasper, and Neal Yarbrough, were charged under the Enforcement Act with intimidating Berry Saunders, an African-American, to prevent him from voting in the 1882 congressional election. The eight were convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. Following their conviction, the eight men filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that Congress had no authority to pass the Enforcement Act.

Question

Did Congress have the authority to pass the Enforcement Act of 1870?

Conclusion

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, the Court concluded that the federal government "must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption." After noting that the implied powers of the Constitution are "as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed," Justice Miller wrote that the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, in conjunction with Article I, Section 4, which provides that "Congress may at any time make or alter" regulations regarding the "times, places, and manner of holding elections," granted Congress the necessary authority to pass the Enforcement Act. Additionally, the Court found additional defense of Congress' authority in the enforcement provision of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court determined that "this fifteenth article of amendment does…substantially confer on the negro the right to vote, and Congress has the power to protect and enforce that right."

Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.

jgoldman — Wed, 30 Jan 1856 13:00:00 +0000

Location

US District Court for the District of New Jersey

50 Walnut Street Newark NJ 07101

Newark, NJ 07101

United States

40° 43' 47.3052" N, 74° 10' 20.2764" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Petitioner

John Den, ex dem. James B. Murray and John C. Kayser

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

John Den, ex dem. James B. Murray et al. v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.

John Den, ex dem. William P. Rathbone et al. Rutsen Suckley et al.

Heard By

Taney Court (1853-1857)

Decided By

Taney Court (1853-1857)

Opinion

59 U.S. 272 (1856)

Argued

January 30-February 1, 1856, Monday, February 4, 1856

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1856

Facts of the Case

While working as a customs collector for the federal government, Samuel Swartwout embezzled more than $1 billion. He used this money to purchase land in New Jersey. In accordance with an act passed in 1820, the Treasury Department issued a warrant of distress against Swartwout. This voided his purchase of land and provided for the seizure of the money he embezzled. Swartwout argued that the 1820 Act violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law since it authorized a non-judicial procedure to remove property. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to resolve conflicting opinions of judges on the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.

Question

Does the federal government violate the due process of law guarantee of the Fifth Amendment by recovering funds embezzled from it through nonjudicial procedures?

Conclusion

No. Justice Benjamin R. Curtis delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court found that "due process of law" meant that all citizens be tried "by the law of the land," a concept established by the Magna Carta. When issuing the warrant, the Treasury Department properly applied the 1820 Act, which was part of the "law of the land." Since the "constitution contains no description of those processes which it [the due process clause] was intended to allow or forbid," the Court examined traditions of common law to find whether nonjudicial warrants had a precedential basis. It found that they did, and did not find a constitutional provision prohibiting their use. Therefore, the Court concluded the Act conformed with the federal government's "power to collect and disburse revenue," which "includes all known and appropriate means of effectually collecting and disbursing that revenue." If a recipient disputes the sum he owes, he may rely upon his procedural right to petition a district court to consider "whether he is indebted as recited in the warrant."

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company

jgoldman — Tue, 26 Jan 1886 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Southern Pacific Railroad Co. headquarters San Francisco, CA

United States

37° 46' 29.748" N, 122° 25' 9.8976" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Plaintiff in error

Santa Clara County

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff In Error

Defendant in error

Southern Pacific Railroad Company et al.

Respondent Type

Defendant In Error

Consolidation

People of the State of California v. Central Pacific Railroad Company

People of the State of California v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company

Opinion

118 U.S. 394 (1886)

Argued

January 26-29, 1886

Decided

Monday, May 10, 1886

Advocates

E. C. Marshall (Attorney General of California, argued the cause for the plaintiffs in error)

S. W. Sanderson (argued the cause for the defendants in error)

George F. Edmunds (argued the cause for the defendants in error)

William M. Evarts (argued the cause for the defendants in error)

Facts of the Case

The state of California taxed fences owned by Southern Pacific Railway Company, but Southern Pacific asserted that the state constitution only allowed taxes on "the franchise, roadway roadbed, rails, and rolling stock." Southern Pacific also claimed that state tax board did not properly subtract its outstanding mortgages from the value of its property. Southern Pacific refused to pay taxes on its fences and the difference account for by subtracting outstanding mortgages. Santa Clara County brought action against it in a state court. The county argued that since it could tax the land which situated the fences, it could also tax the additional value of the land added by the fences. Southern Pacific had the action moved to a federal district court, which ruled that the state did not have jurisdiction to tax fences. The county appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Did the California constitution allow the state to increase property taxes against railroad companies when the companies added additional value to the property by building fences? Did the state tax board wrongfully tax property without deducting for the outstanding mortgages against the property owners?

Conclusion

No and Yes. Justice John Marshall Harlan delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The state tax board tried to levy a single sum against the railway company which both wrongfully included the value of the fences and excluded a deduction for the outstanding mortgages. The state tax board increased taxes on the property based on a arbitrary measure of the value added by the fences. The state constitution required the state and its counties to separately assess the "land, and improvements thereon" before increasing taxes. A state statute specified fences as a form of land improvement. The decision famously implied that equal protection laws provided by the Fourteenth Amendment applied to corporations, but the opinion did not explicitly state this.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins

jgoldman — Thu, 17 May 2012 21:58:58 +0000

Location

A laundry business

2245 Jones Street San Francisco CA 94133

San Francisco, CA 94133

United States

37° 48' 7.2" N, 122° 24' 58.5936" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Plaintiff in error

Yick Wo

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff In Error

Defendant in error

Hopkins, Sheriff

Respondent Type

Defendant In Error

Consolidation

Wo Lee v. Hopkins

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

118 U.S. 356 (1886)

Decided

Monday, May 10, 1886

Facts of the Case

An 1880 ordinance of the city of San Francisco required all laundries in wooden buildings to hold a permit issued by the city's Board of Supervisors. The board had total discretion over who would be issued a permit. Although workers of Chinese descent operated 89 percent of the city's laundry businesses, not a single Chinese owner was granted a permit. Yick Wo and Wo Lee each operated laundry businesses without a permit and, after refusing to pay a $10 fine, were imprisoned by the city's sheriff, Peter Hopkins. Each sued for writ of habeas corpus, arguing the fine and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting that, on its face, the law is nondiscriminatory, the Supreme Court of California and the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California denied claims for Yick Wo and Wo Lee, respectively.

Question

Did the unequal enforcement of the city ordinance violate Yick Wo and Wo Lee's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice T. Stanley Matthews, the Court concluded that, despite the impartial wording of the law, its biased enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause. According to the Court, even if the law is impartial on its face, "if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." The kind of biased enforcement experienced by the plaintiffs, the Court concluded, amounted to "a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the law" and therefore violated the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.

United States v. Reese

jgoldman — Wed, 13 Jan 1875 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Lexington City Council Lexington, KY

United States

38° 2' 51.72" N, 84° 29' 55.68" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Plaintiff in error

United States

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff In Error

Defendant in error

Hiram Reese and Matthew Foushee

Respondent Type

Defendant In Error

Heard By

Waite Court (1874-1877)

Decided By

Waite Court (1874-1877)

Opinion

92 U.S. 214 (1876)

Argued

January 13-14, 1875

Decided

Monday, March 27, 1876

Advocates

George Henry Williams (Attorney General of the United States, argued the cause for the United States)

Samuel F. Phillips (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Henry Stanbery (argued the cause for the defendants in error)

B. F. Buckner (argued the cause for the defendants in error)

Facts of the Case

In January 1873, two election inspectors, Hiram Reese and Matthew Foushee, refused to allow William Garner, an African-American, to vote in a municipal election in Lexington, Kentucky. Reese and Foushee claimed Garner had failed to pay a tax of $1.50, but Garner had attempted to pay the tax and was refused by a tax collector. The Enforcement Act of 1870, which defined penalties associated with violations of voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment, stipulated that if an official refused to permit a citizen to perform an action required for voting, the citizen could present an affidavit that would qualify him. Reese and Foushee refused to accept Garner's affidavit. Reese and Foushee were charged with violating the Enforcement Act. On appeal, the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky found the relevant sections of the Enforcement Act too broad, exceeding the bounds of the Fifteenth Amendment, and dismissed the indictments.

Question

Was the Enforcement Act of 1870 a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

No. In an 8-1 decision authored by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, the Court concluded that the relevant sections of the Enforcement Act lacked the necessary, limiting language to qualify as enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Chief Justice first stated that the Fifteenth Amendment "does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one," but "prevents the States, or the United States, however, from giving preference…to one citizen of the United States over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." In examining the language of the Enforcement Act, the Court noted that, while the first two sections of the act explicitly referred to race in criminalizing interference with the right to vote, the relevant third and fourth sections refer only to the "aforesaid" offense. According to the Court, this language does not sufficiently tailor the law to qualify as "appropriate legislation" under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.

United States v. Kagama

jgoldman — Tue, 02 Mar 1886 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation Hoopa, CA

United States

41° 7' 26.4" N, 123° 41' 0.96" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Plaintiff in error

United States

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff In Error

Defendant in error

Kagama

Respondent Type

Defendant In Error

Heard By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Decided By

Waite Court (1882-1887)

Opinion

118 U.S. 375 (1886)

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 1886

Decided

Monday, May 10, 1886

Advocates

John Goode (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Joseph D. Redding (argued the cause for the defendants in error)

Facts of the Case

In response to the Court's ruling in Ex Parte Crowe Dog (1883), Congress passed the Major Crimes Act as part of the Indian Appropriations Act of 1885, which granted the federal courts jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by one Native American against another. In June 1885, Kagama, a Native American, was tried for the murder of Iyouse, another Native American, on the Hoopa Valley reservation in California. At trial, Kagama challenged the court's jurisdiction over the matter, arguing that the relevant section of the Indian Appropriations Act was unconstitutional. On appeal, Kagama received a division of opinion from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

Question

Does any part of the Constitution grant Congress the power over the jurisdiction of crimes committed by one Native American against another?

Conclusion

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel F. Miller, the Court acknowledged, "The Constitution of the United States is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government which was established by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within its borders." Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that, because the tribal governments "owe all their powers to the statutes of the United States conferring on them the powers which they exercise, and which are liable to be withdrawn, modified, or repealed at any time by Congress," the legislature could therefore control jurisdiction of crimes committed within reservations. Describing Native Americans as "wards of the nation," the Court concluded, "From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power."